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Abstract
Despite its name, "information processing" psychology has become gradually divorced from
the mathematical theory of information. However, Dretske (1981) has proposed that infor¬
mation theoretic ideas can be extended to generate notions of information content and
semantic content which may be applied to the analysis of perceptual and cognitive activity,
and which found a theory of propositional attitudes. In this thesis, I shall argue Dretske's
account is only tenuously related to its supposed information-theoretic basis, and that a
misunderstanding of the relationship between the two has generated a number of crucial
flaws in Dretske's analysis. A revised account, formalised in terms of propositional logic, is
presented. The revised analysis embodies the claim that informational properties cannot be
ascribed absolutely, but are necessarily relative to the informational idealisation chosen. I
argue that Dretske's failure to recognise "idealisation relativity" has serious ramifications
for the application of informational ideas to information processing in general, and mental
activity in particular. For example, by varying the informational idealisation adopted, the
distinction between perception and cognition can be manipulated almost arbitrarily. Build¬
ing on Dretske's analog-digital distinction, I propose that information processing may quite
generally be seen as a matter of transforming information from unusable (inexplicit) form,
to usable (explicit) form. Two important difficulties with applying informational ideas to




0.1 Information and Psychology 1
0.2 Information and Representation 4
0.3 An Introduction to Information Theory 9
Chapter 1: Information Content
1.1 Dretske on Information Content 17
1.2 Breaking the Restriction to Contents of the form 5 is F 21
1.3 Sources and Objects; States and Properties 24
1.4 De Re and De Dicto 29
1.5 Multiple Information Contents and Nested Information 31
1.6 Relativity to Knowledge: the Parenthetical k 33
1.7 Information and the Real World 38
1.8 Propositions and States 42
1.9 The Problem of Probabilistic Contents 46
Chapter 2: A Propositional Account of Information Content
2.1 Introduction 50
2.2 Does Information Content Need Information Theory? I 51
2.3 Does Information Content Need Information Theory? II 53
2.4 Informational Systems: A Propositional Approach 54
2.5 Specifying an Informational Idealisation 56
2.6 Change and Information Flow 59
2.7 Summary 64
Chapter 3: The Analog-Digital Distinction
3.1 Traditional Accounts of the Analog-Digital Distinction 66
3.2 From General Laws to Specific Instances 72
3.3 Digitalisation, Complete Digitalisation and Semantic Content 74
3.4 Pictures and Utterances 79
3.5 Difficulties with "Aboutness" 84
3.6 The Analog-Digital Distinction and Idealisation Dependence ' 88
3.7 Formalising the Analog-Digital Distinction 90
3.8 Summary 105
Chapter 4 Information Processing and Psychology
4.1 Introduction 106
4.2 Is Information Processing Necessary? 107
4.3 Information Processing and Information Reduction 112
4.4 Digitalisation and Behaviour 116
4.5 Information Processing as Digitalisation 119
4.6 Digitalisation and Behaviour (Again) 124
4.7 Dretske on Perception, Cognition and the Analog-Digital Distinction 126
4.8 Perception and Cognition 128
4.9 Is Analog-Digital Conversion Ubiquitous? 132
4.10 Digitalisation and the "Right Kind" of Information 135
4.11 Idealisation Relativity 137
4.12 Strange Idealisations and Strange Consequences 141
Chapter 5 Making Information Explicit
5.1 Introduction 144
-v-
5.2 Gibson's Problem: What Does Information Processing Achieve? 146
5.3 Dretske on the Role of Causality 147
5.4 Process Relativity 148
5.5 Information Processing as Making Information Explicit 150
5.6 Dretske on Belief 153
5.7 Conclusions 155
Chapter 6 Information and Folk Psychology
6.1 Introduction 156
6.2 Information and Psychology 157
6.3 Information and the Reconstruction of Folk Psychology 158
6.4 The Detectability Problem: Digitalisation is too Hard 161
6.5 The Misrepresentation Problem: arrying Information is too Hard 167
6.6 Facing Detectability and Misrepresentation 171
6.7 Dretske on Misattunement 172
6.8 Prescriptive Informational Idealisation 175




0.1 Information and Psychology
It is perhaps ironic that the rise of information processing psychology since the 1960's has
been concurrent with a decline in the interest in the use of methods from information
theory in psychology. The pioneering work of Shannon and Weaver (1949), which prom¬
ised to be a major theoretical tool of the cognitive approach (e.g. Attneave, 1959), has fal¬
len out of fashion in the "information processing school". The application of information-
theoretic measures to human performance spawned a wide variety of experimental investi¬
gations. In a typical experiments, subjects were asked to identify the position of a marker
which might appear at one of a number of locations on a continuous scale. As expected,
the greater the number of possible positions of the marker the harder identification became.
Interestingly, according to Shannon and Weaver's measure, the amount of information car¬
ried by the subject's judgement was roughly constant at around 3.0 - 3.2 bits, however
many positions the marker might take (Hake & Garner, 1951). In similar experiments, sub¬
jects were asked to identify each of a number of pure tones. Almost independently of the
range of frequencies of the tones, or their relative spacing, it was found that subjects were
able reliably identify each tone if the number of possible tones was 5 or below. This
corresponds to a limit of about 2.2 bits of information (Pollack, 1952).
Information theory was also used to explain differences in the way in which meaningful
and nonsense stimuli are processed and remembered. The crucial difference was identified
not as meaningfulness per se, but as the amount of redundancy in the stimulus, again meas¬
ured in bits of information. In a famous study of the effects of redundancy on memory for
more or less sentence-like lists of words, Miller & Selfridge (1950) conclude that "The
significant distinction is not to be drawn between meaning and nonsense but between
materials that utilize previous learning and permit positive transfer and materials that do
not. If the nonsense preserves the short range associations of the English language that are
so familiar to us, the nonsense is easy to learn". Further work (Merlis & Jacks, 1952),
using a slightly different recall procedure showed that meaningfulness of stimulus material,
over and above redundancy does seem to be important. Nonetheless, it seemed impressive
that the information-theoretic approach seemed able to make any contribution to the study
of linguistic meaning. However, the way Miller & Selfridge describe their results highlights
what came to be seen as the downfall of the application of information theory in psychol¬
ogy (Haber, 1974). Miller & Selfridge point out that what is crucial is not the redundancy
of the signal per se, but the degree to which that redundancy fits with "previous learning"
allowing "positive transfer". Processing appears not to be dependent purely on the informa¬
tional properties of the stimulus, but on the degree to which the subject is familiar with,
and has an understanding of, the relevant domain. For example, the processing of visually
presented letters is very different for subjects familiar with the relevant script, rather than
subjects who are not (and who appear to process the stimulus as a complex arrangement of
lines are curves). These differences have been consistently demonstrated in the perception
and reproduction of letter strings (Haber, 1974). Similarly, letter strings which constitute
words of a language are processed very differently from strings which do not, provided that
subjects are familiar with that language. It was considerations such as this that lead Miller
(1956) to postulate the cognitively defined notion of a "chunk" (which might correspond to
a letter, to a word, to a phrase), as an appropriate measure for the study of human informa¬
tion processing, rather than the information-theoretic "bit". The process of "chunking" came
to be seen as a matter of the internal symbolic description that a subject imposed on the
input. How the input is symbolically encoded is dependent on how the subject understands
that input, on what is known about the relevant domain. Information-theoretic measures
came to seem inappropriate since they did not seem to be able to take into account the role
of such knowledge (Laming, 1973; Haber, 1974). Haber puts the point succinctly.
"In retrospect, we can now see that the failure [of information theory in psychology] was
due to a specific problem in the definition of information... the [inability to capture the]
relativization of the amount of information in a signal to what the recipient of that signal
already knows about the signal and about the circumstances of its reception." (Haber,
1983:71)
Hence,
"...while it was generally easy to calculate the amount of information in a stimulus or in a
response, such calculations did not correlate with any interesting or relevant behaviour of
real perceivers, rememberers or thinkers." (Haber, 1983:71)
Rational reconstruction of the science is invariably speculative, but it is tempting to draw
out two additional theoretical reasons for the waning of enthusiasm among psychologists
for talk of information channels, bits per second, equivocal signals and so on.
Firstly, information theory provides a quantitative rather than a qualitative analysis of infor¬
mation bearing signals. It can measure how much information is carried by, for example,
the thermostat being on (given some idealisation of the states and associated probabilities
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involved), but gives no account of what information it conveys - perhaps that the room
temperature is below 20 °. Yet modern psychological theorizing is paradigmatically con¬
cerned with mental representation. The theorist is primarily interested in content, and this is
just what appears to be beyond the scope of information theoretic tools. Only in ecological
psychology has informal talk of information in something like an information theoretic
sense remained (and even here the relationship between the Gibsonian and information
theoretic notions is a matter of debate (Neisser, 1977; Hamlyn, 1977)). Yet ecological
psychologists have vociferously opposed the information processing approach and ques¬
tioned the necessity of postulating mental representations (Gibson, 1979). For the main¬
stream cognitive psychologist, theorizing in terms of contentful mental representations and
computational processes operating over them, information theoretic tools have little to offer.
A second reason for the downturn in psychological interest in information theoretic notions
is surely that there appeared to be an alternative and more powerful notion of content
which does provide an account of the content of informational signals. In logic, computer
science, and even in natural language semantics the tools of model theoretic denotational
semantics appeared to provide an admirably rigorous and precise account of the meaning of
complex symbolic structures. More generally, it seemed that appeal to content of mental
representations need no longer be considered unscientific. If talk of meaning is legitimate in
computer science, then surely it is legitimate in psychology. Such reasoning is particularly
persuasive since digital computers are often taken to be the paradigm example of informa¬
tion processing. After all, the age of information processing psychology is also the age of
the computer metaphor. If computer science is able to ignore information theory, then it is
natural to suppose that psychology may be able to do the same.
With the advent of the 1980's the notion of information has, however, had something of a
renaissance. There has been a growing dissatisfaction with the dominant paradigm in the
study of cognition. Firstly, standard semantic methods are only applicable to symbolic com¬
putation, whereas cognitive modeling has shifted focus to non-symbolic, and particularly
Connectionist, styles of computation. It may be that a very large part of human mental
activity should be viewed as non-symbolic rather than symbolic computation. Hence a
semantics which applies only to the latter may be unexpectedly limited in scope, from the
point of view of psychology. Secondly, traditional model theoretic semantics is not readily
taken to wholly license talk of the content of mental representations. Advocates of the stan¬
dard paradigm have pointed out that although model theoretic semantics may give an
account of the compositional structure of a system representation, it is silent about the
interpretation of the non-logical base terms of that system. It has been proposed that a
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standard semantical account might be supplemented with an information based account of
meaning of such terms (Stampe 1977, Fodor, 1984,1989). More radically, the standard
model theoretic account has itself been criticized as an appropriate tool for studying the
meaning of natural language utterances (or, equally, any postulated system of internal
representation) (Barwise & Perry, 1983). The proposed alternative is to develop an informa¬
tion based account of semantics. It may be hoped that a sufficiently broad semantical
account, which is not tied to symbolic structures, might be appropriate for the analysis of
non-symbolic computation.
Dretske (1981) provides a thorough and detailed account of the theoretical underpinnings of
information based theory of content, and applies it to a wide range of psychological issues -
from the distinction between perception and cognition, to concepts, knowledge and belief.
Yet the account of content that he provides is inspired by the quantitative, content-
independent notions of Shannon and Weaver's information theory. Dretske is thus propos¬
ing that the ideas of information theory may, after all, prove central to the development of
psychological theory.
In this thesis I shall examine both Dretske's account and some of the key applications to
which it is put, in detail. The informational notions that Dretske introduces are found to
require significant modification, and the resulting account is cast formally in terms of pro-
positional logic. Also Dretske's specific applications are found to be problematic, and an
alternative conception of how informational notions relate to psychology is proposed.
Nonetheless, I shall argue that Dretske's ideas may indeed be relevant to the project of
developing a notion of meaning appropriate to psychological theory. Unfortunately, when
the essence of Dretske's account is uncovered, the notions of Shannon and Weaver's infor¬
mation theory have little role to play.
0.2 Information and Representation
Information Theory gives a measure of the amount of information associated with a state of
affairs, and the amount of information that may be transmitted between states of affairs. It
gives no account of information content. That is, although the theory gives a measure of
how much information is generated by some state of affairs, or carried between states of
affairs, it gives no account of what that information is.
Oversimplifying a little, the amount of information generated by the occurence of some
state of affairs is a measure of the number of possibilities reduced in virtue of the
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occurence of that state of affairs. For example, under natural informational idealisations,
the casting of a die generates more information than the toss of a coin. A throw of a die
reduces six possible states of affairs (that the die shows 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 uppermost) to
one. A toss of a coin merely reduces two possible states of affairs (heads or tails) to one.
Suppose that an observer shouts "Hurrah!" just when the coin lands heads, and "Oh no!"
just when the coin lands tails. Then some particular shout (say, of "Hurrah!") also reduces
two possible states of affairs (two possible shouts) to one. Hence it generates the same
amount of information as the tossing of the coin. However, the information generated is
not new information, since the way that the coin falls determines the particular shout the
observer makes That is, once the possible states of the coin are reduced the possible shouts
are too. The shout may be treated not as generating new information but as carrying infor¬
mation generated by the coin This is an instance of information flow between the state of
affairs at the coin and the state of affairs at the shout (we might equally well trace the flow
of information between the state of the coin and the precise forces exerted as the coin is
thrown, or the instaneous dynamics of the arm of the thrower, and so on). The direction of
information flow need not follow the direction of causality. Just as the way that the coin
falls determines the shout made, the shout that is made determines the way that the coin
falls. Information can be viewed as flowing in either direction, depending on what is
viewed as known and what is viewed as unknown.
Although there is no notion of information content within Information Theory itself, many
theorists in psychology, both within the mainstream cognitive tradition (Marr, 1982) and
ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979), have informally used a notion of information con¬
tent. In the psychology of vision, it is important to characterize the particular information
that is carried about the structure of the visual scene by the structure of the optic array. If
an organism is approaching an object, the time to contact is specified by the rate of expan¬
sion of the optic array. A theory of perception must capture not only that the value of
expansion of the optic array carries some amount of information about the time-to-contact,
but that an expansion of such and such carries the information that time-to-contact is so and
so. Similarly, information about the relative distances of objects is carried by the magni¬
tudes of disparities between the images on each retina, the speed of optic flow as the eye
moves through space, and so on. Taking an example from the psychology of hearing, the
relative timing of auditory input at each ear carries information about the direction from
which the sound originates. Psychology is concerned primarily with the content of informa¬
tion signals, and not with measuring how much information they carried. Dretske (1981)
quotes Gibson on the use of information in ecological psychology:
-5-
"Let us begin by noting that information about something means only specificity to some¬
thing. Hence, when we say that information is conveyed by light, or by sound, odor, or
mechanical energy, we do not mean that the source is literally conveyed as a copy or re¬
plica. The sound of a bell is not the bell and the odor of cheese is not the cheese. Similar¬
ly the perspective projection of the faces of an object (by the reverberating flux of
reflected light in a medium) is not the object itself. Nevertheless, in all these cases a pro¬
perty of the stimulus is univocally related to a property of the object by virtue of physical
laws. This is what I mean by the conveying of environmental information." (Gibson,
1966)
Putting the matter in rather unecological terms, the basic intuition that underlies the infor¬
mal notion of information used in psychology is that a signal carries the information that P
just when it is possible to learn that P from that signal. The hat on the hatstand carries the
information that Fred is at home because it is possible to learn that Fred is at home from
the hat's being on the hatstand. A footprint in the flowerbed carries the information that the
murderer escaped through the window, because it is possible to leam that the murderer
escaped through the window from the presence of the footprint. No one may realize that
the murderer's escape must have been through the window, even though they notice the
footprint. The detective may pay little attention to the footprint since the gardener often
walks in that flowerbed. Yet if the gardener has actually been concentrating on the rho¬
dodendrons for the last two weeks, then the presence of the footprint may carry the infor¬
mation that the murderer left through the window nonetheless. From the point of view of
what information is carried, what is important is that it is possible to learn how the murd¬
erer escaped, even if no one actually learned this.
On this informal notion of information, the optic expansion's being such and such carries
the information that time-to-contact is so and so because it is possible to learn that time to
contact is so and so second from the fact that the optic expansion is such and such. Simi¬
larly, given that the disparities in the two retinal images are such and such, it may be possi¬
ble to learn that object A must be twice as far away as object B. Or again, if the sound of
the clap arrived simultaneously at each ear, it is possible to learn that it must have ori¬
ginated from a point on the plane normal to the axis of the two ears.
An important aspect of this informal notion of information is that it is factive. That is, if a
state of affairs carries the information that P, then P must be the case. On this construal of
information, misinformation is not a species of information. The factive character of our
informal notion of information is derivative on the factive character of learning. That the
hat is on the hatstand carries the information that Fred is at home if it is possible to learn
that Fred is at home from the fact that the hat is on the hatstand. Yet a proposition can
only be learned if it is the case. For example, I cannot learn that it is midnight by looking
at my stopped watch if it is actually early afternoon. If it is possible to learn that Fred is
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at home, Fred must be at home. So, in general, for a proposition P to be carried by a signal
(for P to be learnable), P must be true. However, while the tmth of P is a necessary condi¬
tion for information to be carried, it is not, of course, sufficient.
Suppose that Fred lost his hat yesterday, but that his cousin Eric is visiting, and has left his
hat on the hatstand. Then the hat's being on the hatstand does not carry the information
that Fred is at home, even if it happens that Fred is in. The fact that Fred is at home cannot
be learned from the hat's being on the hatstand, there is no lawful relation between Fred's
hat being on the hatstand and his being at home. Similarly, I cannot learn that it is mid¬
night from looking at my stopped watch, even if, by coincidence, it is midnight. There
must be some lawful dependency between the information carrier and the information car¬
ried. Since this is an informal, intuitive notion of information, an elucidation of the nature
of this dependency is absent.
How does this informal notion of information content relate to the quantitative account
given by Information Theory? Dretske (1981) reconstructs the intuitive notion using Infor¬
mation Theoretic tools. A large part of the discussion in the first part of this thesis focuses
on the adequacy of his account. Certain modifications to and simplifications of the
Dretskian approach are suggested.
What is the relationship between the notion of information content and the traditional
notion of representation? There appear to be a number of significant differences: 1. there
may be information without representation; 2. there may be representation without informa¬
tion; 3. a state of affairs may carry many pieces of information, whereas a representational
content is unique.
1. The fact that a lake is covered with ice may carry the information that the temperature is
below freezing. Prima facie, the state of the lake does not represent the temperature as
being -20 °. A sneeze may carry the information that Eric has a cold, but it does not
represent Eric as having a cold. Information can be carried without being represented.
2. By the facticity of information, an utterance of "The earth is at the centre of the
universe" cannot carry the information that the earth is at the centre of the universe given
the facticity of information, since the earth is not at the centre of the universe. Yet the
utterance does mean that the earth is at the centre of the universe, nonetheless; the earth is
represented as being at the centre of the universe; the proposition that the earth is at the
centre of the universe is expressed. The proposition that an utterance expresses can be true
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or false, whereas information is always veridical. Misinformation is not a species of infor¬
mation, but misrepresentation is a species of representation.
3. A state of affairs may carry very many different pieces of information, whereas, say, an
utterance expresses only one proposition. A particular utterance of "The earth is at the cen¬
tre of the universe" might carry information about the state of mental health, sex, mood,
country of origin of the speaker and so on. However, it has only one content: that the earth
is at the centre of the universe.
So information content and representation are prima facie very different. However, Dretske
(1981) nonetheless attempts to provide an account of representation (within a limited
domain) in informational terms. He defines what it is for a state of affairs to carry a piece
of information in digital form, and then what it is for a state of affairs to carry a piece of
information in completely digital form. For Dretske's analysis, a given state of affairs can
carry only one piece of information in completely digital form. This piece of information is
identified with semantic or representational content. Although there are many difficulties
for a Dretskian account, I shall argue that, despite appearances, an informational analysis of
representation may be appropriate for psychology and computer science.
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0.3 An Introduction to Information Theory
Dretske (1981) attempts to explicate the notions of content, cognition, belief and concepts
by extending the Communication Theory or Information Theory of Shannon arid Weaver
(Shannon, 1949). Let us first introduce the elements of this theory.
Information as reduction of uncertainty
Information theory treats the amount of information associated with some event with the
reduction of relevant possible states of affairs, given that event. Suppose that the relevant
states of affairs are the heads/tails orientation of three coins, after they are flipped. Assum¬
ing that the coins are unbiased, there are eight equally likely possible outcomes: HHH,
HHT, HTH, HTT, THH, THT, TTH, TTT. If one coin is flipped and falls 'heads', then
the number of possible outcomes is reduces to four - the remaining two coins may still be
either heads or tails: HHH, HHT, HTH, HTT. Hence, uncertainty about the states of the
coins has been reduced by the first coin's falling heads. The set of possibilities has been
reduced from 8 to 4. The second coin is then flipped and falls 'tails'. Now there are only
two possible outcomes remaining - HTH, HTT. After the third coin has fallen 'tails' there
is only one possibility remaining: HTT. There is nolonger any uncertainty about the
heads/tails states of the three coins. The amount of information that a state of affairs car¬
ries is supposed to measure the extent to which uncertainty is reduced, or the extent to
which possibilities are eliminated. Since the flipping of each coin reduced the number of
possible outcomes, we wish to associate some amount of information with each such event.
What is an appropriate measure to be associated with each event? The first flip reduces the
number of possibilities from 8 to 4, the second flip reduced the number from 4 to 2, and
the third from 2 to 1. It might seem natural to make the number of possibilities eliminated
the measure of information. Yet, this makes the amount of information associated with a
flip depend radically on the order in which we consider the flips. If the flipping of one coin
is considered first, then it has information value 4, if it is considered last it has just 1.
Further, if we increased the number of coins, then we should have further information
values associated with a simple coin flip (in fact, 2 to any power would be a possible
value). Yet, there is something in common between all the flips that we have considered so
far. In each case, the number of possibilities is halved. So a better measure of the amount
of information associated with an event would seem to be the proportion of possibilities
reduced associated with an event. In accordance with this intuition, a coin flip might be
assigned the value 0.5, whatever the order in which the coins are considered. This measure
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of the information associated with a state of affairs is independent of the order in which the
coin flips are considered, and independent of the total number of coins. However, this
measure is not quite what we require.
Suppose that we consider the flipping of two of the three coins. This reduces the number of
possibly outcomes from 8 to 2. Hence, on our proportion measure, the amount of informa¬
tion associated is 0.25. Yet the flipping of the two coins is made up of two individual flips,
each with information 0.5. On the present measure, two events of informational- value 0.5
combine to produce a single event of informational value 0.25. The informational value
assigned to two flips is less than that assigned to one. Yet intuitively, we should like our
measure of information to be additive. The information associated with an event made up
of two (independent) events should be the sum of the information associated with each
individual event considered separately.
This condition is easy to enforce. On the present measure, the reduction of possibilities by
a factor of 2 = 21 (One flip) is associated 1/21 units of information; reduction by a factor of
2 2 3
4 = 2 (two flips) is associated with 1/2 units; reduction by a factor of 8 = 2 (3 flips) is
associated with 1/2 units; and so on. So let us take the exponent as our measure of infor¬
mation, rather than the fraction itself. Reduction by a factor of 2n (n flips) is thus associ¬
ated simply with n bits of information. So, reducing 8 equally likely possibilities to 1
requires 3 bits of information; reducing 4 equally likely possibilities to 1 requires 2 bits of
information; reducing 2 equally likely possibilities to 1 requires 1 bit of information. The
general rule is plain enough. Reducing n possibilities to 1 requires log n bits of information
(here and henceforth all logarithms will be taken to be log base 2). This measure of infor¬
mation is additive. The information associated with n + m flips (n + m bits) is the sum of
the information associated with n flips (n bits) and m flips (m bits). This measure is the
essence of that proposed by Shannon and Weaver (1949). To outline the account more
fully, we must introduce a definition.
A source is a specification of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities each
with an associated probability. For a source S we shall denote its n possible states,
S1,...S.,...Sn. Each state S. has an associated probability p(S.).
The set of all possible head/tales states of three coins is the particular source we have been
dealing with so far. The flipped coins must occupy exactly one of the states HHH, HHT,
HTH, HTT, THH, THT, TTH, TTT (assuming that they cannot balance on edge). Hence,
the states are indeed mutually exclusive and exhaustive. In the present case, the probability
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associated with each possibility is equal (0.125), since the coins are unbiased and fall
independently. A particular state of the source (say that the coins are THH) is said to gen¬
erate information (in this case 3 bits, since 8 equally likely possibilities have been reduced
to 1). If we let I(S.) be the amount of information generated by a source which reduces n
equally likely possible states of affairs to 1 (by being in state S., rather than in some other
of the n states), the generalisation of the end of the last paragraph can be put as follows:
I(S.) = log n
(Dretske, 1981:7).
So far we have been dealing with sources in which each possible state is equally likely.
Thus, if there are n states, they each have the probability 1/n. Notice that our formula
above could have been written,
I(S.) = log (l/p(S.))
where p(S.) is the probability of the source's being in the state S.. This suggests how we
may generalise to sources which have states which are not equally probable.
Suppose that a coin is biased, such that it falls heads 0.9 of the time. The flipping of such
a coin should, in general, lead to less reduction in uncertainty, and hence to less informa¬
tion generated, than in the unbiased case. This is because the state of the coin is actually
fairly predictable in any case - it is a pretty safe bet that it will be 'heads'. Thus there is
less uncertainty to reduce, and less information generated. The formula
I(S.) = log (l/p(S.))
can be applied to cases in which the states are not equally likely. I(S.) is the amount of
information generated by a source's being in a particular state S.. This is known as the
surprisal of that state of the source S.. If the state of a source has the probability 0.5, then
the surprisal is 1 bit. If the state of the source is probable (p > 0.5 - heads in the present
example), the surprisal is less than 1 bit; if the state is improbable (p < 0.5 - tails in the
present example), the surprisal value is greater than 1 bit. Let us denote the average
surprisal at a source S by I(S).
I(S) = Ij p(S.).I(S.)
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The arithmetic works out to show that the amount of average information generated by a
biased coin is less than that generated by an unbiased coin. When the biased coin comes
up heads it generates less information than the unbiased coin; when it comes up tails it gen¬
erates more information. Since it comes up heads much more often on average it generates
less information than the unbiased coin, as expected.
We now have a fuller intuitive picture of what 'amount of information' measures. The
amount of information associated with a particular state of affairs measures the reduction
of uncertainty given the occurrence of that state; to what extent possibilities have been
eliminated; the degree to which the occurrence of that state is surprising. The amount of
information associated with a source measures the average amount of information associ¬
ated with the states of that source; the degree to which the state of the source is unpredict¬
able.
Information transmission
So far we have dealt merely with the generation of information at a source. Now we turn
to the transmission of information. Let us consider three British gymnasts performing on
the beam to a partisan British crowd. Suppose that each of them has a half chance of fal¬
ling off during their routine. Suppose also that the crowd groans when and only when a
gymnast crashes to the floor. For each routine there are two relevant states of the gymnast
(fell off or stayed on), and two relevant states of the crowd (groaned or did not groan). Let
us denote a gymnast's safely staying on the bar by S, and falling off by F. Let us denote
the crowd's groaning by G, and the crowd's remaining happy by H. Both the state of the
gymnast and the state of the crowd can be considered as sources of information. For the
gymnasts, there are eight equally likely outcomes - SSS, SSF, SFS, SFF, FSS, FSF, FFS,
FFF. Each of these outcomes has a surprisal of 3 bits. Similarly, for the crowd there are
eight equally likely outcomes - HHH, HHG, HGH, HGG, GHH, GHG, GGH, GGG.
Again the surprisal of each outcome is 3 bits. Hence, both sources generate 3 bits of infor¬
mation.
How much information is generated by the two sources considered together? A natural
response is just to add together the information generated by each source. In this fashion
we would say that the two sources considered together must carry 3 + 3 = 6 bits of infor¬
mation. However, the state of the crowd is precisely tied to whether or not the gymnast
has come to grief. Hence, if we get SSF (safe, safe, fell), then we must get HHG (happy,
happy, groan). So there are only 8, equally likely, possible states of the two sources
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considered together. Hence, both sources generate just 3 bits of information between them.
How are we to explain the puzzle that the gymnasts generate 3 bits of information, and the
crowd generates 3 bits of information, but that the two together still only generate 3 bits of
information? Given the state of the gymnasts, the state of the crowd is wholly predictable.
Hence, the state of the crowd carries no new information, given the state of the gymnasts.
The state of the crowd can be said to carry information about the state of the gymnasts
rather than generate any new information. An informational source which is viewed as car¬
rying information about the state of some other informational source is called a receiver.
A receiver is a specification of a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of possibilities,
R1,...R.,...Rn, each associated with a probability p(R ),...p(R.),...p(Rn). In addition, each
state of the receiver is associated with a conditional probability for each state of the source.
A signal is a particular state of the receiver R., which may carry more or less information
about the state of the source depending on the probabilities involved.
Let us treat the state of the crowd as receiving information about the gymnasts. For each
state of the crowd there must be an associated probability conditional on each state of the
source. In this example, the probabilities are straightforward. Take some state of the crowd
(say GGG). The conditional probability of that state given the corresponding state of the
gymnasts (FFF) is 1; the conditional probability is 0 for all other states of the gymnasts. Of
course, in a more realistic idealisation of the scenario, the specification of the probabilities
would be more complicated since the probabilities would be between 0 and 1. For example,
the crowd might groan at disasters other than falling off the bar, and might not groan if the
falling off were done with such grace and aplomb as to appear to be part of the routine.
How much new information is generated by the crowd - that is, how much information is
not merely transmitted from the state of the gymnasts? Or again, how uncertain is the state
of the crowd given the state of the gymnasts? Suppose that the gymnasts are in the state S3
(say SFS). Then we calculate the information generated at the receiver just as before,
except that instead of using the absolute probability values, we use the probabilities condi¬
tional on S3. The amount of new information generated is known as noise, and denoted
N(S3).
N(S3) = I. p(R./S3).I(R./S3), where
I(R./S3) = log l/p(R./S3)
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The average noise N is simply:
N = £. p(S.) N(S.)
Noise is a measure of the amount of information generated at the receiver which is new
information, relative to the source. Suppose that the crowd was characterised as having four
instantaneous possible states instead of two at any time instant. These might be happy and
eating popcorn (H+P); happy and not eating popcorn (H-P); groaning and eating popcorn
(G+P); groaning and not eating popcorn (G-P). Suppose that whether or not the crowd is
eating popcorn is dependent solely on the presence of the popcorn sellers in the aisles. The
popcorn sellers are randomly present for exactly half the routines, and their presence is, of
course, quite unrelated to whether or not the British gymnasts are on or off the floor. Con¬
sider a particular routine of a British gymnast. Previously, the gymnast's performance gen¬
erated one bit of information, and the crowd's reaction generated one bit of informatioa
And, given the gymnast's performance, the state of the crowd was determinate - thus there
was no noise (this may be verified using the formulae above). Now, however, the crowd is
viewed as having four equally likely states. So the state of the crowd generates 2 bits of
information. Some of this information must, therefore, be new. In fact, exactly 1 bit is
noise, and 1 bit is old information, transmitted from the source. Intuitively, this is because,
given the state of the gymnast (say, on the floor), there are just two possible states of the
crowd (groaning and eating popcorn, or just groaning). This reduction of four equally
probable states to two equally probable states amounts to the transmission of 1 bit of infor¬
mation from the state of the gymnast (the source) to the state of the crowd (the receiver). A
specification of the state of the crowd which resolves the issue one way or the other gen¬
erates the remaining 1 bit of new information (noise). Following Dretske (1981:19) let us
call the amount of information generated at the receiver, R, transmitted from the source, S,
Is(R). This is the overlap of the information associated with the source and the receiver,
and hence the amount of information that the receiver carries about the source, Is(R), is the
same as the amount of information that the source carries about the receiver, If(S). The
same amount of information flows between informational sources in each direction. The
total information generated at the receiver (I(R)), the amount of information carried about
the source Is(R), and the noise (N(R)) may be related as follows:
I(R) = Is(R) + N(R)
That is, the amount of information generated at the receiver is the sum of the amount
transmitted from the source to the receiver (Is(R)) and the noise (N(R)).
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Just as not all the information generated at the receiver need be transmitted from the
source, not all the information generated at the source need be transmitted to the receiver.
The quantity of information that is not transmitted is known as the equivocation. Just as
noise is a measure of the uncertainty of the state of the receiver given the state of the
source, the equivocation E(S) is a measure of the uncertainty of the state of the source
given the state of the receiver. So far our examples have all been of equivocation free
information transmission - the whether or not the gymnasts fell off or not was completely
determinate given the state of the crowd. However, suppose that we consider the state of
the gymnasts to include the colour of their strip - at random they choose red, white and
blue (-L); or leopard skin (+L). There are now four equally probable states each gymnast
S+L, S-L, F+L, F-L. The groaning and pop corn eating behaviour of the crowd can only
determine that a gymnast has fallen off - there are still two equally likely possible cases -
say F+L and F-L. (Of course, we are assuming, perhaps implausibly, that the strip worn
has no effect on the likelihood of calamity). Hence, there is 1 bit of equivocation. The
mathematics is completely analogous to that for noise. In particular,
I(S) = Ir(S) + E(S)
That is, the amount of information generated at the source is the sum of the amount
transmitted from the source to the receiver (Ir(S)), and the equivocation (E(S)).
Notice that, in the examples so far, whether or not information transmission is noisy or
equivocal is dependent on the way we characterise the system. In particular, it is relative to
the specification of the source (the state of the gymnast). In one case, the state of the gym¬
nast is characterised only by whether or not the routine is completed without mishap (no
equivocation), in the other we take in to account the colour of the strip worn (equivoca¬
tion). Further, informational properties are relative to the specification of the receiver (the
state of the crowd). In one case the crowd is either happy or groans (no noise), in the other
we also took in to account popcorn eating (noise). Such specifications may appear arbitrary
- and indeed there is no constraint that the characterisation make intuitive sense. For a
source (or a receiver) is just any set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states.
How much information is carried by some state of affairs, whether information transmis¬
sion is equivocal or noisy, and so on, is dependent on what the states of the source and
receiver are taken to be, and the values of the associated absolute and conditional probabili¬
ties. Informational properties quite generally are relative to the informational idealisation
of a situation. We shall see, however, that in a variety of applications of information
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theory to the problems of representation and content it is easy to lose sight of this funda¬
mental relativity. The fact that such relativity to the specification of source and receiver is
built in to information theory at its very foundation will have far reaching consequences for
the development of an information-based account of content.
So far our examples have been extremely idealised. For example, the crowd is supposed to
groan when and only when a British gymnast falls off the bar. However, more realistically
the crowd might groan only, say, 90% of the time; perhaps their attention is sometimes dis¬
tracted by the some other event; further, there might be other reasons for groaning -
perhaps 20% of groans are caused by the scoreboard showing the marks of British competi¬
tors in other disciplines. In this case, the information transmission between gymnast and
crowd is both equivocal and noisy. It is equivocal because the state of the crowd does not
fully determine the state of the British gymnast. If the crowd groans, a British gymnast has
probably come to grief - but perhaps the scoreboard has just been updated. If the crowd
does not groan, then the British gymnast has probably successfully negotiated the routine -
but it is possible that the Russian on the floor exercise so captured the crowd's attention
that the fall passed unnoticed. The information transmission is noisy since the state of the
crowd is not fully determined by the state of the gymnast. If the gymnast falls off then the
crowd will probably groan, but not if their attention has been distracted; if the gymnast
does not fall off then they may groan anyway, when the scoreboard is updated.
Within information theory we have no account of what information is carried by a signal.
Dretske (1981) attempts to augment the theory with an appropriate notion of information
content, which accords with our pretheoretic intuitions. As we shall see, Dretske's account
is only loosely related to ideas from information theory. It is to this account that we turn in
Chapter 1.
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Chapter 1: Information Content
1.1 Dretske on Information Content
Dretske provides the following definition of information content:
"Information content: A signal r carries the information that s is F = The conditional pro¬
bability of s's being F, given r (and k), is 1 (but given k alone, less than 1)" (Dretske,
1981:65)
where k stands "for what the receiver already knows (if anything) about the possibilities
that exist at the source" (Dretske, 1981:65). For the moment we shall ignore this complica¬
tion.
In the case of the flipped coin, the observer shouts "Hurrah!" if the coin falls heads, and
"Oh no!" if the coin falls tails. Since the fact that the coin falls heads can be learnt from
the shout of "Hurrah!", on our intuitive account of information content, the fact that
observer shouts "Hurrah!" carries the information that the coin fell heads. This intuition
accords with Dretske's definition. Making the appropriate substitutions, we obtain:
The shout's being "Hurrah!" (the signal, r) carries the information that the coin (s) fell
heads (F) = The conditional probability of the coin's falling heads given the shout's being
"Hurrah!" is 1.
In the example, the probability of the coin's falling heads is indeed 1, given a shout of
"Hurrah!", so the information is carried.
Prima facie, the restriction that the conditional probability, p, must be precisely 1 may
seem to be over restrictive. If we consider our informal notion of information content, as
that which can be learned from a signal, it is perhaps unclear whether or not it is possible
to learn some proposition from a signal when the relevant conditional probability is less
than 1. One persuasive intuition is that learning would be impossible, if learning some pro¬
position requires such perfect evidence. Can I not learn that the cat is outside (if the cat is
outside), from your assurance, even though there is a small chance that you may be mis¬
taken? However, Dretske persuasively argues that if p is set at any value less than 1, para¬
doxical consequences ensue. I shall present the essence of his arguments in a slightly
different form.
Consider a lottery in which just one of the n tickets reveals the winning number when the
aluminium foil is scratched. Suppose that we allow p to be less than 1. The new criterion is
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that p is greater than 1-8, for some small 5. For any such 8, there will be an n (> 1/8)
such that the probability of a given ticket not carrying the winning number is greater than 1
- 8. Hence, if I buy a losing ticket, the information that I will lose is already carried, sim¬
ply by my buying a single ticket. For the conditional probability of my losing, given that I
buy a single ticket, is greater than 1 - 8, and so fulfills the relaxed criterion. Yet on this
analysis, actually scratching the ticket to reveal the losing number carries no new informa¬
tion, since this information is carried just by my buying the single ticket. Yet surely I have
learnt something by scratching the ticket - after all, it would be crazy for me to buy the
ticket and never check to see if I had won, on the basis that I already possessed the con¬
trary information. Difficulties multiply if we consider the case in which I buy many (los¬
ing) tickets. If I have the information that each ticket, individually, is a losing ticket, then
surely I have the information that all the tickets are losing tickets. However, if I buy
enough tickets then the probability that all of the tickets are losers will be less than 1 - 8.
So the information that all the tickets are losers is not carried, even thought the information
that each individual ticket is a loser is carried. So, scratching each individual ticket is
informationally uninformative, but scratching all of them is not! Dretske concludes that this
paradoxical conclusion rules out any non-zero value of 8. (A counter to this, which
Dretske does not discuss is that 8 could be treated as a free parameter, which should be set
for any situation so that such problems do not arise. An unappealing aspect of this line is
that the setting of an appropriate d will thus require some prior analysis of the situation,
and what calculations we are interested in.
Dretske argues further than allowing a probability p of less than 1 also leads to paradoxical
consequences for the integrity of information flow. Consider the pretheoretic account of the
information content of a signal as what can be learnt from that signal. If C can be learnt
from B and B can be learnt from A, then C can be learnt from A. In terms of information
content this observation generates what Dretske calls the Xerox principle.
"If A carries the information that B , and B carries the information that C, then A carries
the information that C." (Dretske, 1981:57)
This principle can only be denied on pain of undermining the possibility of chains of infor¬
mation flow. (In logic, such a move would be analogous to denying that if A I- B and B I-
C, then A I- C, without which inferential chains are banished.)
The Xerox principle is, however, incompatible with the concession that p may be less than
1. Consider a row of n dominoes. Suppose that each domino has a probability of greater
than 1 - 8 of knocking over the next domino, and that the dominoes are stable otherwise.
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So, since this probability of the next domino falling is greater than p then, on our relaxed
criterion, the falling of each domino carries the information that the next will fall. By the
Xerox principle, the falling of the first domino will therefore carry the information that the
last (the rtth) domino will fall, for any n. However, as n increases, the probability that the
last domino will fall tends to 0. In intuitive terms, if the links in the informational chain are
not perfectly secure, then if the chain is made sufficiently long, then it will be almost
bound to break. So, given a long enough row of dominoes, we seem to be forced to the
conclusion that, however long the row of dominoes, the falling of the first domino carries
the information that the last domino will fall (assuming that, however unlikely it may be,
all the dominoes do happen to fall. This is required because since information is factive and
the falling of each domino carries the information that the next will fall.) This will be true
even if the conditional probability between the falling of the first and last dominoes - in
other words, the probability that all the dominoes fall, if the first one does - is, say, one in
a million. Yet this conclusion directly contradicts the conclusion obtained if we consider
the conditional probability between the first and last dominoes directly, rather than consid¬
ering the intervening informational links. In informational terms, the point is this: if a small
amount of equivocation is tolerated in carrying of information, that equivocation may be
increased arbitrarily in information flow. So no equivocation can be tolerated - p must be 1
and no less (again there is the possible counter that 5 may be set appropriately for each
situation considered).
It might be objected that since, in the above example, the contradiction is obtained only
when all the dominoes fall (since only then are all the informational links in place), then
the last domino will necessarily fall if the first one does - the conditional probability that
the last domino falls, given that the first falls, must be 1, after all. However, this reasoning
is fallacious. By making the row of dominoes as long as required the conditional probabil¬
ity between the first and last dominoes can be made arbitrarily small. The paradox that
information may flow between each informational link but not along the whole chain only
arises in the rare eventuality that all the dominoes do happen to fall. Given that this is the
case, then the falling of the last domino is trivially determined by the falling of the first.
But this does not mean that the conditional probability between the falling of the two domi¬
noes is 1. All that follows is the trivial observation that the conditional probability of the
last domino falling is 1, given that the first domino falls and that all the dominoes fall.
Superficially more innocuous than the restriction that p is exactly 1, is that Dretske's
definition of information content applies only to contents of the form s is F. This may not
appear to be a very severe limitation, since it seems to include any information content
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which can be rendered in subject-predicate form. However, Dretske points out that the
scope of his account is intended to be rather more restricted. The account applies to con¬
tents of the form s is F
"...where the letter s is understood to be an indexical or demonstrative element referring to
some item at the source. What the definition gives us is an account of... a content that
might... be expressed by saying that r carries the information of or about s that it is F."
(Dretske, 1981: 66)
"...it is only the descriptive or conceptual elements embodied in the predicate expression
("...is F") that reflect the informational content of the signal. The subject term merely at¬
taches that content to a particular individual." (Dretske, 1981: 67)
So Dretske takes his theory to give an account of what it is for a signal to carry the infor¬
mation, of some object, that it has a certain property. The specification of the object to
which the property is attached is not part of the information content. All that is important is
what object is specified, not how it is specified:
"What the definition gives us is an account of what philosophers might call the signal's de
re informational content... A signal's de re informational content is determined by two
things: (1) the individual 5 about which the signal carries information, and (2) the infor¬
mation (determined by the open sentence "...is F") it carries about that individual. What
descriptive phrase we happen to use (in the verbal expression of a signal's information
content) to refer to the individual about which information is carried is irrelevant."
(Dretske, 1981:66-67)
"Signals can therefore differ in the information they carry in two ways. If r^ carries the
information that j is F and r2 carries the information that s is G, then (assuming F and G
give expression to independent features or characteristics) they carry different pieces of in¬
formation. In addition, however, r may carry the information that s is F while r2 carries
the information that t, a different individual, is F... Throughout this work attention will be
restricted to prepositional contents of the de re variety [that is, to differences of the form¬
er kind]." (Dretske, 1981: 67)
That is, Dretske's account can distinguish the former contents which have different de re
contents and but does not deal with the latter, which have different de dicto contents. The
point may be rephrased as follows. If the information carried is that s is F rather than that s
is G or H, then the information content of some signal falls within the scope of Dretske's
definition. In this case, the information content is that the specified object has this property
rather than that property. However, Dretske's definition does not include the case in which
the information carried is that s is F, rather than that t is F or u is F, since the specification
of an object can not be part of the information content of the signal. In more concrete
terms, the Dretskian definition is appropriate for explicating what it is for a signal to carry
the information that an apple is red rather than green or brown, but not for explicating what
it is for a signal to carry the information that this apple is green, rather than that apple or
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this pear. For in the latter case, the information carried is about which object has a certain
property.
1.2 Breaking the Restriction to Contents of the form s is F
Dretske's account of the information content of a signal is limited to contents of the form s
is F, where the singular term which picks out the object s is not part of the content. A sig¬
nal can have the information content that Fido is asleep rather than awake, but not that
Fido is asleep, rather than Rover. There does not appear to be a correlate of this restriction
in our informal notion of information. It seems equally possible to learn either piece of
information from a signal.
Suppose that I hear snoring from next door, and wonder which of the dogs is sleeping. If
you look next door, and whisper "Fido", this signal carries the information that Fido is
asleep rather than awake. On the intuitive notion of information, the signal carries the
information that Fido is asleep rather than awake, since it is possible to leam that Fido is
asleep rather than awake from the whisper. Since the snoring has already told me that one
of the dogs is asleep, the whisper seems to carry the specific information that it is Fido
rather than Rover who is asleep. Yet this is just the kind of information that Dretske's
account rules out. For although the proposition that Fido is asleep is of the form s is F, the
signal carries information which picks out the individual s (that it is Fido rather than
Rover), rather than attaching a property (being asleep) to a specific individual.
The cleavage between the Dretskian notion of information content and our intuitive notion
is far greater than is suggested by the previous example. On our intuitive account, not only
is it possible for a signal to carry information about the identity of s in propositions of the
form s is F. Rather, a signal may carry any proposition at all.
Suppose that an undercover policeman is visiting the leader of a gang of bank robbers
ostensibly to finalise the details of their next robbery. He arranges a code with a con¬
federate who is watching the bank robber's house. The crucial signal is whether or not he
puts his coat on before he leaves the house. The confederate then decides if the police
should move in. The agreed code could be such that policeman puts on his coat before he
leaves the house just when:
All the robbers in the gang are present in the house
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It is possible that the policeman's cover has been blown
None of the robbers is armed
None of the robbers believes that the police are after them
and so on. None of these sentences is of the form s is F. Their logical form, under standard
semantic analysis, involves quantification or modal operators. Yet the confederate can per¬
fectly well learn the truth of each of these propositions from the way in which the police¬
man leaves the house, given the adoption of the appropriate code. In each case, the condi¬
tional probability of the truth of each proposition, given that the policeman leaves the house
with his coat already on, is 1.
These examples suggest that Dretske's definition of information content may be generalised
to apply to an arbitrary proposition P, rather than applying just to propositions of the form
£ is F:
Information content 2: A signal r carries the information that P, where P is any proposi¬
tion = The conditional probability of P, given r, is 1.
[Dretske's parenthetical k is left out for simplicity]
Before discussing the application of this revised definition, let us tidy up the notation.
Sources and receivers are both species of informational source. Hence, a uniform notation
should apply to states of source and receiver alike. In Dretske's original formulation, the
lowercase r stands for a particular state of the receiver, whereas the lowercase s stands not
for a particular state of the source, but for the object at the source. The particular state of
the source (the information carried by the signal) is denoted by the complex formula s is F.
In the revised formulation we also have a terminological inconsistency. As before the state
of the signal is denoted by a lowercase r but the state of the source is now denoted by a
capitalised P. This appears to build in a spurious asymmetry between the the information
carrier (state of the receiver) and the information carried (state of the source).
It might be countered that there is a distinction between r and P. For r stands for the state
of the receiver simpliciter, whereas P stands for the proposition that the source is in such
and such a state. So perhaps the difference in notation marks an important conceptual dis¬
tinction: that between a state and a proposition. However, since there is a one to one
correspondence between the states of an informational source, and the set of propositions
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that the source is in each of those states, this is not a substantive constraint. Thus, we may
equally speak of the information carrier as being the state of the receiver or as being the
proposition that the receiver is in that state. Similarly we may equally speak of the infor¬
mation carried as being the state of the source or the proposition that the source is in that
state. Either line may be taken, but the same line should be taken for both sources and
receivers. Throughout the present account we shall employ proposition talk rather than
state talk. Let us now render our revised treatment of information content. The informa¬
tion carried (the state of the source) and the information carrier (the state of the receiver)
are both rendered as propositions:
Information content 3: A signal Q carries the information that P, where P is any proposi¬
tion = The conditional probability of P given Q is 1.
Now that the constraint on the form of the proposition has been dropped, the appropriate
signal may carry the information that all the robbers in the gang are present in the house;
that it is possible that the policeman's cover has been blown; that none of the robbers is
armed and so on.
Rather than laboriously illustrate how our revised definition of information content is
appropriate in each of our previous cases, let us take a fresh example. Suppose that the
army lay a minefield in training only when it is impossible that anyone will wander into it
by accident in the next few days. Perhaps they surround the area with barbed wire, and
post up large warning signs, until the mines are defused. Clearly the proposition that it is
impossible that anyone will wander into the field by accident in the next few days may be
learned from the fact that the field is mined. So this information is carried by the fact that
the field is mined, on our intuitive account (indeed, this information typically would be
learned by anyone who knew how rigourous the precautions are). However, such a com¬
plex, modal information content is beyond the scope of Dretske's definitions. It is, how¬
ever, captured by our revised, more general, formulation. Consider the state of the field. It
can be mined or unmined. These alternatives are, of course, mutually exclusive and exhaus¬
tive. Since the army will only mine a field given that certain conditions hold, the state of
the field can be viewed as a receiver carrying the information about whether those condi¬
tions hold. Applying our definition, we have, in particular, that:
The signal Q (that the field is mined) carries the information that P (that it is impossible
that anyone will wander into the field in the next few days) since the conditional probabil¬
ity of P given Q is 1.
It seems that the revised definition better captures our intuitive notion of information. This
has been done simply from abstracting away from a constraint that Dretske imposes on the
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structure of propositions that can be carried by a signal. It is natural to wonder why
Dretske imposes this restriction. In the following sections, the reason for the restriction is
examined. I shall argue that it stems from the identification of information theoretic talk
about sources and their states with everyday talk of objects and their properties. .
1.3 Sources and Objects; States and Properties
An informational signal carries the information that a source is in some state. If a coin is
tossed, it must fall either heads or tails. Thus, these states constitute an informational
source. A shout of "Heads" might carry the information that the source is in the "Heads"
state (assuming that the speaker is reliable), rather than the "Tails" state. Informally, the
information content of the shout is that the coin fell heads. Yet this description suggests
that the information content of the signal is that some object, the coin, has a certain pro¬
perty, falling heads. There is a natural mapping between these the descriptions in terms of
states and sources, and the description in terms of objects and properties. Information that a
source is in some state seems ipso facto to be information that an object has some property.
Hence it is tempting to identify the everyday notion of an object with informational notion
of a source and the everyday notion of a property with the informational notion of a state.
The information carried by an informational signal reduces the possibilities at the source.
That is, the signal carries the information that the source is in some particular state or res¬
tricted set of states. If we identify sources with objects and states with properties, then an
informational signal carries the information that an object has some (possibly disjunctive)
property. So, according to the identification, the information content of a signal must be of
the form s is F. Further, in an informational system, the signal can carry information only
about what state the source is in, and no information about what the source is. For there
can be only one source, and it is part of the specification of the informational system.
According to the identification, this observation becomes the constraint that no informa¬
tional signal can carry information about the identity of the object s. The information car¬
ried cannot pick out that object, but merely say of it that it has the property F.
Thus the restrictions that Dretske puts on the scope of his account seem to follow from his
identification of sources with objects and states and properties. Further, these identifications
are implicit throughout Dretske's text. For example, Dretske outlines the • following
scenario:
"There are four possibilities (P, Y, B, and G) at the source. They are equally likely. A sig¬






The signal raises the probability that s is P and simultaneously lowers the probability of
all competing alternatives." (Dretske, 1981: 94)
The identification of properties and states of the source is embodied in the use of the same
letters (P, Y, B, and G) for both. The state of the source, P, is just taken to be that some
object at the source, s, has the property P.
In this example, the symbol s is used, as it is throughout Dretske's exposition, to refer to
both the source itself, and the object at the source. A similar identification of the receiver
and some object is evident in the following passage. In explaining the definition of infor¬
mation content, Dretske comments that
"The parenthetical k will be explained in a moment. It is meant to stand for what the re¬
ceiver already knows (if anything) about the source." (Dretske, 1981:65)
The receiver is both a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states and an individual
who may know about the possibilities at the source. Hence, an informational source is
treated as an object. Indeed, it is treated as an object capable of having propositional atti¬
tudes.
Unfortunately, this tidy exegetical picture is complicated by a passage which appears to
suggest a rather different identification:
"Suppose a signal r carries the information that s is F and carries this information in vir¬
tue of having the property F\ That is, r's being F' (not, say, its being G) that is responsi¬
ble for r carrying this specific piece of information. Not just any knock on the door tells
the spy that the courier has arrived. The signal is three quick knocks followed by a pause
and another three quick knocks. It is this particular sequence that carries the vital piece of
information..." (Dretske, 1981:87)
Here the signal is both a state of affairs (that is, a state of the receiver) and an object capa¬
ble of having properties such as F and G (here, and throughout, the notion of an object is
purely the logical notion of anything that can have properties. So shouts, sequences of
knocks at the door, people, tables and chairs are all objects. In particular, events are treated
as a species of object). So in this instance, Dretske appears to be identify states with
objects rather than identifying sources with objects. This inconsistency probably stems from
a conflation of the non-technical and technical uses of the term "signal". Technically, a
signal is just the state of an informational receiver. Each particular sequence of knocks
corresponds to a distinct state of the receiver. That is, r's being F' and r's being G'
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correspond to distinct informational signals, rather than to different instances of the same
signal r. So, in information theory signals may correspond to states of an object (e.g. that r
is F') but not to objects themselves. This contrasts with the non-technical use of "signal",
on which a signal corresponds to an object (in this case, a sequence of knocks at the door)
which may have a variety of properties. Only if this object has the right properties will it
carry the specified information. It is on the non-technical reading that we can point out that
not just any signal (that is, any sequence of knocks at the door) conveys the information
that the courier has arrived since the information is only conveyed by a particular sequence
of knocks.
Are the identifications legitimate?
The above passage notwithstanding, the restrictions that Dretske imposes on the structure of
information contents appear to arise out of his identification of objects with sources, and
properties with states. We have yet to show, however, that these identifications are mis¬
taken.
According to Information Theory, the fact that a source is in some state generates informa¬
tion. Yet throughout Dretske's discussion, there is talk of the fact that an object has some
property generating information. For instance, in illustrating a point Dretske introduces a
simple example:
"Suppose j is a red square. Its being red generates 3 bits of information and its being
square generates 3 bits of independent information..." (Dretske, 1981:64)
Yet if we frame this example in terms of sources and their states, it seems that we have
two sources to one object, and so that sources and objects cannot be identified. First, con¬
sider states corresponding to the colours that the square can have - perhaps red, blue, green,
and so on. Assuming that the square must be uniformly coloured, the set of states is mum-
ally exclusive and exhaustive, since the square can have one and only one colour. So the
set of colour states constitutes an informational source. If the probability of the square's
being red is 1/8, then the information generated by the source being in that state is 3 bits.
How are we now to deal with shape in terms of sources and states? We can proceed in just
the same way as for colour. Let the states be the shapes that the object can have - perhaps
square, circle, triangle and so on. Since the object has precisely one shape, the set of states
is mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and hence constitutes an informational source. If the
probability of the shape's being square is also 1/8, then the information generated by the
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source being in that state is 3 bits.
We have defined two different informational sources, one based on the shape that an object
has, and one based on the colour of that object. Within an information theoretic treatment
there appears to be no way of expressing the fact that the states of the two sources are
somehow about the same real world object. In any case, it is surely a mistake to identify
some particular source defined on the properties of some real world object with the object
itself, since any number of sources may be associated with a single object. In the present
case, we could define sources based on the physical location of the red square (in the
lounge, in the kitchen, in the garden), or based on orientation, brightness, size, etc. The
states of a source may be more or less fine grained: (red, blue, green) versus (red, cobalt
blue, navy blue, turquoise, light green, dark green). The states of a source may classify
across more than one dimension of variation (red and square, red and triangular, red and
circular, blue and square, blue and triangular, blue and circular, green and square, green
and triangular, green and circular). An informational source is specified by any set of mutu¬
ally exclusive and exhaustive states.
A further argument against the identification is that there are sources whose states do not
correspond to the states of a particular object at all. We have already considered such cases.
For example, the heads/tails orientations of a set of three coins defines a source with eight
equally likely states. The fact that the source is in, say, state HHT does not correspond to
some object having a certain property (at least, unless the collection of three coins is con¬
sidered as a single object). Rather the states of three objects (the coins) are mapped onto a
single source.
Suppose that a gambler bets all his money on a horse so that he can buy his wife a new
lounge suite for her birthday. Then the states {{wife receives birthday present, gambler gets
thrown out of the house)} may be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and thus constitute
an informational source (henceforth, I shall use double brackets to denote sets of states
which constitute informational sources). However, the states do not correspond to proper¬
ties of any single object.
So not only can a single object correspond to many sources, but a single source may
correspond to many objects. Finally, the identification implies that just as a source is a set
of mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of states, so an object is a mutually exclusive and
exhaustive set of properties! Whatever objects are, they are surely not such exclusive and
exhaustive sets. So objects cannot be identified with informational sources.
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There are also difficulties with the identification of informational states and properties. Con¬
sider the flipping of three coins. Each may fall heads or tails. The states of each coin may
be taken to constitute an informational source. Let us call the states of the first coin SI and
S2, the states of the second coin T1 and T2, and the third U1 and U2. In the information
theoretic description there is nothing to say that the apparently unrelated states correspond
to the same properties (SI, T1 and U1 correspond to the property of falling heads; S2, T2
and U2 correspond to the property of falling tails). So, just as many sources may be asso¬
ciated with a single object, many states may be associated with a single property. In partic¬
ular, states cannot be independent of their sources in the same way that properties are
independent of the objects which instantiate them. Independent objects may have the same
property, but there is no account of how independent sources can have the same state.
Further, just as a source need not be associated with an object at all, so a state need be
associated with no particular property. After all, if a source does not correspond to an
object, then the states of source cannot correspond to the properties of that object.
Consider the three coins. Each coin has either the property of falling heads or tails. The
eight informational states may be mnemonically labelled: HHH, HHT, HTH, HTT, THH,
THT, TTH, TTT. These states do not correspond to the properties of any object (unless the
three coins are viewed as a single object with such ad hoc properties as falling head-head-
head, head-tail-tail, tail-head-head...).
Notice that there are important differences in the expressive power of object-property talk
and source-state talk. Viewing the example in terms of objects of properties, we may note
that, say, HHT, HTH, and HHT have something in common. That is, one of the coins fell
heads, and the other two fell tails. While, on our mnemonic labelling, it is apparent that the
states do have something in common (since the labels contain one "H" and two "T"s), if
we relabel the states non-mnemonically {{SI, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8}}, the set of
states in which one coin falls heads is {S4, S6, S7}. In terms of objects and properties, the
states in which just one coin falls heads can be straightforwardly delimited. Yet there is no
way to pick out this set in terms of sources and states, except by enumeration.
The intuitive notion of information content applies to any proposition, whereas Drestke's
notion is more restricted. In particular, an information signal is viewed as carrying infor¬
mation of the form s is F. Yet it seems that Dretske's definition can easily be extended to
deal with arbitrary propositions. The source of Drestke's restrictions appears to be the
identification of objects with sources, and properties with states. In the present section we
have seen that these identifications are unworkable.
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Let us now turn to Dretske's restriction that an information signal may not carry informa¬
tion which picks out the object s, but only about some object s that is F.
1.4 De Re and De Dicto
Dretske says that his definition of information content gives us an "account of what philo¬
sopher might call the signal's de re informational content, a content that might, (more
revealingly) be expressed by saying that r carries the information of or about s that it is F.
This content is called a de re (versus a de dicto) content because what is being described
when we describe a signal's informational content is a relation between what is expressed
by an open sentence ("...is F") and some individual s." Given that Dretske identifies objects
with sources and properties with states, this restriction follows directly from the trivial
observation that an informational signal can carry no information about the nature of the
source. Information reduces possibilities at a given source, rather than specifying one
source rather than another.
If objects are identified with sources, and properties are identified with states, then the
observation that a signal carries information about the state S of the source s becomes the
constraint that a signal carries information that the object s has the property S. The obser¬
vation that a signal cannot carry information about the nature of the source s becomes the
constraint that a signal cannot carry information picking out the object s.
It is this constraint on informational content that a signal can carry that Dretske expresses
by saying that his definition of information content gives us an "account of what philoso¬
phers might call the signal's de re informational content". I have argued that this constraint
flows naturally from the conflation of objects with sources, and properties of objects with
states of sources. In introducing the apparently natural extension of Dretske's ideas to arbi¬
trary propositions, it was argued that such a restriction is unnecessary. Further, it is unable
to handle some of Dretske's own examples. For instance, having introduced the definition
of information content, and having argued that it applies only to de re rather than de dicto
prepositional contents, Dretske applies the definition to the following scenario.
A group of eight employees must decide who is to perform some unpleasant task. Since
they must choose one and only one employee, the set of possible choices constitutes a
source. Having made their decision, the employees write the name of the hapless individual
on a piece of paper and have it sent to the manager. There must be one and only one name
on the piece of paper that the manager receives, and which name is present carries
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information about the state of the source. Hence, the set of eight possible names may be
viewed as a receiver. In one scenario, the employees agree to name Herman if either Her¬
man or Shirley are selected, since Shirley has delicate health. As it happens, Herman is
selected directly, and so the memo arrives on the manager's desk with "Herman" printed on
it. The note having "Herman" on it is consistent with 2 out of the 8 employees having been
initially selected. Since this involves reducing 8 equally likely possibilities to 2...
"...communication theory told us that the note carried only 2 bits of information about
which employee had been selected... But although this theory tells us how much informa¬
tion the note carries, it does not tell us what information it carries. As far as this quantita¬
tive theory is concerned, the memo could carry a variety of different messages as long as
these messages have a measure of 2 bits. So, for example, the memo might carry the in¬
formation that either Herman or Shirley was selected (2 bits) or it might carry the infor¬
mation that either Herman or Donald was selected (2 bits). Both these possible messages
are true (since Herman was selected)... Our definition of a signal's propositional content
neatly distinguishes between these two possible messages. It fixes on Herman or Shirley as
the content rather than Herman or Donald because the former possibility (given the name
appearing on the memo) has a probability of 1 while the latter possibility has a probability
of only .5." (Dretske, 1981:68)
The information content that Herman or Shirley are selected is of the the form s is F, so
this content might superficially appear to be compatible with Dretske's account.- However,
the information content of the signal does not specify what property the object s has, but
rather to pick out which which object or objects have that property. The information con¬
tent of the signal is that Herman or Shirley rather than Herman or Donald or Eric is
selected. The content is not that Herman or Shirley are selected rather than left out. Making
the appropriate substitutions in Dretske's text we have:
"The informational content of a signal is being expressed in the form "s is F" [Herman or
Shirley are selected] where the letter 5 [Herman or Shirley] is understood to be an indexi-
cal or demonstrative element referring to some item at the source. What the definition
gives us is an account of... a content that might... be expressed by saying of or about s
[Herman or Shirley] that it is F [... is selected]." (Dretske, 1981: 66)
"...it is only the descriptive or conceptual elements embodied in the predicate expression
("...is F") [...is selected] that reflect the informational content of the signal." (Dretske,
1981: 67) (My additions in square brackets)
In the present case, the information carried by the signal is not ofHerman or Shirley, that
one of them was selected. Rather, it is of the selection that Herman or Shirley was picked.
Perhaps Dretkse's account can be saved by recasting "Herman or Shirley (s) are selected
(F)" as "the selection (s) was Herman_or_Shirlied (F)", say. However, the need to resort to
such convolutions in order to make simple examples fit the required form is unnecessary, if
we merely lift the restrictions on the propositional content of an informational signal.
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According to the revised definition of information content, an information signal may carry
an arbitrary proposition. A signal Q carries the information that P, where P is any proposi¬
tion if and only if the conditional probability of P given Q is 1. The probability that Her¬
man or Shirley is selected, given that the name "Herman" is on the memo (the signal) is 1.
The probability that Herman or Donald is selected, given that the name "Herman" is on the
memo is less than 1. Hence according to the revised definition the signal carries the infor¬
mation that Herman or Shirley rather than that Herman or Donald is selected, as required.
The propositional account does not differentiate between de re and de dicto.
1.5 Multiple Information Contents and Nested Information
Consider again the case of the flipped coin and the shout. The observer shouts "Hurrah!"
for heads, and "Oh no!" for tails. According to our current definition of information con¬
tent, the shout of "Hurrah!" carries the information that the coin fell heads, since the condi¬
tional probability of the proposition that the coin falls heads given the proposition that the
observer shouted "Hurrah!" is 1.
Perhaps we allow in to the idealisation the possibility that the coin may occasionally bal¬
ance on edge. This elicits a cry of "Good grief!". Such an idealisation contains a source
and receiver each with three rather than two possible states. The cry of "Heads!" carries the
information that the coin fell heads, and also carries the information that the coin did not
fall tails, that the coin did not balance on edge, and, for that matter, that the coin neither
fell tails nor balanced on edge.
Dretske makes the point as follows:
"... it makes little sense to speak of the informational content of a signal. For if a signal
carries the information that s is F, and s's being F carries, in turn, the information that s
is G (or t is H), then this same signal also carries the information that s is G (or t is H).
For example, if r carries the information that s is a square, then it also carries the infor¬
mation that j is a rectangle. This is so because if the conditional probability (given r) of
s's being a square is 1, then the conditional probability (given r) of s's being a rectangle
is also 1. Furthermore such a signal will also carry the information that s is a quadrala-
teral, a parallelogram, not a circle, not a pentagon, a square or a circle, and so on. Simi¬
larly, if the mercury's expansion carries the information that the temperature is rising,
then any signal carrying the information that the mercury is expanding also carries the in¬
formation that the temperature is rising... This point may be expressed by saying that if a
signal carries the information that s is F, it also carries all the information nested in s's
being F. This follows immediately from our definition of a signal's informational content
and the following definition of the nesting relation:
The information that t is G is nested in s's being F = s's being F carries the information
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that t is G."
(Dretske, 1981:70-71)
Since on our revised definition of the notion of information content, informational signals
are specified by atomic propositions (P, Q), rather than propositions of the form s is F, the
definition of nestedness becomes simply:
The proposition that Q is nested in the proposition that P = P carries the information that
Q.
The definition applies straightforwardly to our initial example. Consider the proposition
that the coin fell heads; that the information that the coin did not fall tails; that the coin did
not balance on edge; that the coin neither fell tails or balanced on edge; that the coin is in
stable (rather than unstable) equilibrium; that the Queen's head is uppermost; that the bet
has been won; that the observer is 5 pounds richer. All these propositions are nested in the
proposition that the observer cries "Hurrah!" (if the idealisation is sufficiently rich, as will
be stressed below).
Notice that the nestedness relation is not antisymmetric. That is, Q's being nested in P does
not preclude the possibility that P is nested in Q. According to our definitions, P and Q
will be mutually nested just in case the conditional probability of P given Q is 1, and the
conditional probability of Q given P is 1. This will be true if there is some lawlike relation
between P and Q which ensures that if either is true then both are true. Let us say that pro¬
positions P and <2 track each other if they are mutually nested. If P and Q track each other,
they have identical informational properties: that is, P carries the information that R just
when <2 carries the information that P; and a signal S carries the information that P just
when it also carries the information that Q. For example, the proposition that the Queen's
head faces up tracks the proposition that the coin falls heads, since neither proposition can
be true without the other being true. All and only signals that carry the information that the
Queen's head faces up also carry the information that the coin fell heads; and all and only
pieces of information carried by the proposition that the Queen's head faces up are also
carried by the proposition that the coin fell heads.
We have seen that a signal may carry many pieces of information. Information content is
thus crucially different from semantic or representational content. Whereas the observer's
utterance of "You owe me five pounds" carries the information that he is happy, that he is
from Scotland, that he has a cold, that he is owed five pounds, and so on, it means just that
his friend owes him five pounds, and no more. To account for representation in terms of
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informational content we must have some way of specifying some unique content from the
mass of information that a signal carries. To this end Dretske introduces the notions of a
signal's carrying information in digital and completely digital form. In later sections we
shall be extensively concerned with these ideas and their application.
1.6 Relativity to Knowledge: the Parenthetical k
Informational Properties and Informational Idealisation
Informational properties are relative to the specification of an informational system. In the
example of the British gymnasts and the partisan crowd (of section 1.2), what information
the state of the crowd carries and whether information transmission is noisy or equivocal
were found to depend on the particular informational idealisation chosen.
Consider the informational idealisation of the receiver: Is the crowd viewed as a two state
source (happy, or groaning); or is it viewed as a four state source (happy and eating pop¬
corn; happy and not eating popcorn; groaning and eating popcorn; groaning and not eating
popcorn)? Since there is no dependency between popcorn eating and the performance of
the gymnast, if we employ the latter idealisation, some of the information generated by the
crowd being in a particular state is not information carried about the state of the gymnast.
Hence information transmission is noisy. If the two state idealisation of the state of the
crowd is employed, there is no such additional information, and hence information
transmission is noiseless.
Or consider the idealisation of the source. Is the state of gymnast treated as a two state
source (either on the beam or on the floor) or a four state source (either on the beam or on
the floor wearing either red, white and blue or leopard skin strip)? Since the colour of the
strip is not determined by the state of the crowd (assuming that the idealisation of the
crowd is not sensitive to the giggling of the spectators), there is information generated at
the source which is not carried by the state of the receiver. That is, information transmis¬
sion is equivocal. If the two state idealisation of the state of the gymnasts is employed, all
the information generated at the source (whether or not the gymnast falls oft) is carried by
the state of the crowd (whether the crowd is happy or groaning). Hence information
transmission is not equivocal. So, if two state sources are used in both cases, transmission
is noiseless and unequivocal. If four state sources are used, information transmission is
both noisy and equivocal - informational properties are dependent on the way in which the
states are individuated.
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Informational properties are also sensitive to the absolute probabilities of each state of the
source and receiver and the conditional probabilities of each state of the receiver given each
state of the source. In the present example, we have assumed that the crowd will certainly
groan, if the gymnast falls off the bar. Despite the partisan attitude of the crowd, there are
imaginable circumstances in which the gymnast falls off the bar and the crowd does not
react. For example, the entire crowd could simultaneously be doing up their shoelaces at
the time of the fall, and so fail to notice it; the crowd could be under mass hypnosis; the
stadium might be rocked by an earthquake, thus distracting the crowd from the event, and
so on. If these are treated as genuine possibilities, then the conditional probability of the
crowd groaning, given the gymnast's mishap is less than 1. It is always possible to ima¬
gine ways in which information flow might break down. The voltmeter might be faulty,
the informant might be lying, my senses might be deceiving me. The probabilities we
assign to the absolute and conditional probabilities will depend on which imaginable possi¬
bilities we take into account, and which we idealise away from.
Since informational properties depend on the specification of the states of the source and
receiver and the associated absolute and conditional probabilities we have considerable free¬
dom in assigning informational properties to real world situations. Dretske notes that,
pretheoretically, information transmission appears to be relative to the knowledge of an
observer, and builds this directly in to the definition of information content by adding the
parenthetical k. I shall argue that this move is unnecessary. What is relative to the
knowledge of the observer is the informational idealisation appropriate for modeling the
situation. The different idealisations appropriate for different observers will automatically
generate the differences in the informational properties that our intuitions require. In short, I
argue that the importance of the knowledge of the observer is that it constrains the way in
which the theory is appropriately applied, and should not be part of the theory itself. This
is more than a terminological variation. Firstly, many different knowledge states of the
observer may correspond to the same informational idealisation - much of the' observers
knowledge may be irrelevant, for example. Secondly, idealisation relativity applies even
when there is no observer. Thirdly, putting considerations of observer knowledge outside
the domain of the theory of information allows a tractable formalisation of Dretske's ideas
to be provided (as we shall see below).
Knowledge Relativity
Dretske explains the role of the parenthetical k in the definition of information content as
follows:
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"Our definition of informational content makes reference to what the receiver already
knows (k) about the possibilities existing at the source. To illustrate, suppose that there
are four shells and a peanut is located under one of them. In attempting to find under
which shell the peanut is located, I turn over shells 1 and 2 and discover them to be emp¬
ty. At this point you arrive on the scene and join the investigation. You are not told about
my previous discoveries. We turn over shell 3 and find it empty. How much information
do you receive from this observation? How much do I receive? Do I receive information
that you do not receive?" (Dretske, 1981:78)
"Having already examined shells 1 and 2, I know they are empty. The peanut is under ei¬
ther shell 3 or 4. When we turn over shell 3 and find it empty, the two possibilities are re¬
duced to one. Hence, the third observation provides me with 1 bit of information as to the
whereabouts of the peanut. You, however, undertake the examination of shell 3 in ig¬
norance of the results of the first two observations. For you there are four possibilities and
the examination of shell 3 reduces these four possibilities to three. Hence, you receive
only .42 bits of information as to the whereabouts of the peanut. Since there are 2 bits of
information associated with the peanut's being under shell 4, you receive too little infor¬
mation to locate the peanut... On the other hand, the third observation supplies m'e with
the information that shell 3 is empty (1 bit) and the information that the peanut is under
shell 4 (1 bit). The latter piece of information is (for me) nested in the former piece of in¬
formation. For you it is not." (Dretske, 1981:79)
Dretske's calculations are based on the following reasoning. Since I know that the peanut is
not under shell 1 or shell 2, and have no further information about the location of the
peanut, the source has two equally probable states (peanut under shell 3 or 4). When shell
3 is uncovered, only one possible state remains (peanut under shell 4). 2 equally probable
alternatives have been reduced to 1. Hence 1 bit of information is generated at the source.
Since you initially know nothing other than that the peanut is under on of the four cups, the
lifting of cup 3 reduces 4 equally probable state to 3. This generates just .42 bits of infor¬
mation.
A source consists of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states, each with an associ¬
ated probability. In the calculations above, in considering the amount of information that I
gain from the lifting of shell 3, a source with two equally likely states is employed (peanut
under shell 3 or peanut under shell 4). In considering the amount of information that you
gain from the lifting of shell 3, a source with four equally likely states is employed (peanut
under shell 1, 2, 3, or 4). These are distinct sources. That is, on Dretske's own account,
the appropriate informational idealisation of the situation is relative to the knowledge of the
observer under consideration. Since information content is defined like all other informa¬
tional properties relative to an informational idealisation, there is no need to build
knowledge in to the definition of information content. The intuition that information content
is relative to knowledge is captured by the fact that knowledge constrains the appropriate
informational idealisation and that information content is relative to informational idealisa¬
tion.
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Dretske takes his example to elucidate the significance of "what the receiver already knows
(k) about the possibilities existing at the source" (Dretske, 1981:78). However, the calcula¬
tions above have concerned only information generated at the source. In the example, as
outlined, no receiver has been specified. There has been no mention of a set of mutually
exclusive and exhaustive set of states with associated absolute probabilities, and probabili¬
ties conditional on the states of the source. We have been concerned with information gen¬
eration, and not information flow. While there are no receivers, in the information theoretic
sense, there are observers: you and me.
Some mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of states of an observer can, of course, be
viewed as a receiver. However, as noted above, Dretske seems rather to identify observers
with receivers, k "is meant to stand for what the receiver already knows" (Dretske,
1981:65). But receivers cannot know anything. They are merely sets of states with associ¬
ated probabilities. We argued above that informational sources cannot be identified with
objects; still less can they be identified with people. So we cannot accept at face value
Dretske's conclusion that what is required is
"... a relativisation of the information contained in a signal because how much information
a signal contains, and hence what information it carries, depends on what the potential re¬
ceiver already knows about the various possibilities that exist at the source." (Dretske,
1981:79)
The substance of Dretske's analysis of the example, however, is unobjectionable. Accord¬
ing to the definition of information content, Dretske might be expected to take a single
informational system (with one source and one receiver) and somehow apply to it a
knowledge relative notion of information content. That is, the notion of information content
would assign a different information content to the same signal of the same receiver, about
the state of the same source, depending of the knowledge of the observer. In practice, how¬
ever, Dretske adopts distinct idealisations of the situation (two distinct sources, one with
two states and one with four states), according to the knowledge of the observer that he is
considering, and applies the same notion of information content in each case. Dretske's
conclusion that the information carried by a signal is knowledge dependent might be recast.
What is required is
A relativisation of the information generated by an occurrence because how much infor¬
mation an occurrence contains, and hence what information it carries, depends on what
idealisation of the information system we adopt.
The degree to which an idealisation captures our intuitions about what information some
occurrence carries for an individual, depends, at least in part, on what that individual takes
the possibilities to be. That is, what that individual already knows about the various
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possibilities (such as whether or not the peanut can be under shells 1 and 2) constrains the
way the information theoretic apparatus should be applied. The parenthetical k need play no
role in the account of information content itself.
Information Content and Propositions with Probability 1
It may be argued that Dretske's parenthetical k cannot be dispensed with so easily. Con¬
sider a variant of the previous example. As the peanut and the cups are being set up I
sneakily look through the keyhole, and see that the peanut is under shell 4. I then come in
and begin the procedure as usual. Shell 1 is lifted and found to be empty. On the revised
definition of information content, we arrive at the very counterintuitive conclusion that the
proposition that shell 1 is empty carries the information that the peanut is under shell 4.
Applying our new definition of informational content, we have:
The proposition that the peanut is not under shell 1 carries the information that the peanut
is under shell 4 = The conditional probability that the peanut is under shell 4, given that
the peanut is not under shell 1, is 1.
Since I saw the peanut being put under shell 4, the probability that the peanut is under shell
4 is 1, on any informational set up which appropriately idealises my knowledge of the
situation. Hence, trivially, the probability of the peanut's being under shell 4 given that the
peanut is not under shell 1 is also 1. So, according to the revised definition, the informa¬
tion that the peanut is under shell 4 is carried. More generally, if any state of a source has
probability 1, then it must have probability 1 conditional on any other state. If the probabil¬
ity that the sun will rise is 1, then the probability that the sun will rise, given that the
Johnny forget to do his homework is also 1. Hence, Johnny forgetting to do his homework
carries the information that the sun will rise.
Dretske avoids this problem in his definition:
"Information content: A signal r carries the information that s is F = The conditional pro¬
bability of s's being F, given r (and k), is 1 (but given k alone, less than 1)" (Dretske,
1981:65)
The clause "(but given k alone, less than 1)" corresponds to the informal intuition that you
can't learn something that you already know. So according to an appropriate idealisation,
the probability that the coin is under shell 4 is 1, given k alone, and hence no signal r can
carry this piece of information. Similarly, neither Johnny's forgetting to do his homework,
nor any other signal can carry the information that the sun will rise, if we idealise the abso¬
lute probability that the sun will rise as 1.
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One natural way to avoid the consequence that any signal carries all propositions with pro¬
bability 1, according to the revised definition, is to borrow Dretske's approach. That is, we
could stipulate that a proposition at a source may be carried by signal if its absolute proba¬
bility is not 1:
A signal Q carries the information that P, where P is any proposition = The conditional
probability of P given Q is 1, and the absolute probability of P is less than 1.
However, this option is a provisional solution only. As we modify and generalise our
theory of information content, we must ensure that the new account also avoids this conse¬
quence. In the formal treatment below (2.5), we shall see that this may be straightforwardly
avoided.
1.7 Information and the Real World
In Chapter 2 we turn to the modification and simplification of Dretske's notion of informa¬
tion content. We have found two crucial presuppositions of Dretske's work to be unsound.
Firstly, that objects can be identified with sources, and properties with states; and secondly,
that the informational properties of a situation can be specified independently from any par¬
ticular informational idealisation. I shall now argue that these assumptions are closely
related.
Information theory idealises situations into informational sources and states (I use situation
as loosely and atheoretically as possible). Informational properties are defined within an
informational idealisation. Hence, the informational idealisation that we choose influences
the informational properties that we ascribe in a particular situation. The number of bits that
the falling of a coin generates is dependent on the idealisation that we employ. If we are
concerned only with heads/tails orientation, then only 1 bit is generated; if our idealisation
includes the position on the ground on which the coin falls, then considerably more infor¬
mation is generated. Since Dretske bases his theory of informational and semantic content
on (some of) the ideas of information theory, this idealisation dependence applies equally
to both accounts. Whether or not a shout of "Heads" carries the information that the coin
actually fell heads is dependent on the idealisation of the situation that we choose. For
example, suppose that the speaker tells the truth half the time and lies the other half of the
time. On this particular occasion, he decided to tell the truth. On one idealisation, the
utterance does not carry the information, since there is only a 75% chance that the coin is
in fact heads, given the shout. On another idealisation, the utterance does carry the infor¬
mation, since, given that he had decided to tell the truth, the probability that the coin was
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heads, given the shout was 1. We can idealise a voltmeter as giving the correct reading
with probability 1 (if it is working); on the other hand, we can idealise the same voltmeter
as giving the correct reading with probability .95 (because it doesn't work properly 5% of
the time. In general, we may either presuppose that certain conditions hold as prerequisites
for the idealisation, or include the possibility that they do not as part of the idealisation.
The idealisation dependence of informational properties appears to contrast with the
apparent idealisation independence of physical properties. For example, the mass or tem¬
perature of the coin are the same under any idealisation. Whether the coin is idealised as a
point mass, or as a thin disc, or as a cylindrical volume, it still is assigned the same mass
and temperature. If we wish to be realists about information and information flow, the
idealisation dependence of informational properties may be worrying.
The idealisation dependence of informational properties may be rendered unthreatening if
there is only one appropriate idealisation of the real world. Of course, in analysing particu¬
lar situations with particular informational idealisations we may only capture incomplete
fragments of the whole. Indeed, the incompleteness of these fragments may mislead us as
to the informational properties that should be ascribed. If our idealisation is too impover¬
ished, for example, we might not account for the information that the temperature of the
coin carries about the temperature of the room. However, on what I shall call the one true
informational idealisation hypothesis, there is a determinate fact about whether such infor¬
mation is carried or not. This view is analogous to the naive view (with no derogatory
overtones intended) of idealisation in the physical sciences. To idealise the coin as a point
mass is appropriate for predicting the trajectory that it takes when flipped; an idealisation as
a thin disc may be appropriate for accounting for the fact that it cannot be passed through
the cheese grater; an idealisation under a description of its conductivity may be appropriate
for accounting for the degree to which its temperature mirrors the temperature of the room.
But, on the naive view, if we knew everything about the coin, we could frame a single
idealisation (perhaps such an idealisation would be expressed in terms of atoms and
molecules) capturing all the physical properties of the coin. This would be a basic physical
idealisation. Less general idealisations are only useful insofar as they are special cases of
the larger idealisation. The basic physical idealisation might be said to ground physical pro¬
perties. Similarly, on a naive realist view towards information, then there should be a basic
informational idealisation which grounds informational properties.
Hence although informational properties are relative to idealisation, according to the "one
true" informational idealisation hypothesis, informational properties need not be seen as
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intrinsically relative to a particular idealisation. There is, on such a view, a fact of the
matter as to whether the shout carries the information that the coin fell heads or not. The
fact of the matter is determined by whether or not the information was carried on the one
true informational idealisation.
I argue that i) it is inescapable that informational properties are idealisation relative; ii) the
"one true" informational idealisation hypothesis is untenable. Hence it is impossible to
make informational ascriptions about the world tout court without specifying an informa¬
tional idealisation to which the informational properties ascribed are relative. That is, unless
a particular idealisation is understood, it cannot be asserted that the flipping of the coin car¬
ries 1 bit of information; or that the shout carries or does not carry the information that the
coin fell heads.
Since Dretske does not explicitly discuss the issue of idealisation relativity, it would be
misleading to ascribe to Dretske the view that either i) or ii) are mistaken (although it is
possible that he may hold this position). However, Dretske does implicitly go against i) and
ii) in that he consistently does ascribe informational properties as if these are bare proper¬
ties of the world.
How is it that Dretske does not notice that he has adopted this strong and controversial
position? I argue that it is the result of a running identification of informational sources
with real world objects, and of informational states with properties of those objects. There
is an easy slippage between talk of an informational source consisting of two mutually
exclusive and exhaustive states of the coin as generating 1 bit of information, and the coin
itself generating 1 bit of information. Indeed, such confusion is latent when we say, for
example, "consider the coin as a two state source". Yet it is a category mistake to identify
sources with objects. A source is just a set of states, not an object. The coin has mass, tem¬
perature and orientation. A set of states can have none of these properties.
The identification of objects with sources and properties with states appears to give a trivial
translation from "informational talk" into "real world" talk. The content of a shout is not
just that some source is in such and such a state, but that the coin has the property of fal¬
ling heads. If we are realists about the ontology of the real world (about objects and pro¬
perties), then, given the identification, we can be realists about the informational world. In
so far as there are real world facts about what objects and properties there are, and what
laws hold between them there will be corresponding informational facts about what sources
and states there are and what information flows between them. That is, informational
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properties turn out to be idealisation independent after all. For there is, if we make the
identification between informational and real objects, one true idealisation - the one that
corresponds to the objects and properties and laws that make up the world. Of course, such
a line is less than persuasive for those who find notions of object, property and law prob¬
lematic. Still, surely to show that an account of content is naturalistically respectable there
is no need to explicate notions which underlie the physical sciences also.
So the identification of real and informational objects leads to a "one true idealisation" view
of information. The informational properties of a system may be specified without specify¬
ing a particular way in which that system is being idealised by the theorist, but tout court.
Hence, Dretske's conflation of informational and real objects leads him to the view that
informational properties can be specified without reference to idealisation.
Although I have extensively argued against the identification of sources with objects and
states with properties, I have not argued against the "one true" idealisation hypothesis.
Rather than addressing the hypothesis head on, the subsequent discussion will attempt to
show the inappropriateness the hypothesis by tracing the consequences that it has for the
development of the theory. I claim that Dretske's account is strongly influenced by the con¬
straint imposed by the hypothesis.
Consider the "knowledge relativity of information (1.8, above). In the present account, this
was explained as a consequence of the fact that appropriate informational idealisation of a
situation is inter alia a function of the knowledge of the participants. I know that the
peanut is not under shell's 1 and 2, and so a two state source is an appropriate idealisation
of the position of the peanut. For you, on the other hand, the peanut could be under any of
the shells, and so a four state source is appropriate. Dretske, however, does not appeal to
the relativity of informational properties to idealisations; rather, he adds the "parenthetical
k" to his definition of information content.
I shall argue below that the "aboutness" condition in the analog-digital distinction, and the
account of the communication channel are also products of Dretske's unwillingness to
accept idealisation relativity. The "one true idealisation hypothesis" creates a variety of
difficulties for the analog-digital distinction. The "aboutness" condition on digitalisation
amounts to an attempt to circumvent some of these difficulties; it is an attempt that I claim
is ultimately unworkable.
In considering these issues in detail below, I aim to show that the relativity of
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informational properties to informational idealisation is fundamental to the proper treatment
of information and information processing.
1.8 Propositions and States
According to the revised treatment of informational content, an informational source is
taken to consist of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions:
A signal Q carries the information that P, where P is any proposition = The conditional
probability of P given Q is 1.
The state of the receiver (the signal, Q) and the state of the source (the information carried,
P) are propositions. On this approach, every proposition that can be carried by an informa¬
tional signal must belong to some informational source in that idealisation. So if a signal
carries information about a source {{PI, P2,....PN]}, then the only propositions that it can
carry are PI, P2, ...PN (and, perhaps, Boolean functions of these). Let us return to the
case of the flipped coin, which may fall heads or tails. The most natural informational
idealisation is {{coin falls heads, coin falls tails}}. The observer's shouting "Hurrah!" car¬
ries the information that the coin fell heads, since the probability of that state of the source,
given such a shout, (the proposition that the coin falls heads) is 1. Informally it seems that
the observer's shouting "Hurrah!" also carries further, distinct propositions: that the
Queen's head is facing up, that the monarch's head is facing up, that the Queen's head is
visible, and so on. Similarly, it seems that a cry of "Oh no!" carries the further information
that the Queen's head is facing down, that the monarch's head is facing down, that the
Queen's head is not visible and so on.
If states are identified with propositions, then each of these propositions corresponds to a
different informational state. An informational source is a set of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive propositions. Hence if two states can be true together they must belong to dis¬
tinct informational sources. Any propositions that are carried by the same signal will be
true together, given that signal. Hence, the propositions that the coin fell heads, that the
Queen's head is facing up, that the monarch's head is facing up, that the Queen's head is
visible, must belong to different informational sources. The number of informational
sources required in our informational idealisation is in danger of getting very large indeed.
It appears necessary to postulate distinct informational sources: {{coin falls heads, coin
falls tails}}; {{Queen's head faces up, Queen's head faces down}}; {{monarch's head
faces up, monarch's head faces down}}; {{Queen's head is visible, Queen's head is not
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visible}}.
In the formal account of information theory, on which Dretske's notion of information con¬
tent based, an informational system consists of a Source, a Receiver and the absolute and
conditional probabilities associated with their states. To formalise the intuition that a signal
can carry more than one piece of information, the account must simply be extended to
allow informational systems to have more than two informational sources. To capture the
richness of our previous example, we shall need a lot more than two.
Such informational inflation may make one wonder if distinct informational sources are
really necessary. Should the propositions that the coin fell heads, that the Queen's head
faces up, that the monarch's head faces up, that the Queen's head is visible really be
treated as corresponding to distinct informational states? Perhaps these propositions should
be viewed as different ways of describing the same informational state. Perhaps the grain of
informational states should be coarser than the grain of propositions. There is an intuition
that, in the situation described in the example, the coins falling heads, a monarch's facing
upward, the Queen's head being visible and so on, all amount to the same thing. However,
there are two considerations which mitigate against using some coarse grained notion of
state rather than a finer grained notion of proposition.
Firstly, the information content of a signal is typically construed as propositional. The shout
of "Hurrah!" is said to carry the information that the coin fell heads. The object of "that"
clauses are typically taken to be propositions rather than states. If the "states" of informa¬
tional sources are taken to be propositions, then the propositional nature of information
content does not stand in need of explanation. On the other hand, if the informational
notion of a state is considered to be distinct from (perhaps more coarse grained than) the
proposition which is the content of the signal, then an additional account of how to get
from state-talk (in the which the informational set-up is described) to proposition-talk (in
which content ascriptions are made) is required. That is, since the information theoretic
apparatus only licenses talk of states, there is need for an account of how a signal's deter¬
mining that a source is in a particular state amounts that signal's carrying a particular pro¬
position. The advantage of the identification of states of a source with propositions is that
there is no need to provide such an account - for a signal to determine that the source is in
state S6 is ipso facto for it to carry the proposition that S6. It seems parsimonious to argue
that informational sources are collections of propositions, and that a signal (some proposi¬
tion 0 carries a proposition (P) just if the probability of P given Q is 1. It seems distinctly
less parsimonious to argue that states are somehow different from, but closely related to,
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propositions, such that a signal may carry a proposition just when it determines that the
source is in an appropriate state. If the states of an informational source are not identified
with propositions, then a rigourous account must be provided of the relationship that does
connect the two. For it is this relationship which licenses talk of a proposition being car¬
ried by a signal, rather than merely talk of the state of the source being determined by a
signal. A theory that does not spell out the nature of the relationship between states of an
informational source and propositions is not properly described as a theory of informational
content at all. The present approach does provide an account of this relationship, albeit the
simplest possible relationship, identity.
This argument for a prepositional treatment is hardly overwhelming. Perhaps some natural
and appropriate mapping between state-talk and proposition-talk can be provided, or
perhaps our naive ascription of propositional content is misguided, and should be replaced
with a coarser grained state-based notion. However, I take the second consideration to be
more compelling - that what licenses our intuitions about which propositions amount to the
same thing in a given informational set-up are best captured within the information idealisa¬
tion itself. To perform this task, the idealisation must be able to represent the distinct pro¬
positions separately, before demonstrating that they are, in the relevant sense, equivalent.
The point is best made with reference to specific examples.
In the case of the coin which may fall heads or tails, it seems plausible that the proposition
that the coin fell heads, and the proposition that the Queen's head faces up, amount to the
same thing. However, consider an example in which the coin is picked at random from a
collection of old British coins. There might be a half chance that the coin picked has a
queen on it, and a half chance that it has a king on it. In an appropriate informational
idealisation of this example, the proposition that the Queen's head faces up may be more
specific than the proposition that the coin fell heads. Even in this case, the proposition that
the coin falls heads still seems to amount to the same thing as the proposition that a
monarch faces up since a monarch faces up when and only when the coin falls heads.
Suppose, however, that the coin is drawn from a collection of coins of the world. Then the
proposition that a monarch is facing up is more specific than (and hence carries) the propo¬
sition that the coin falls heads, for it may be that, say, a president is depicted on the coin
rather than a monarch. Similarly, the proposition that the coin falls heads and the proposi¬
tion that the Queen is visible do not amount to the same thing if the coin may balance on
edge. If the coin balances on edge and is oriented appropriately, the Queen may be visible,
but the coin has not fallen heads. So the proposition that the coin falls heads is more
specific than (and hence carries) the proposition that the Queen is visible.
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We noted above that our intuitions that distinct propositions can amount to the same thing
is best treated within the informational framework. Specifically, I propose that two propo¬
sitions amount to the same thing, relative to a particular informational idealisation, just in
case they track each other.
Propositions P and Q track just when P carries the information that Q and Q carries the
information that P. The relation of tracking is an equivalence relation. It is symmetric (if P
tracks Q then Q tracks P), transitive (if P tracks Q and Q tracks R, then P tracks R), and
reflexive (P tracks P). Hence, given an informational idealisation, we may partition the set
of propositions into equivalence classes. This partition is informationally well motivated
since if P and Q track they have identical informational properties (see section 1.7 above).
That is, P carries the information that R just when Q carries the information that R\ and a
signal S carries the information that P just when it also carries the information that Q. So if
P and Q track each other, from an informational point of view, they do amount to the same
thing (the present informal discussion will be made precise in the Chapter II). On this line
the informational equivalence of distinct propositions can only be ascertained from within
the informational idealisation. Distinct propositions must receive distinct representations
within the informational system. Hence, in our initial example, the propositions that the
coin falls heads, that the Queen's head faces up, that a monarch faces up, and that the
Queen is visible, should be assigned to different informational states in the informational
idealisation. For only by examining the information flow within this particular informational
idealisation can we discover that the these propositions are informationally equivalent. If
these distinct propositions are assigned the same informational state in the idealisation (on
the basis that the grain of states is coarser than the grain of propositions), then the informa¬
tional relation between the coin's falling heads and the Queen's head facing up cannot even
be expressed, since there are not two informational states but one.
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1.9 The Problem of Probabilistic Contents
Dretske discusses the restriction that a signal only has a certain proposition as its informa¬
tion content if the conditional probability that the proposition is true given that signal is
precisely 1.
"Up to this point examples have been carefully chosen so as to always yield an
identifiable content. Not all signals, however, have an informational content that lends it¬
self so neatly and economically to propositional expression. Suppose that s can be in any
of four different states, each of which is equally likely: A, B, C, and D. Suppose, further¬
more, that s occupies state B and a signal r carries 1 bit of information about the situation
at 5. There are a variety of ways a signal can carry 1 bit of information about the condi¬
tion of s. It might, for example, reduce the probability of A and D to 0, leaving B and C
equally likely. In this event the signal carries 1 bit of information and (according to our
definition) carries the information that s is in either state B or C. But the signal might also
shift the configuration of probabilities in such a way as to yield 1 bit of information. If,





then... the equivocation is 1 bit. Hence, r carries 1 bit of information about the condition
of s. What is the content of this signal? What is the message? We obviously cannot sup¬
pose that the signal carries the information that .9 is in state B because, even though s is in
state B, this condition generates 2 bits of information and our signal carries only 1 bit.
Neither can we suppose that the signal carries the information (say) that s is in either state
B or state C. For although 5 is in either state B or state C and although this condition has
a measure of only 1 bit, our definition tells us that this is not the 1 bit of information that
the signal carries (since the probability of this state is less than 1). There is not, in fact,
any unqualified way of expressing the information carried by this signal. The best we can
do in such cases is to say that the signal carries the information that s is probably in state
B. This comes closest to satisfying our definition of informational content, since (we may
suppose) the conditional probability of s's probably being B, given r, is unity. I am not
sure that it makes sense to talk this way. It is silly, of course, to think of s's probably be¬
ing B as itself a condition of s that we could receive information about, as something that
could have a conditional probability of 1 and therefore qualify as the informational con¬
tent of a signal. But this is not the point. When there is no sentence describing the situa¬
tion that does exist at the source which satisfies our definition of informational content,
and we nonetheless wish to give propositional expression to the quantity of information
that is transmitted, we are forced to adopt the expedient of talking about the fact that
something is probably so as the informational content of a signal." (Dretske, 1981:68-70)
Dretske's discussion points out a dilemma for an account of information content. On the
one hand, there is good reason to maintain that a signal Q cannot carry the information that
P (in Dretske's terms that s is F) unless the probability of P, given Q is 1, and no less (see
1.1). On the other, there is an intuition that slightly equivocal signals (where the condi¬
tional probability is just less than 1) can be given a propositional content. Namely, the sig¬
nal Q may intuitively seems to carry the information that probably P. Yet probably P is not
a state of the informational source at all, and hence the signal cannot carry the information
that the source is in that state. I shall term this dilemma the problem of probabilistic
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contents.
This dilemma appears problematic for Dretske, since informational contents of the form s is
probably F appear to fall outside the scope of the definition content. The source has states
F, and G, but it appears that cannot have additional states probably F and probably G. The
states of a source must be mutually exclusive, whereas the states s is probably F and s is F
can co-occur. Dretske believes that "We are forced to adopt the expedient of talking about
the fact that something is probably so as the informational content of a signal" (Dretske,
1981:70). Yet there is no attempt to integrate the intuition that equivocal messages can have
probabilistic contents with the definition of informational content. Probabilistic contents are
sui generis.
Yet the dilemma appears problematic for the revised account also. The revised account
was intended to apply to informational contents which correspond to arbitrary propositions,
rather than only those which have the form s is F. However, it seems that one class of pro¬
position does not yield to such a treatment - namely probabilistic propositions. That is, the
revised account appears to be unable to handle probabilistic propositions of the form prob¬
ably P. For a source consists of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions,
PI, P2... PN. It does not have additional states probably PI, probably P2 and so on.
However, the difficulties for these accounts are only apparent. The discussion will proceed
in terms of the revised account of informational content, but the resolution of the problem
of probabilistic contents applies equally well to the original Dretskian definition.
Let us consider two dice, one blue and one red. The blue die has 1 spot printed on all sides
except one, which has six spots. The red die has 6 spots on all sides except one, which has
a single spot. Suppose that we are playing a game in which you roll one of the die, I have
to guess whether or not it will fall "1" or "6". The procedure is as follows. I close my
eyes, while you choose one of the dice. Before opening my eyes, I must make 'my guess.
Then you throw the die. Suppose that I sneakily watch you choosing the die, and see that it
is blue. I cannot learn from this whether the die will fall "1" or "6", but I can learn that it
will fall "1" with probability 5/6. There are two possible choices of die: blue, (the die pro¬
bability 5/6 of falling 1), or red (the die has probability 1/6 of falling 1). Hence the {{there
is probability 5/6 that the die will fall "1", there is probability 1/6 that the die will fall
"1"}} is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states, and so constitutes an informa¬
tional source. Given that I see that the coin is blue (the signal), the conditional probability
that the die has probability 5/6 of falling 1 given that signal, is (exactly!) 1. So, the
-47-
definition of informational content captures the probabilistic information content of the sig¬
nal directly, relative to a source whose propositions are themselves probabilistic in charac¬
ter.
Informational properties are relative to the specification of the informational system. If the
informational source has states P, Q and R, then the only propositions that a signal can
carry about that source (as the theory stands) are P, Q and R. Hence, no signal can carry
the propositions probably P, probably Q and probably R, just as no signal can carry any
other propositions S, T, U. In Dretske's example, no state of the source {{A, B, C, D}} has
probability 1 given the signal. However, the source {{B has probability .80, B has probabil¬
ity not equal to .80}} has a state which has conditional probability 1, given the signal.
Relative to this informational source, the signal has the informational content that B has the
probability .80.
It might be objected that no account has been offered of how the propositions that probably
P and P are related. We have merely postulated distinct sources {{A, B, C, D}} and {{B
has probability .80, B has probability not equal to .80}}. Since we are treating states as
unstructured propositions, the latter source might just as well be denoted by {{£, F}}. The
fact that the state B has a conditional probability of .80 given state E is accidental, as far as
the theory is concerned. Yet, from our perspective, this fact is far from accidental, since E
just is the proposition that B has a conditional probability of .80.
An informational theory of content which deals only with unstructured propositions will,
however, fail to pick up all regularities based on the internal structure of propositions. Just
as the informational relationship between probably P and P is arbitrary, from the point of
view of the theory, so is the informational relationship between the propositions that John
loves Mary and John loves someone, or that Eric owns a dog and Eric owns an animal.
Since the theory is defined at the level of unstructured propositions, informational relation¬
ships which are predictable from the internal structure of the propositions cannot be cap¬
tured within the theory.
Returning to our original dilemma, the intuition that informational signals can carry proba¬
bilistic information has been reconciled with the restriction that a signal can only carry a
proposition if the conditional probability of that proposition, given that signal, is exactly 1.
There is no need to treat probabilistic information contents any differently from non-
probabilistic information contents. There is a need to define distinct informational sources
for each.
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In Chapter 1, Dretske's account of information content was introduced and it was proposed
that it be recast in propositional terms. In Chapter 2, this prepositional account leads natur¬
ally to a more fundamental reworking of Dretske's account.
Chapter 2: A Propositional Account of Information Content
2.1 Introduction
Dretske's account of informational content is intended to apply only to propositions of the
form s is F. The revised account applies to any proposition P, and the conflation of objects
with sources and properties with states has been expunged. However, the account of infor¬
mation content is still based on Dretske's probabilistic formulation. In this section, some
rather more radical revisions are proposed. These are intended to both generalise and sim¬
plify the existing account. Our final formulation excises the notion of probability and
models informational systems using the propositional calculus. The information content of a
proposition P becomes simply the set of all propositions derivable in the system after the
assertion of P, that were not derivable before the assertion of P. The path from information
theory to the propositional calculus turns out to be surprising direct.
Dretske motivates his account of information content as a natural extension of Shannon and
Weaver's quantitative account of information. However, neither Dretske's account of infor¬
mation content, or the revised account, appear to presuppose the full apparatus of the
theory. The definitions are as follows:
"Informational content: A signal r carries the information that s is F = The condition pro¬
bability of s's being F, given *r (and k), is 1 (but given k alone, less than 1)" (Dretske,
1981:65)
Informational content 3: A signal Q carries the information that P, where P is any propo¬
sition = The conditional probability of P given Q is 1.
There are two relevant points to note about these definitions. Firstly, they make no refer¬
ence to probabilities other than 1; secondly, they make no reference to the notion of an
informational source. I shall examine the role of probability in a Dretskian approach to
information content in the remainder of this section. In the next section, I shall suggest that
informational sources should be taken as secondary to information states (propositions), and
that the theory of information content should be framed purely in terms of the latter notion.
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2.2 Does Information Content Need Information Theory? I: Probability and
Information Content
A signal Q carries a proposition P just when the probability of P, given Q, is 1. Hence, to
derive the information content of the states of an informational system, all that is required
is a specification of the conditional probabilities between states which are exactly 1. What
about the specification of absolute probabilities? If we want to capture the intuition that a
proposition cannot be learned from a signal if it has probability 1, then we must specify
which informational states have absolute probability 1. From the point of view of the
theory of information content, the values of all the other conditional and absolute probabili¬
ties (those less than 1) are irrelevant.
This suggests that, from the point of view of specifying information content, informational
systems may be economically specified. Below a formal account of informational systems
will be proposed, in terms of propositional logic. I shall argue that this simple apparatus
allows us to capture the intuitions underlying Dretske's approach. Although we are not
quite yet in a position to introduce the formal approach, the kind of simplified specification
of an information system that might suffice may nonetheless be illustrated (using somewhat
suggestive notation). Suppose that our informational system consists of four informational
sources. Source {{A, B, C, £>}} corresponds to the choice of one of four knobs on the
cooker; {{£, F, G, H}} corresponds to a jet of gas emerging from one of four gas rings.
Each knob turns on a single gas jet, and no two knobs turn on the same gas jet. {{/, J, K,
L}} corresponds to the cooker's being in the kitchen (which it invariably is), the bathroom,
the bedroom, and in the garden shed. {[M, N)} corresponds to the cooker's being an elec¬
tric cooker (which it is not) or a gas cooker (which it is).
{{A, B, C, D)}
A, B, C, D form an informational source
{{£, F, G, H}}
E, F, G, H form an informational source
{{/, J,K,L}}
/, J, K, L form an informational source
{[M, N)}
M, N form an informational source
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/
state I has absolute probability 1
N
state N has absolute probability 1
E-> A
the conditional probability of A, given E is 1
F -> B
the conditional probability of B, given F is 1
G->C
the conditional probability of C, given G is 1
H -> D
the conditional probability of D, given H is 1
Such a specification captures what is required to map out the information flow within the
informational system. Of course, since we have presented only a flavour of what the for-
malisation of an informational system might look like, rather than a formalisation proper,
there are variety of unresolved technical questions. For example, is it legitimate to write X
-> I, for any proposition X, since given that the absolute probability of / is 1, the probabil¬
ity of I conditional on X must be 1? Indeed, should informational sources in which one
state has probability 1 be treated as legitimate? Should there also be a preclusion relation,
-I, such that X -I Y if the conditional probability of Y, given X, is 0? How can we specify
the information contents of signals which specify that a source is in either of, say two,
states? Suppose that a state X has a probability 1, given that one source is in state Y, and
another source is in state Z. How is this to be expressed in our notation? These issues will
be resolved when the formalisation is introduced.
The discussion so far may be summarised as follows. Intuitions about informational con¬
tent, even when that content is probabilistic (in the sense used above), may be captured
with reference to absolute and conditional probabilities of exactly 1 (and, perhaps 0, if we
countenance the -I relation). Hence, from the point of view of informational content, an
informational system may be specified by listing the states (propositions) with probability 1
(if we countenance such states at all), and specifying the probabilistic dependencies
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between states of different sources of value 1 (and perhaps 0), by some relation (and
perhaps That is, we need specify only the determinate dependencies between infor¬
mational states. All reference to probabilities may be excised without affecting, the scope
and explanatory power of our notion of informational content. This excision constitutes a
considerable departure from the spirit of the probabilistic treatment of information due to
Shannon and Weaver. It is not that a Dretskian account of informational content is in any
way at odds with information theory. It is rather that Dretske's treatment of informational
content and the probabilistic apparatus of information theory seem to have little to say to
one another. Rather than providing the basis for Dretske's treatment, the probabilistic
aspect of information theory appears to have little relevance to it.
Despite the fact that the treatment of information content does not use the concept of real
valued probability, which is central to an information theoretic approach, the two
approaches do appear to have significant commonalities. In particular, the basic objects of
both are informational sources: sets of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states. In the
next section I shall argue that this commonality is more apparent than real.
2.3 Does Information Content Need Information Theory? II: Sources and
States
Both Dretske's definition of informational content and the present, revised definition are
concerned only with the signal, Q, and the proposition carried P. There is no mention of
the other states of the receiver (of which Q is the actual state), or other states of the source
(of which P is the actual state). All that matters is that the conditional probability of P,
given Q, is 1. In information theory, the specification of an informational system involves
the specification of informational sources, and informational sources are specified by listing
their states (and the probabilities associated with each state). There are no other states than
these. That is, states have no existence independent of the informational sources to which
they belong.
Yet it seems that the informational link between Q and P may be recognised by the account
of informational content regardless of the nature of the informational sources to which Q
and P belong.
There is an analogous direct link between some state of the source and some state of the
receiver in information theory. A quantity of information, I(S.), is associated with a single
state, S., dependent only on its probability, p(S.), and hence independent of the source to
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which it belongs:
I(S.) = log (l/p(S.))
I(S.) is the amount of information generated by a source's being in a particular state S..
This is termed the surprisal of that state of the source S. (1.2 above). Information theory is
not primarily concerned with the amount of information generated by any particular state,
but rather with the average amount of information generated or transmitted in an informa¬
tional setup. The notion of an informational source (a set of mutually exclusive and exhaus¬
tive states) is introduced to allow the quantification of this average value. The average
amount of information at a source is just the sum of the surprisals of each state of that
source, weighted according to the probability of that state.
I(S) = E. p(S.) I(S.)
I(S) is the average amount of information generated by the source S. Since information
theory is, in practice, concerned with this average quantity, rather than the information gen¬
erated by specific events, it is natural to specify an informational system by specifying the
informational sources (source and receiver). States need not have existence independent of
the propositions to which they belong, since it is only in the context of an informational
source that a state can play a role in determining average quantities of information.
The study of informational content is concerned with specific information flow between
propositions (states), P and Q. In the present reformulation, propositions, rather than infor¬
mational sources, will be elementary. Any mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of sources
constitutes an informational source. Hence, a proposition may belong to several sources, or
to no sources at all.
2.4 Informational Systems - A Propositional Approach
So far, the account of informational content treated only unstructured propositions. How¬
ever, if all propositions are treated as atomic, then the theory will be unable to capture cer¬
tain important informational generalisations. For example, suppose that the fact that there is
a frantic scratching sound at the door carries the information that the cat is at the door and
that the cat is being chased by the dog. Then the scratching must carry the information that
the cat is outside. Suppose that the cat running up the tree carries the information that
either it is being chased by the dog, or that it is chasing a squirrel. Then the cat running up
the tree and the dog being in his kennel carries the information that the cat is chasing a
squirrel. Suppose that the fact that there is food on the table carries the information that the
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dog comes indoors, then the fact that the dog does not come indoors carries the information
that there is not food on the table. If we treat conjunctive, disjunctive and negative proposi¬
tions as atomic, then the informational relations above will be purely accidental. In order
to capture these informational generalisations, we shall represent complex propositions as
Boolean functions of their constituents: P & Q, P v Q, -P and so on. Notice that informa¬
tional relations between propositions which are below the level of atomic propositions are
accidental on this formulation: for example, if a signal carries the information that all men
are mortal it carries the information that Socrates is a man. This generalisation can only be
captured if we analyse propositions at the level of the objects and properties. (The preposi¬
tional treatment given here may be naturally extended to cover such cases, by employing a
richer logic).
The atomic propositions of an informational system might be: that the coin falls heads; that
the coin falls tails; that the coin falls on edge; that there is a shout of "Hurrah!"; that there
is a shout of "Oh no!"; that there is a shout of "Good grief!". Then the system will also
have the propositions: that the coin falls heads and there is a shout of "Hurrah!"; that the
coin does not fall tails; that there is a shout of "Oh no!" or (there is a shout of "Good
grief!" and the coin does not fall tails); and so on. The atomic propositions may be arbi¬
trarily Booleanly conjoined to produce the unbounded set of all propositions in the idealisa¬
tion. These may be characterised by a simple inductive definition.
Let the language L be defined as follows:
Let P = Py PN,—. be the prepositional letters. These correspond to the atomic proposi¬
tions of the information system.
Let the prepositional connectives be -, v, &, ->, <-> (the additional connectives " ->" and
may be freely added, since they can be defined in terms of the other connectives,
and will later prove useful).
Each wff of L corresponds to a possible proposition of the informational idealisation.
Formation Rules
1) Any prepositional letter is a wff
2) i) if A is a wff, so is -A
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3) Nothing else is a wff.
This definition omits parentheses for simplicity. Strictly speaking, they are required to
specify complex syntactic forms unambiguously. For example, (A & B) v C must be dis¬
tinguished from A & (B v C).
An informational source is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions. The set
{A , A2,... A., ... An) is a source if either A1 is holds and the rest do not, or A2 holds and
the rest do not... or A^ holds and the rest do not. Expressing this in prepositional logic:
{A , A2>... A., —An} is a source iff
[A1&-(A2vA3.,.An)] v
[ A2 & -(Aj v A3 ... An) ] v ...
[ A. & -(A ... A. , v A. ... A ) ] v ...i v 1 i-l l+l n
[ A & -(A ... v A ) ]
n 1 n-r
If a set {A^ A2,... A., ...An) is source we enclose it is double parentheses: {{A^ A2„.. A.,
...A }}.nJ'
2.5 Specifying an Informational Idealisation
Having specified the propositions that are part of an informational system, we now turn to
specifying the informational properties which characterise a particular idealisation. First we
introduce the basic idea via some examples. Then I shall present a more formal account.
Suppose that the tossed coin may fall heads, tails or balance on edge {{//, T, £}} and that





as axioms of the system (strictly speaking, we assert the lengthy formulae of prepositional
logic to which these are equivalent). Further, we wish to capture the dependencies between
the states of these sources:
Hurrah <-> H
Oh_no <-> (T v B)
A set of formulae closed under deduction is called a theory. The theory induced by these
axioms, that is, their deductive consequences, characterises the informational system. Some
of these consequences are:
Hurrah -> -T




{{{Hurrah & H), T\ B}}...
There are unboundedly many sets of axioms which induce the same theory. Thus there are
unboundedly many sets of axioms with which the informational system may be specified.
The choice of which subset of the formulae of the theory are taken as the axioms, and
which are consequences of these axioms, is arbitrary. Let us now give a more formal expo¬
sition.
Assume some Gentzen type formulation of the rules of proof of the classical prepositional
calculus. In a Gentzen type formulation the proof rules are of the form A I- a. That is, the
basic relation is is that of syntactic implication between sets of sentences A and a single
sentence oc. This is important in defining a theory, below. (By contrast, in a Hilbert for¬
mulation, the rules are of the form I- a -> p. That is, the basic relation is that of material
implication between single sentences of L.)
If A is a set of wffs,
[A] = {al A I- a} is the theory generated by the set of sentences A.
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A theory is a set of sentences closed under implication: if some set of sentences of the
theory imply some further sentence, then that too must be in the theory. The notion of a
theory will prove important below.
So an informational setup is captured by specifying axioms of propositional logic which
describe the informational structure of the setup. Let us reconsider the example of the coin
and the shout. Suppose that a coin may fall heads, tails or may balance on edge (H, T, B).
An observer shouts "Hurrah!" (Hurrah) just if the coin falls heads, and "Oh no!" (Ohjno)
otherwise. In this case, there are two natural informational sources. Since the coin must
fall heads, tails or on edge, but can only fall one way, {{//, T, 5}} may be taken as an
axiom. Similarly, the shout must be exactly one of "Hurrah!" and "Oh No!" and so {{Hur¬
rah, Oh_no}} may be taken as an axiom. Now let us capture the information dependencies
between the way the coin falls and the shout emitted. There is a shout of "Hurrah!" if and
only if the coin falls heads: Hurrah <-> H. There is a shout of "Oh no!" just when the coin
falls tails or on edge: Ohjno <-> (T v B). There are indefinitely many additional informa¬
tional properties that we might add as axioms. For example, if the coin falls tails, there is a
shout of "Oh no!": T -> Ohjno. However, this follows from the other axioms (it is a trivial
consequence of Oh_no <-> (T v B)), and so it need not be added. The informational pro¬
perties of the system may be captured the axioms and their consequences - the theory that
the axioms induce. We shall sometimes refer to this theory as the information state. If the
set of axioms is A, the information state is the theory generated by those axioms, [A], In
this case,
[A] = [{{//, T, B}}, {{Hurrah, Oh_no}}, Hurrah <-> H, Oh_no <-> (T v B)]
Tracking
If two propositions track, then if one holds then the other must hold and vice versa. In the
above example, Hurrah and H track, and this is captured by the axiom Hurrah <-> H. In
general, we shall say that propositions P tracks proposition Q, given some set of axioms A,
just in case,
A I- P <-> Q
Clearly, this definition is symmetrical - P tracks Q just when Q tracks P.
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2.6 Change and Information Flow
So far, we have assumed that the axioms of an informational system are fixed. Yet in the
study of the generation and flow of information it must be possible to express change. Sup¬
pose that there is a yell of "Oh no!". This may be added to the axioms A to produce a new
set of axioms, A'. The yell of "Oh no!" will have considerable informational ramifications.
For example, if the yell was "Oh no!", the coin must either have fallen tails or balanced on
edge T v B, and cannot have fallen heads -H. These ramifications are consequences of the
theory, [A'] generated by the new set of axioms, A, Oh_no.
[A', Ohjno] = [{{//, T, £}}, {{Hurrah, Ohjio}}, Hurrah <-> H, Oh_no <-> (T v B),
Ohjid]
It is easy to show that, for example, T v B and -H are consequences of A, Oh_no and
hence members of [A, Oh_no].
1. A, Oh_no I- Oh_no
2. A, Ohjno I- Oh_no <-> (T v B)
3. A, Ohjio I - T m B
Q.E.D
1. A, Ohjno I- Ohjno
2. A, Ohjno I- {{Hurrah, Ohjno}}
3. A, Ohjio I- -Hurrah
4. A, Ohjio I- Hurrah <-> H
5. A, Oh_no I- -H
Q.E.D.
Fresh Consequences and Informational Content
These are all fresh consequences of the system. That is, they are consequences of A,
Ohjno, but not A alone. They all seem to be propositions that can be learned from the
presence of the new premise Ohjno. Surely it is just these new consequences which are
the information that is carried by the signal. Indeed, the notion of fresh consequence seems
to capture, in our prepositional theory, Dretske's notion of informational content.










"Informational content: A signal r carries the information that s is F = The condition pro¬
bability of s's being F, given r (and k), is 1 (but given k alone, less than 1)" (Dretske,
1981:65)
So, according to Dretske, the proposition that the coin fell tails or balanced on edge is car¬
ried by the shout's being "Oh no!". For the probability that the coin fell tails or balanced
on edge is 1, given that the shout is "Oh no!" (and k), but is less than 1, given k alone. On
the prepositional account, the proposition that the coin fell tails or balanced on edge is a
fresh consequence of the shout's being "Oh no!". For T v B is a consequence of Oh_no
(and A), but is not a consequence of A alone. Dretske's condition that the conditional pro¬
bability is precisely 1 is replaced by the constraint that the proposition carried is a conse¬
quence of the signal (and the axioms of the current informational state). Dretske's stricture
that this information cannot already be known, which was our remaining motivation for the
presence the parenthetical k in the definition of informational content, corresponds to the
restriction that the proposition carried is afresh consequence. So, as promised in 1.6, k may
be eliminated without loss.
The notion of fresh consequence may be formalised straightforwardly. Firstly, we define
the full informational content of a signal to be just the set of consequences of the signal
(and the current axioms of the system) which are not consequences of the current axioms
alone. Formally,
The full informational content, S(a), of a
= {[A, a]} - {[A]}
The full content of a signal (proposition) is the set of all fresh consequences. Since, for any
formula P, there are unboundedly many logically equivalent formulae (for example, P v P,
P v P, P v P v P, and so on), if S(a) is non-empty, it will be unbounded.
Full content is, of course, a function of both the current axioms of the system (A) and the
axiom added (a). Hence, it does not make sense to ask what the full content of a signal is,
without specifying the state of the system at which this is to be evaluated.
a carries the information that A iff A is an element of S(a).
More generally, we say that
a carries the information that P where P is a subset of S(a).
So, a signal carries all and only propositions which are members of the full informational
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content and all and only sets of propositions that are subsets of the full informational con¬
tent. Of course, what information a signal a carries is dependent on the current axioms of
the system, A.
Does the propositional reformulation really capture Dretske's informational content? Let us
consider how the revised account treats two examples that Dretske considers to be particu¬
larly important. The first requires that the account handle disjunctive contents; the second
involves the apparent "knowledge relativity" of informational properties.
Recall Dretske's example of a group of 8 workers who must choose which of them is to
perform some unpleasant task, and write the name of the unlucky worker on a memo to the
manager. In one scenario, they decide that they will write Herman's name on the memo if
Herman is selected or if Shirley is selected (in deference to Shirley's delicate health). As it
happens Herman is selected, and so his name is written on the memo. Dretske remarks as
follows:
"...communication theory told us that the note carried only 2 bits of information, about
which employee had been selected... As far as this quantitative theory is concerned, the
memo could carry a variety of different messages as long as these messages have a meas¬
ure of 2 bits. So, for example, the memo might carry the information that either Herman
or Shirley was selected (2 bits) or it might carry the information that either Herman or
Donald was selected (2 bits). Both of these possible messages are true (since Herman was
selected)... Our definition of a signal's propositional content neatly distinguishes between
these two possible messages. It fixes on Herman or Shirley as the content rather than Her¬
man or Donald because the former possibility has a probability of only .5." (Dretske,
1981: 68)
It was argued that this example is beyond the scope of Dretske's account and requires a
propositional treatment. The formal propositional definition assigns the appropriate infor¬
mational content to Herman's name being on the memo.
There are two sources: the employees must choose precisely one of eight possibilities, A,
B, C, D (Donald), E, F, S (Shirley), or H (Herman); the memo has exactly one of seven
possible messages: A', B', C', D', E', F', H' (Herman's name on the memo). So we have
the following two axioms:
1. {{A, B, C, D, E, F, S, H}}
2. {{A\B\ C', D', E\ F', H'}}
The states of the two sources are linked such that each state of the memo corresponds to
just one employee, except if Herman's name is on the memo (H'), when either Herman (H)
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or Shirley (S) may be chosen. Formally, this may be rendered:
3. A' <-> A
4. B' <-> B
5. C' <-> C
6. D' <-> D
7. E' <-> E
8. F* <-> F
9. H' <-> S v H
So, before the name on the memo is decided, the information state is [A], where,
A = { {(A, B, C, D,E,F,S,H}), {{A', B\ C\ D', E\ F, H'}}, A' <-> A, B' <-> B,
C' <-> C, D' <-> D, E' <-> E, F' <-> F, H'oSvH)
If Herman's name appears on the memo, then the axiom
10. H'
is asserted. The new information state is [A, H']. By our definition, a proposition P is car¬
ried by Herman's name being on the memo (H'), if P is in the set [A, H'] - [A],
Let us consider whether Herman's name appearing on the message carries the information
that H (Herman was selected), H v S (Herman or Shirley was selected) or H v D (Herman
or Donald was selected). Plainly, none of these are consequences of A, since any of the
employees might have been selected. S v H is a consequence of A, H':
1. A, H' I- (H' <-> S v H) (axiom)
2. A, H* I- H' (axiom)
3. A,H' 1-SvH (1, 2)
By hypothesis, A, H' is consistent with Shirley being selected. If Shirley is selected, then H
(Herman is selected), and H v D (Herman or Donald is selected) do not hold. So A, H'
can not have H or H v D as consequences. Hence, while S v H is carried by Herman's
name being on the memo, H and H v D are not. So the propositional account gives just the
result that Dretske recommends.
Now let us turn to Dretske's shells and peanut example. This is intended to illustrate that
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the information carried by an event (e.g. the lifting of shell 3) is relative to the knowledge
of the observer. Dretske attempts to capture this by introducing the parenthetical k. We
argued above (section 1.6) that the knowledge of the observer should not be treated as part
of the theory. Rather the informational idealisation appropriate for modeling the situation is
sensitive to the knowledge of the observer. Since informational properties are idealisation
relative, the information that an event carries is derivatively sensitive to the observer's
knowledge. Does our formalism actually generate intuitively appropriate predictions?
Let us call the basic propositions are SI, S2, S3, S4 (where S. is the proposition that the
peanut is under shell i). Since the peanut must be under some shell but cannot be under
more than one, exactly one of SI, S2, S3, S4 must hold. So {{SI, S2, S3, S4}} is an
axiom. When I come in to the room for the first time, I know only that the peanut is under
one the four shells. Hence, an idealisation appropriate for modeling my point of view need
have no further axioms. If I am shown that shell i is empty, then my idealisation must be
revised by adding the axiom -S. to the current informational state. Hence, after I have been
shown that both SI and S2 are empty, the current informational state is A, where:
A = { {{S1.S2, S3, S4}}, -SI, -S2}
Recall that I see that shells 1 and 2 are empty before you come in to the room. Hence, we
should distinguish the idealisation appropriate for me, Amc, and the idealisation appropriate
for you, Ayou> Both idealisations include {{SI, S2, S3, S4}}, but only my idealisation
includes the additional axioms -SI and -S2.
Amc = S2' S3, S4}}' "S1, "S2]
Ayou=[{{Sl,S2, S3, S4}}]
Suppose that we are both shown that shell 3 is empty. This carries different information for
you and me. Hence, the full informational content under the two idealisations are, respec¬
tively, for me,
[{{SI, S2, S3, S4}}, -SI, -S2, -S3] - [{{SI, S2, S3, S4}}, -SI, -S2]
and, for you,
[{{SI, S2, S3, S4}}, -S3] - [{{SI, S2, S3, S4}}]
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Under my idealisation, S4 is part of the full information content. Intuitively, before I see
that shell 3 is empty, I do not know that the peanut is under shell 4 (SI does not follow
from the axioms); afterwards, the peanut can only be under shell 4 (S4 does follow from
the axioms and -S3). So S4 is part of the informational content of -S3, under my idealisa¬
tion. By contrast, on the idealisation appropriate to you, S4 does not follow from the addi¬
tion of -S3 as an axiom. The peanut could still be under shell's 1, 2 or 4. So, while SI v
S2 v S4 is part of the informational content of -S3, S4 is not. Hence, the "relativity to
knowledge" is captured by the relativity of the information carried by a signal to the
current informational state of the system. Thus Dretske's parenthetical k may be dispensed
with.
Dretske notes that on the idealisation appropriate for me the signal -S3 carries 1 bit of
information, and whereas on your idealisation it carries just 0.42 bits of information. Intui¬
tively, since I have more information than you have, I can exploit the new axiom more
fully. This suggests that the information that the signal carries for me includes all the
information that it carries for you.
However, the signal also carries information under your idealisation that it does not carry
under mine. For you, -S2 carries the information that -S2 v -S3. However, since my ideali¬
sation has -S3 as an axiom, -S2 v -S3 is a derivable before the signal -S2 is added. So -S2
v -S3 is not part of the informational content of the signal. Informally, since I know more
than you, the signal may carry propositions that are news to you, but that are not news to
me (and so do not count as part of the information content under the my idealisation).
2.7 Summary
In this section, a simple propositional formalisation of some of Dretske's ideas about infor¬
mation generation and information flow has been presented. A signal, a, carries a proposi¬
tion P, if P is a fresh consequence of a. That is, if P does not follow from the current set
of axioms A, but is a consequence of A, ex. This definition within our propositional account
of information appears to capture the essence of Dretske's informal, probabilistic formula¬
tion of information content. When applied to two key examples, the propositional approach
is shown to give the same results as Dretske's informal analysis, as predicted. Indeed, the
propositional definition is more parsimonious. For there is no need to build "knowledge
relativity" in to the definition, using some device analogous to Dretske's parenthetical k.
Rather, knowledge relativity is a consequence of i) that considerations of what the observer
knows affect the choice of an appropriate informational idealisation; ii) whether or not a
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proposition is carried by a signal is dependent on the informational idealisation chosen.
Since the full content of a signal (if non-empty) is an unbounded set of propositions, an
informational signal has (very) many information contents. In contrast, according to the
intuitive notion of the semantic content, the semantic content of, say, an utterance, is typi¬
cally taken to be unique. So a reconstruction of semantic content requires a more restricted
notion than information content. To this end, Dretske introduces an important distinction
between information carried in analog and digital form. The more restricted notion of
information carried in digital form is the basis for the reconstruction of semantic content. It
is to the analog-digital distinction we turn in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3: The Analog-Digital Distinction
3.1 Traditional Accounts of the Analog-Digital Distinction
In Chapter 2, we analysed Dretske's notion of informational content and gave an-alternative
account to his probabilistic formulation in terms of the prepositional calculus. In this
chapter, we turn to Dretske's analog digital distinction. This distinction is fundamental to
Dretske's account of how semantic content can be derived from informational dependency.
Further, it is the basis for Dretske's approach to perception, belief and knowledge. In par¬
ticular, Dretske takes the distinction between information carried in analog and digital form
to provide a foundation for a sharp distinction between sensory or perceptual processes on
the one hand, and cognitive processes on the other. In Chapter 4 we shall examine this
claim in detail, and discuss the way in which the notion of information content can be
applied to elucidate the nature of information processing. In the present chapter, the discus¬
sion will primarily focus on various difficulties with, and adjustments to, Dretske's analog-
digital distinction. In the previous section we rendered Dretske's account of information in
terms of the prepositional calculus. In the present section, I show how the analog-digital
distinction may be straightforwardly cast in these terms.
Before outlining Dretske's analog-digital distinction, let us survey various ways in which
the distinction has been characterised. There are almost as many variants of the analog-
digital distinction as there are authors discussing the topic. Although, there are certain core
intuitions about what is analog and what is digital, making these intuitions precise has
proved extremely difficult. For example, the display on a digital watch is paradigmatically a
digital representation of the time. The position of the hands on Big Ben are a paradigmati¬
cally analog representation of the time. A linguistic formula carries information in digital
form; a photograph carries information in analog form. A VAX is a digital computer; a set
of resistors and capacitors used to directly model the differential equations of some system
is an analog computer. Chess is digital, shove ha'penny is analog. The analog-digital dis¬
tinction has been taken to apply to the way in which some information is conveyed, to sys¬
tems of representation, to styles of computation and so on. In the rest of this section, I shall
try to draw out some of the main threads in recent discussions of the distinction.
1) Minsky (1967) gives a characterisation from the point of view of computer science:
"Computer scientists often talk of a distinction between "digital" and "analog" quantities,
where a digital quantity is one that takes on only one of a fixed, finite set of values while
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an analog quantity has values from a continuum, e.g., the voltage measured across a resis¬
tor or capacitor. The term "analog" comes from the era in which most "computers" were
electrical or mechanical devices designed to approximate the differential equations of con¬
tinuous physical systems, in such a way that one could think of an analogy between the
physical behaviour of the computer and the other system. In this sense, [in automata
theory] we are deciding to develop our theory around ideas of finite mathematics rather
than infinite, continuous, differential mathematics." (Minsky, 1967:29)
From the above passage, distinctions on four dimensions may be drawn:
i) continuous versus discrete quantities
ii) computation by analogy versus non-analogical computation
iii) dynamical systems (of electrical or mechanical components) versus formal systems
iv) discrete (finite) mathematics versus continuous mathematics
All of these aspects have been elaborated by other authors, as we shall see.
2) Banks (1977) draws out two readings of the distinction (senses i) and ii) above) which
he takes to be relevant to the concerns of psychology:
"The term "analog" has two different meanings when applied to models of mental activity.
The first meaning comes directly from the idea of analogy. It indicates that the mental
processes themselves model in some way the events or objects being thought about, and
perceptual mechanisms may even be used internally. Analog models of this type are gen¬
erally called image processing models.
The other sense of "analog" implies only that mental processing operates on a continuous
representation of some kind. This sense derives from the first, since a complete mental
representation of perceptual events that map, one for one, every possible sensory level
would have to be a continuous representation. A continuous representation is generally
considered to be one in which any two points, arbitrarily close together, still have a third
point placed between them. However, a weaker notion that retains the idea of a mapping
could preserve the interval scale (or ratio scale) properties of the perceptual continuum but
not have the accuracy that would be required to represent separately every possible level
of it." (Banks, 1977:118-119)
Strictly, the definition that Banks gives corresponds to the mathematical notion of dense-
ness rather than continuity. The rationals are dense (there is a rational which lies between
any two rationals), but not continuous (since there are also irrationals between any two
rationals). It is the notion of denseness which is used by Goodman (1968) in his definition
of analog versus digital symbolic schemes.
3) The notion analog mental processes as processes of analogy is developed in the work of
Roger Shepard.
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Shepard and his associates (e.g. Shepard, 1978; Shepard & Cooper, 1982) conducted an
important series of experiments in which subjects are presented with a pair of 2 dimen¬
sional plane figures, or 2 dimensional projections of 3 dimensional figures. The pair con¬
sists either of identical figures, at different angles of orientation (in 2 or 3 dimensions), or
of mirror image figures, also at various angles of orientation. The task is to distinguish the
identical pairs from the mirror image pairs as rapidly as possible. If the pairs were identi¬
cal, rather than mirror images, Shepard found a linear relationship between the angle
between the orientation of two shapes and the time taken to classify them as the same. If
the shapes could be manually manipulated, a natural way to solve the problem would be to
physically rotate the shapes until they are aligned. Although the shapes cannot be physi¬
cally rotated, it seems that subjects instead perform a continuous "mental rotation". This
hypothesis is supported by the finding that if a shape in an intermediate orientation is
presented while the subject is in the middle of "mentally rotating" a shape, there is a very
fast same/different judgement for the interposed shape. It is argued that the rotated shape
really does pass through the intermediate orientations and so can be immediately compared
with the interposed shape.
The conjecture that subjects mentally rotate is that the temporal evolution of an actual phy¬
sical rotation of one of the shapes is mentally simulated. Shepard argues that mental
imagery in general typically involves the simulation of temporal evolution of processes in
the world. The interpretation of these results and related results on the timing of the mental
scanning of images (Kosslyn, 1980) and their relevance to the analog-digital distinction has
been controversial (Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith & Schwartz, 1979; Pylyshyn, 1981).
Shepard (Shepard & Chipman, 1970; Shepard, 1975) argues that the crucial question sur¬
rounding the debate on the nature of mental imagery is whether or not there is a "second-
order isomorphism" between the structure of the world and the structure of the mental
processes mediating computation about the world. Consider how the positions of the
planets in two weeks time might be predicted. If the initial conditions of the solar system
and the laws of Newtonian gravitation are applied, then a solution may be calculated
analytically. An alternative approach is to use an iterative numerical algorithm, which
updates the state of the planetary system by small increments. Such an iterative model
passes through the intermediate state corresponding to the intermediate state of positions of
the planets. In both cases, the correct output is obtained (there is a "first-order isomor¬
phism" between the modeled system, and the modeling system). Only in the latter case is
there an isomorphism between the intermediate states of the modeled system, and the
modeling system. This is what Shepard calls a second-order isomorphism between the
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modeled system and modeling system. Processes which preserves a second order isomor¬
phism are termed analog processes.
Pylyshyn (1981, 1984) has argued against Shepard's characterisation of analog .processes.
For Pylyshyn, what it is crucial is not that a second order isomorphism is maintained with
the modeled system, but how such an isomorphism is generated. In an iterative computer
simulation on a conventional computer of the movement of the planets. The isomorphism is
the result of the application of rules to items in prepositional database. The modeling pro¬
cess (the processing of the computer) is a product of a stored symbolic program running on
a conventional digital computer. Nonetheless, for Shepard, such a computation is analog.
Pylyshyn, on the other hand, claims the computation should be seen as digital. He claims
that the substantive issue concerns the principles that underlie the computational process
(such as transforming a mental image). For Pylyshyn the substantive issue is whether the
process is governed by rules and representations or determined by the properties of the
implementational substrate? Before we turn to Pylyshyn's own characterisation of the
analog-digital distinction, let us consider David Lewis's treatment of analog.
4) Lewis (1971) takes the paradigm case of analog representation to be representation of
numbers by physical magnitudes such as voltage, angle or length:
"...analog representation of numbers is representation of numbers by physical magnitudes
that are either primitive or almost primitive..." (Lewis, 1971:325)
where
"We define a primitive magnitude as any physical magnitude that is expressed by a primi¬
tive term in some good reconstruction of the language of physics - good according to our
ordinary standards of economy, elegance, convenience, familiarity." (Lewis, 1971:324)
and,
"...physical magnitudes... are almost primitive [if] definable in some simple way, with little
use of arithmetical operations, in terms of one or a few primitive magnitudes." (Lewis,
1971:324)
Lewis also gives a rather elaborate characterisation of digital. On Lewis's account the
notions of analog and digital, while mutually exclusive are certainly not exhaustive.
If an analog representation of a number is directly tied to a physical magnitude, then the
causal role of that representation may be mediated directly by the physical laws which
apply to that magnitude, rather than indirectly via rules and representations. It is this
difference in causal role that is the essence of Pylyshyn's characterisation of the analog-
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digital distinction.
5) Pylyshyn (1981) takes a digital computation to be based on rules and representations,
which encode "tacit knowledge" about the domain of computation in prepositional form.
Pylyshyn (1980, 1984) argues claim that a substantial part of human mental activity has
this character. For Pylyshyn, this is the force of treating cognitive processes as a species of
cognition. On the other hand:
"...an analog process... is one in whose behavior must be characterised in terms of intrinsic
lawful relations among properties of a particular physical instantiation of a process," rather
than in terms of rules and representations (or algorithms). Whenever people appeal to an
"analog representational medium"... they take it for granted that this medium incorporates
a whole system of lawfully connected properties or intrinsic constraints and that is pre¬
cisely this set of properties and relations that determines how objects represented in that
medium will behave." (Pylyshyn 1981: 157)
While Lewis stresses that analog representations must be encoded by physical magnitudes
(the magnitudes over which physical laws are defined) Pylyshyn stresses that analog
processes must operate in virtue of the "lawfully connected properties or intrinsic con¬
straints" of the representational medium.
Pylyshyn (1979) has shown experimentally that there is an influence of the content of the
image on the speed at which images are rotated. For example, subjects mentally rotate light
objects faster than they can mentally rotate heavy objects. Pylyshyn argues that such effects
undermine the view that mental rotation is mediated by the underlying physical properties
of the medium of representation, since the properties of this medium should be independent
of what is represented. In the terms of Pylyshyn (1984), the processes operating on mental
images appear to be cognitively penetrable - that is, sensitive to the content of what is
represented. Pylyshyn argues that cognitively penetrable processes must be governed by
underlying rules and representations; their behaviour cannot be understood as a function of
the implementational medium.
On Pylyshyn's reading of the analog-digital distinction, the very fact that the second order
isomorphism between image and world is so close (that it is sensitive to the relevant physi¬
cal properties of the particular objects being transformed) implies that mental imagery is
based on tacit knowledge, and is hence digital.
6) For Pylyshyn, a digital process is one that is governed by rules and representations.
Haugeland (1981) attempts to spell out what it is for a system to be rule governed. The
characterisation of such formal systems is the basis of Haugeland's notion of "digital". The
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account focuses on the syntactic, and not the semantic aspect of rules and representations.
There need be no meaning attached to the syntactic tokens in a formal system.
"A formal system is like a game in which tokens are manipulated according to rules, in
order to see what configurations can be obtained. Basically, to define such a game, three
things have to be specified:
(1) what the tokens are;
(2) what the starting position is; and,
(3) what moves are allowed in any given position.
[A formal system is]... entirely self contained. Only its own tokens, positions, and moves
make any difference to it... the "outside world"... makes no difference whatsoever in the
game. Second, every relevant feature of the game is perfectly definite; that is... there are
no ambiguities, approximations or "judgement calls" in determining what the position is,
or whether a certain move is legal... Third, the moves are finitely checkable, in the sense
that for each position and each candidate move, only a finite number of things have to be
checked to see whether the move would be legal in that position...we will say that a game
or system that has all three properties is digital. All formal systems are digital in this
sense." (Haugeland, 1981:6-7)
"An analog device, on the other hand, doesn't even have clearly defined moves, rules and
positions - though it may have states (which may change) and there is usually some way
that it is supposed to work. The crucial difference is that in analog systems the relevant
factors have not been defined and segregated to the point where it is always perfectly
definite what the current state is, and whether it is doing what it is supposed to do. That
is, there will often be slight inaccuracies, and marginal judgement calls, even when the
device in working normally" (Haugeland, 1981:19)
7) Another characterisation of the analog-digital distinction focuses on the difference
between idealisations which employ discrete versus continuous mathematics. Viewed as a
symbol processing device, the conventional computer is a paradigm example of a discrete
mechanised formal system. So it counts as a digital system in Haugeland's terms. However,
from the point of view of the electrical engineer, a computer is an array of continuously
varying electrical components. The behaviour of these components is appropriately
described by a system of differential equations, rather than a set of formal rules. So it
seems that whether a system is seen as digital or analog depends upon the kind of analysis
adopted. This brings us to points iii) and iv) in Minsky's text: the distinction between for¬
mal and dynamical systems, and the concomitant application of discrete or continuous
mathematics . The suggestion is that whether a system is analog or digital is determined by
the kind of mathematical idealisation with which it is described. The centrality of this dis¬
tinction between modes of mathematical analysis had been stressed by a number of authors
(Rosen, 1985; Padulo & Arbib, 1974; Smolensky, 1988).
There is a deep cleavage between the methods of discrete mathematics (automata theory,
category theory, logic, algebra and so on) and continuous mathematics (dynamical systems
theory, field theory, analysis, differential calculus and so on). Despite the many analogies
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between the two branches of mathematics, discrete and continuous mathematical methods
appear to analyse systems in fundamentally different ways. If a system (device, process) is
analysed using discrete mathematics, then it is treated as having discrete states, and the
temporal evolution of the system is described by a system of rules specifying the allowable
transitions between states. That is, it is viewed as some kind of automaton. To adopt such
an analysis is to model the system as a digital system. By contrast, if a system is analysed
as a continuous system, it is modeled by specifying a vector field over a manifold (or
equivalent) (Hirsch & Smail, 1974). Each point in the manifold is a state of the system,
and the vector at that point specifies the change in the state of the system at that point. On
this version of the analog-digital distinction, to adopt a dynamical analysis is to model the
system as an analog system.
According to this view, the analog-digital distinction is, in the first instance, a distinction
between species of idealisation, rather than kinds of system. However, the distinction may
derivatively be applied to systems themselves. A system which is most appropriately ideal¬
ised using discrete mathematics may be labelled digital and a system best modeled with
continuous mathematics labelled analog. This derivative analog-digital distinction does not
rigidly divide systems into disjoint classes - for, as we noted above, a computer may be
viewed under a continuous idealisation (analog) by the electrical engineer, and a discrete
idealisation (digital) by the computer scientist. Nonetheless, we may loosely categorise
hourglasses and sliderules, on the one hand, as analog and quartz watches and pocket cal¬
culators, on the other, as digital.
In this section we have surveyed some of ways in which the analog-digital distinction has
been drawn. In the next, we turn to Dretske's treatment.
3.2 The Analog-Digital Distinction: From General Laws to Specific Instances
Dretske notes that he uses the terms analog and digital in a slightly non-standard way:
"The analog-digital distinction is usually used to mark a difference in the way information
is carried about a variable property, magnitude, or quantity: time, speed, temperature,
pressure, height, volume, weight, distance, and so on. Ordinary household thermometers
are analog devices: the variable height of the mercury represents the variable temperature.
The hands on a clock carry information about the time in analog form, but alarm clocks
convert a preselected part of this into digital form.
I am interested, however, not in information about properties and magnitudes and the vari¬
ous ways this might be encoded, but in information about the instantiation of these proper¬
ties and magnitudes by particular items at the source. I am interested, in other words, not
in how we might encode information about temperature, but in how we might represent
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the fact that the temperature is too high, over 100°, or exactly 153°. What we want is a
distinction, similar to the analog-digital distinction as it relates to the representation of
properties, to mark the different way facts can be represented. Can we say, for example,
that one structure carries the information that j is F in digital form, and that another car¬
ries it in analog form?" (Dretske, 1981:136)
In the section 3.1 we outlined some of the many ways in which the terms "analog" and
"digital" have been characterised. The analog-digital distinction has been taken to classify
styles of computation, to distinguish continuous versus discrete phenomena, to distinguish
between systems idealised by discrete mathematics from systems idealised by continuous
mathematics and so on. In his account of the standard accounts of the analog-digital dis¬
tinction, Dretske focuses on the reading which distinguishes continuous versus discrete
methods of encoding the value of a property. The height of the mercury (continuous)
encodes temperature in analog form; the on-off value of the thermostat (discrete) encodes
the temperature in digital form; the position of the hands of a clock (continuous) encode the
temperature in analog form; the on-off state of an alarm clock, or the reading on a digital
watch encode the temperature in digital form. It is this set of intuitions which Lewis's
account, described briefly in the previous section, attempts to capture (Lewis, 1971).
Dretske notes that he is "interested... not in how we might encode information about tem¬
perature, but in how we might represent the fact that the temperature is too high, over 100°,
or exactly 153°". What Lewis gives is an account of what it means to say that, in general,
the height of the mercury is a digital representation of temperature or that the state of the
thermostat is an analog representation. Dretske notes that this account has nothing to say
about informational content of particular states. What is it for a particular height of the
mercury (say, 50 mm) to carry the particular information that it is 25°? What is it for a par¬
ticular state of the thermostat (say, "off) to carry the information that the temperature is
above 20°?
Yet there is a very natural way to introduce an analog-digital distinction for the way in
which particular pieces of information are carried. The distinction in the particular case is
inherited from the distinction in the general case. The particular information that it is 25°
is carried in analog form if the magnitude concerned is encoded in general in analog form
(according to a Lewis style definition). Mutatis mutandis for information carried in digital
form. So the thermometer carries the information that it is 25° in analog form because
thermometers encode temperature in analog form. The particular state of the thermostat on
some occasion carries the information that it is over 20° in digital form, since, in general,
the thermostat encodes temperature in digital form. The analog-digital distinction for partic¬
ular pieces of information is precisely tied to an analog-digital distinction for the encoding
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properties and magnitudes. Notice that, on this account, there is no informational asym¬
metry between the way in which the thermometer and the thermostat carry information. The
difference is simply inherited from a putative distinction between the character of their phy¬
sical embodiments (roughly, continuous versus discrete, where the precise sense is fixed by
an account such as Lewis's).
Rather than using Lewis's analysis of analog and digital, we might prefer to use the distinc¬
tion between idealisations using discrete mathematics versus idealisations using continuous
mathematics. The thermometer is naturally modeled as having a continuum of information-
ally relevant states (the height of the mercury is naturally modeled as a real number); the
thermostat is naturally viewed as having just two informationally relevant states (on and
off), and thus may be better modeled as a simple automaton. On this account, some particu¬
lar state of a thermometer - say, with the top of the mercury column precisely at the 20°
mark - would be said to carry the information that the temperature is 20° in analog form,
since the state of the thermometer is one of continuously many states (under a natural ideal¬
isation). Similarly, some particular state of a thermostat - for example being on - would
carry the information that it is below 20° in digital form, since the state of the thermostat is
defined with respect to a discrete idealisation. Again, the analog-digital distinction for par¬
ticular instances is simply inherited directly from the account of general analog-digital dis¬
tinction.
So we have at least two natural ways of distinguishing information carried in analog and
digital form. In both cases, the distinction between analog and digital information content is
inherited from a distinction extrinsic to the account of information itself - where this
account is provided by some analysis of the difference between analog and digital systems,
such as we have discussed above. However, Dretske pursues neither of the approaches
outlined above. Rather, he proposes a distinction internal to the theory of information con¬
tent, based on none of the accounts of the analog-digital distinction that we have discussed.
Dretske's distinction turns out to be very interesting and important, and much of the rest
of his theory is founded upon it. The use of terms "analog" and "digital" is suggestive, but,
I shall argue, misleadingly so.
3.3 Digitalisation, complete digitalisation and semantic content
Let us turn at last to Dretske's distinction between information carried in analog and digital
form. First we must introduce the auxiliary notion of nestedness, which is simply the
reverse of the information carries relation;
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"The information that r is G is nested in j's being F = s's being F carries the information
that t is G." (Dretske, 1981:71)
In prepositional terms, this becomes,
B is nested in A when and only when B carries the information that A.
We are now in a position to draw the analog-digital distinction.
"...a signal (structure, event, state) carries the information that s is F in digital form'if and
only if the signal carries no additional information about s, no information that is not al¬
ready nested in s's being F. If the signal does carry additional information about s, infor¬
mation that is not already nested is s's being F, then I shall say that the signal carries this
information in analog form... Every signal carries information in both analog and digital
form..." (Dretske, 1981:137)
How does this definition relate to our pretheoretic notions of analog and digital? Dretske
explains how the definition distinguishes information carried in paradigmatically analog and
paradigmatically digital form:
"To illustrate the way this distinction applies, consider the difference between a picture
and a statement. Suppose a cup has coffee in it, and we want to communicate this piece
of information. If I simply tell you, "The cup has coffee in it," this (acoustic) signal car¬
ries the information that the cup has coffee in it in digital form. No more specific infor¬
mation is supplied about the cup (or the coffee) than that there is some coffee in the cup.
You are not told how much coffee there is in the cup, how large the cup is, how dark the
coffee is, what the shape and orientation of the cup are, and so on. If, on the other hand, I
photograph the scene and show you the picture, the information that the cup has coffee in
it is conveyed in analog form. The picture tells you that there is some coffee is in the cup,
the shape, size, and color of the cup, and so on."
I can say that A and B are of different size without saying how much they differ in size or
which is larger, but I cannot picture A and B as being of different size without picturing
one of them as larger and indicating, roughly, how much larger it is. Similarly, if a yellow
ball is situated between a red and a blue ball, I can state that this is so without revealing
where (on the left or on the right) the blue ball is. But if this information is to be com¬
municated pictorially, the signal is necessarily more specific... For such facts as these a
picture is, of necessity, an analog representation. The corresponding statements... are digi¬
tal representations of the same facts." (Dretske, 1981: 137-8)
We shall consider the analog-digital distinction in some detail below. First, however, we
shall compare the notion of digitalisation with a related notion that Dretske introduces in
order to provide an account of belief - complete digitalisation.
Dretske introduces complete digitalisation as a refinement of digitalisation tout court:
"Structure S has the fact that t is F as its semantic content = (a) S carries the information
that t is F and (b) S carries no other piece of information, r is G, which is such that the
information that t is F is nested... in r's being G." (Dretske, 1981: 185)
A piece of information that is the semantic content of a signal is said to be'carried in
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completely digital form. Let us say that all information carried by a signal which is not car¬
ried in completely digital form is carried in fairly analog form.
Roughly, for a piece of information to be carried by a signal in completely digital form,
there must be no additional information carried by that signal. I shall argue that, digitalisa-
tion tout court is an extension of this notion, in which only additional information about
the source s is excluded. So, despite Dretske, I shall claim that digitalisation is an elabora¬
tion of the more basic notion of complete digitalisation, rather than vice versa. However,
immediate comparison of the notion is not easy since Dretske's formulations of the two
look rather different. Indeed, as the definitions stand, they do indeed behave differently.
However, I argue the main source of difference is due to a flaw in the characterisation of
semantic content. This flaw has the consequence that no information that a signal carries
about a source can be the semantic content of that signal. Once it is eliminated, and
definitions are cast in the same terms, the straightforward relation between them becomes
apparent.
Let us re-examine Dretske's definition of digital:
"...a signal (structure, event, state) carries the information that 5 is F in digital form if and
only if the signal carries no additional information about s, no information that is not al¬
ready nested in j's being F." (Dretske, 1981:137)
How does digitalisation tout court relate to the notion of complete digitalisation?
Superficially, the definitions are very different. The information that a signal carries in
completely digital form is the semantic content of that signal, where:
"Structure S has the fact that t is F as its semantic content =
(a) S carries the information that s is F and
(b) S carries no other piece of information, r is G, which is such that the information that
s is F is nested... in r's being G." (Dretske, 1981: 185)
(I have substituted an "s" for each "t", to ease the comparison with digitalisation)
As it stands, the definition of semantic content will not do. The signal S is that the
receiver is in some state (for Dretske this is the same as saying that some object at the
receiver, a, has some property, Z). Let us suppose that this signal (a is Z) carries the infor¬
mation that b is Y. The present definition has the consequence that this arbitrary piece of
information about an arbitrary object b (where b is not equal to a) cannot be the semantic
content of the signal. That is, the definition of semantic content is sufficiently restrictive to
rule out every piece of information carried about any source. The unexpected consequence
-76-
is easily derived.
By hypothesis, that a is Z carries the information that b is Y, and so b is Y is nested within
the information that a is Z. So there is a piece of information, namely a is Z in which the
information that b is Y is nested. So, according to the definition of semantic content, the
information that b is Y is not the semantic content of the signal - the information is not car¬
ried in completely digital form. Since s is F is an arbitrary piece of information, this obser¬
vation means that no information that a receiver carries about a source can be carried in
completely digital form. For all such information is carried by (is nested within) the state of
the receiver - i.e. the signal itself.
On the present definition, the only information that a signal a is Z can carry in completely
digital form is simply that a is Z. Even this information is not necessarily carried in com¬
pletely digital form. Notice that any two states which track are ipso facto nested within
each other. Thus, according to the present definition, neither of them can be carried in com¬
pletely digital form. So, if the signal (say, a shout of "Heads!") tracks a state of the source
(that the coin falls heads) even the signal a is Z is not carried in completely digital form. In
such a case, the signal has not even the trivial semantic content. It has no semantic content
at all.
One approach to avoiding these difficulties is to amend the definition such that i) additional
information at the receiver does not count as genuine additional information - so, in partic¬
ular, that a is Z does not count as genuine additional information, ii) the semantic content
itself may not be the state of the receiver. The first change blocks the unpalatable inference
that no information that a signal carries about a source can be the semantic content of that
signal, simply because all information carried about the source is nested in the state of the
receiver. The second change disallows the state of the receiver (a is Z) from being its own
semantic content.
However, it is not sufficient merely to disallow states of the receiver. Suppose that two
cards are balanced in an inverted "V". Consider two informational sources {{left card up,
left card down}}, {{right card up, right card down}}. Since the left card will fall when
and only when the right card falls, the states of these sources track each other. We noted
above that if two states track each other, then neither can be the semantic content of a sig¬
nal. Suppose that an observer shouts "Left card up" just when the left card is up, and "Left
card down" just when the left card is down. What is the semantic content of these cries?
Since the states of the receiver {shout of "Left card up", shout of "Left card down"} tracks
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the state of, say, the left card {left card up, left card down), all information that is carried
by (is nested in) the cry will ipso facto be carried by the state of the left card. Hence, no
such information can be the semantic content of the cry, since a semantic content cannot be
nested within any other piece of information (such as the state of the left card) carried by
the cry. Yet neither can the state of the left card itself be the semantic content of the cry,
since it tracks, and hence is nested within, the state of the right card. Hence, the cry has no
semantic content. So the definition of semantic content is problematic even if we disallow
states of the receiver.
The semantic content of a signal is intended to be the maximal piece of information that a
signal carries. That is, all other information that the signal carries is nested within the
semantic content. Since informational states may track each other, there is the possibility
that more that one informational state may "tie" as the maximal piece of information car¬
ried. On the present definition, if there is a tie, then both states are excluded. In such
cases, the signal has no semantic content.
These difficulties can be at least partially obviated by changing the definition so that, rather
than excluding tied maximal pieces of information, we take each of them to be equally
valid semantic contents. According to this modification, the cry of "Left card up" carries
both the information that the left card is up and the information that the right card is up in
completely digital form. Semantic content is then unique only up to the equivalence classes
induced by the tracking relation.
Let us make this point more precisely, drawing an analogy with a simple arithmetical
example. According to Dretske's original definition:
s is F is the semantic content of a signal iff no other piece of information, t is G, carried
by the signal, nests s is F.
This entails that there is a unique semantic content or no semantic content at all. Consider
an analogous putative definition of what it is for an element of a set of numbers to be big.
Given a set X {x , x , ...x }, x is big iff there is no element of X, x., such that x. > x . If,l z n K 1 1 K
say, x3 and x? are joint highest numbers, then neither element is big, since x3 > x?, and x?
> x3 and x3 > xr
According to the revised definition of semantic content:
s is F is the semantic content of a signal iff there is no additional information, t is G, car¬
ried by the signal, that is not nested in j's being F
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This definition has the consequence that semantic content is not necessarily unique. The
relevant arithmetical analog of this definition is that xk is big iff there is no element of X,
x., such that it is not the case that x, > x.. If there is a tie between x. and x_ then they are
i k i 3 7 J
both big, since for both there is no element of the set which they are not greater than or
equal to.
This revised definition of semantic content is equivalent to Dretske's original definition of
what it is to carry information is digital form, with the "aboutness" condition removed:
"...a signal (structure, event, state) carries the information that s is F in digital form if and
only if the signal carries no additional information... that is not already nested in s's being
F." (Dretske, 1981: 137)
So, under the revised definition, semantic content, or the completely analog-digital distinc¬
tion is more basic than Dretske's analog-digital distinction.
3.4 Pictures and Utterances
Why does Dretske add the "aboutness" condition to semantic content, to produce his
analog-digital distinction? I argue that this move is an attempt to capture various intuitions
about the application of the analog-digital distinction, while maintaining the "one true ideal¬
isation" hypothesis. These intuitions and two attempts to account for them are the subject
of this section. Recall that Dretske uses his analog-digital distinction to differentiate the
way in which information is carried by a statement and a photograph:
"Suppose a cup has coffee in it, and we want to communicate this piece of information. If
I simply tell you, "The cup has coffee in it," this (acoustic) signal carries the information
that the cup has coffee in it in digital form. No more specific information is supplied
about the cup (or the coffee) than that there is some coffee in the cup. You are not told
how much coffee there is in the cup, how large the cup is, how dark the coffee is, what
the shape and orientation of the cup are, and so on. If, on the other hand, I photograph the
scene and show you the picture, the information that the cup has coffee in it is conveyed
in analog form. The picture tells you that there is some coffee is in the cup, the shape,
size, and color of the cup, and so on." (Dretske, 1981: 137)
Prima facie, however, there is all sorts of additional information carried by my telling you
that the cup has coffee in it - that I've noticed that the cup has coffee in it, that I speak
English, where I am from, that I have a cold, and so on. So how can we defend the intui¬
tion that there really is a difference between the two cases? I shall examine two accounts.
Firstly that utterances do indeed carry just as much unwanted additional information as
photographs do, but that statements construed abstractly, do not. Secondly, that the "about¬
ness" condition in the definition of digital may be invoked to rule out unwanted, additional
information. On this account, the "aboutness" condition is used to rule out the unwanted
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additional information since it is not genuinely about the cup (or the coffee).
i) Level ofAbstraction
Given some appropriately rich informational idealisation (perhaps the signal is described in
terms of the detailed structure of its acoustic waveform) an utterance of "The cup has
coffee in it" carries a wealth of information over and above the information that the cup
has coffee in it - about the speaker's mood, state of health, nationality and so on. How¬
ever, consider a more abstract description of the utterance - simply that it is a tokening of
that particular sentence of English. The fact that the utterance is a token of the sentence
"The cup has coffee in it" no longer carries (at least much of) the unwanted additional
information. In our informal terms, that the speaker, say, has a cold can only be learnt
from the utterance in virtue of the quality of the speech signal - not in virtue of the words
uttered. Yet even on this more abstract description, some unwanted additional information
is carried - for example that the first word of the utterance was "The", that the speaker
knows English and so on. So let us consider a still more abstract description of the utter¬
ance. The fact that the utterance expressed the proposition that the cup has coffee in it car¬
ries still less information. This fact carries no information about the words or even the
language used. In general, the more general the description of an event (from a low-level
acoustic specification, to a specification of sentence type, to a specification of the proposi¬
tion expressed) the less unwanted additional information is carried.
The amount of information that a state of the world (event, occurrence) carries, like all
informational properties, is relative to an informational idealisation. If some event (state of
the world, occurrence) is idealised under a very specific description (perhaps each acoustic
description corresponds to a distinct informational state), then the relevant state of the
informational system may carry a lot of additional information. If, under a more coarse
grained idealisation, the same event (state of the world, occurrence) is idealised under a
more general, abstract description (perhaps acoustical objects are only distinguished if they
are tokens of different sentences of English, or if they express of the same proposition),
then the relevant informational state will carry rather less information. The coarser the
grain of the informational idealisation under which a state of the world is idealised, the less
information that will be carried.
This observation suggests that the apparent asymmetry between the way in which linguistic
utterances and photographs carry the information that the cup contains coffee is due to the
fact that our natural, intuitive idealisation of the photograph is under some specific, physical
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description, whereas our natural, intuitive idealisation of linguistic utterances is under a
much more abstract description (sentence type, proposition). Thus the specific properties of
the utterance are idealised away, and hence can play no informational role. On the other
hand, the specific (e.g. physical) properties of the photograph are part of the idealisation,
and carry all sorts of additional information about the photographed scene. Hence, accord¬
ing to our natural idealisation, the photograph is considered to carry the information that
the cup has coffee in it in analog form, whereas the linguistic expression is considered to
carry this information in digital form.
On this account, under an appropriately general description of the photograph it too carries
the information that the cup has coffee in it in digital form. For example, suppose that pho¬
tographs are classified according to whether or not they depict a cup which contains coffee.
Thus we may define a two state source {{photo depicts cup containing coffee, photo con¬
tains cup not containing coffee}}. Under this informational idealisation, the photograph
carries only the information that the cup contains coffee and so carries this information in
digital form. So perhaps the crucial difference between the two cases is not the.difference
between pictorial and linguistic description, but between the level of abstraction that seems
most appropriate in the two cases.
From Dretske's specification of the example it is unclear whether this is the interpretation
that he intends. Rather than using the terms 'utterance' (physical) or 'proposition'
(abstract), be uses the term 'statement', which is notoriously ambiguous between the two.
Grayling notes that:
"Often philosophers make a three-way distinction, between sentences, statements and pro¬
positions. A statement, on the received interpretation, is an actual use of an uttered or in¬
scribed sentence on a particular occasion [i.e. an utterance]. Often, however, 'statement'
is used as a synonym for 'proposition'..." (Grayling, 1982:41)
If the difference between the information carried by a photograph and a statement is based
on the level of abstraction at which they are typically idealised, then the cleavage is depen¬
dent on the prepositional reading of 'statement'. There need be no difference between the
way a photograph or an utterance carries the information that the cup has cqffee in it.
However, rather than appeal to levels of abstraction, Dretske takes a rather different line.
ii) A Real Difference Between Linguistic and Pictorial Representation: The Appeal to
"Aboutness"
The preceding analysis relies on the observation that whether a piece of information is
-81-
carried in analog or digital form to be a function of the level of abstraction used to idealise
the situation. Thus, the difference between pictures and statements relies crucially on the
fact that statements are interpreted as being less concrete than pictures. However, Dretske's
account is not consonant with such an interpretation. Rather, Dretske seems to use 'state¬
ment' as synonymous with 'utterance'. While he grants that an utterance carries all sorts of
additional information, over and above that the cup has coffee in it, he attempts to rule out
this additional information as being of the wrong kind. I take Dretske to hold that the
analog-digital distinction captures a genuine difference between the way in which informa¬
tion is carried by utterances and photographs.
A presupposition of this reading is that it is possible to make sense of the notion of infor¬
mation flow, independent of any particular 'level of abstraction' or informational idealisa¬
tion. We noted above that whether or not some piece of information is carried in digital
form may depend on the level of abstraction that is used to describe the situation. Indeed,
more generally, we have stressed throughout that informational properties are relative to the
informational idealisation of the scenario under study. As I read Dretske, the analog-digital
distinction is intended to mark a real difference in the way in which utterances and pictures
carry information. That is, on a sufficiently detailed idealisation, perhaps detailed enough to
capture the entire structure of information flow within the situation (if this is possible!), or
perhaps as the description tends towards this limit (if it is not), the utterances may carry the
information that the cup has coffee in it in digital form and picture can carry this informa¬
tion only in analog form. To some it may seem unlikely that sense can be made of "ideali¬
sation independent" information flow. I shall not deal with this larger question directly, but
rather assume that this approach can somehow be made coherent, and show how it does not
allow us to capture our intuitions about what information is carried in analog or digital
form, despite Dretske's ingenious technical manoeuveres.
If it is possible to make sense of the notion of "idealisation independent" information, then
we should be able to take any real, lawlike dependency as conveying information. The
height of the river carries information about the recent rainfall, the curve of the river carries
information about the underlying topography and geology of the area, the bubbles on the
surface carry information about the locations of resident fish, the temperature carries infor¬
mation about time of year, and so on. It seems that information flow is ubiquitous; the
world is "teeming with information" (Devlin, 1988); and not just teeming with information
in the sense of Shannon & Weaver (1949), but it appears to be teeming with information
content.
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Let us assume that information flow is not dependent on the particular idealisation that we
choose, but part of the world order. According to this view, the claim that a piece of infor¬
mation carries information in digital form is extremely strong. For a signal to carry the
information that s is F and no additional information comes to the claim that there are no
additional lawlike dependencies whatever between the signal and the source which carry
additional information about any informational source. Indeed, if we consider how the dis¬
tinction applies in practice, we find that the condition is too stringent to be met, even by
linguistic utterances, which, for Dretske, are paradigm cases of structures which carry infor¬
mation in digital form.
Both a picture of a cup with coffee in it and an utterance of "The cup has coffee in it"
carry more information than that the cup has coffee in it. At a minimum, the picture car¬
ries additional information about the layout of the scene, and the utterance carries additional
information about the voice of the speaker. Indeed, every utterance will carry some addi¬
tional information over and above its semantic content, and hence will not carry that
semantic content in digital form. So it seems that there are no relevant distinctions between
pictorial and linguistic representation - they both carry information in analog form. What is
required is a criterion to eliminate this unwanted additional information.
So far we have ignored an important aspect of Dretske's characterisation of the analog-
digital distinction. "A signal... carries the information that s is F is digital form if and
only if the signal carries no additional information about s..." (my italicisation of "about").
A signal may carry a piece of information in digital form despite the fact that it carries any
amount of additional information as long as none of that information is about the object at
the source. It is this "aboutness" condition that lets the analog-digital distinction
differentiate between the utterance and the photograph. The utterance carries information
about the voice, country of origin, mood of the speaker. Yet the information that the cup
has coffee in it is carried in digital form as long of none of this information is about the
cup. Indeed, it seems prima facie plausible that the only information that the utterance car¬
ries about the cup is that it has coffee in it. The utterance does not carry information about
the colour, size, orientation of the cup, or about how much coffee is in it. By contrast the
photograph of necessity carries such additional information about the cup.
There are two problems with the invocation of "aboutness". Firstly whether or not the
"aboutness" condition can be made to eliminate unwanted additional information and so
make sense of the analog-digital distinction, Dretske's later analysis is still problematic.
From the point of view of providing an account of meaning, the notion of digitalisation tout
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court has a very undesirable property - that a signal can carry many distinct pieces of infor¬
mation in digital form about different objects. Suppose that there is a cry of dismay as a
bridge collapses in the river. This cry might carry the information, of the bridge, that it had
collapsed, in digital form, since the cry might carry no additional information about the
bridge. However, the cry might also carry the information, of the car on the bridge, that it
had plunged into the river, in digital form, since the cry might carry no additional informa¬
tion about the car. Yet intuitively we want the semantic content to be unique. In the case of
an utterance of "The cup has coffee in it", the semantic content should be just that the cup
has coffee in it. In his later development of the theory, Dretske points out this failing, and
avoids it by replacing digitalisation with complete digitalisation. For, as we saw in the quo¬
tation at the beginning of this section, the information that a signal carries in completely
digital form is, for Dretske, its semantic content. So, the "aboutness" condition is rejected
just when it might be thought that it would be needed most - in providing an account of
meaning.
The secondly difficulty with appealing to "aboutness" is that it is very difficult to provide a
workable account of "aboutness" such that an utterance of "The cup has coffee in it" carries
no additional, unwanted information. It is to this more specific problem that we turn in the
next section. In subsequent sections, I shall develop the "levels of abstraction" account of
our analog-digital intuitions, and account for Dretske's cases with a formulation of the
analog-digital distinction which makes no reference to the problematic notion of aboutness.
3.5 Difficulties with "Aboutness"
For Dretske, the content of an informational signal is of the form s is F, where s is an
indexically specified object at the source. The content of the signal is that the designated
object s has the property F. It seems natural to say that this piece of information is about
s, and not, say, about some other object r. Hence, on a Dretskian notion of information
content, there is no need to build in a separate account of "aboutness"; for it is built into
the structure of the information carried. The object that a proposition is about is simply the
"indexically" or "demonstratively" specified object s at the source.
It has been argued that information content should, rather, be treated as unstructured. The
notions of object and property, as they are used in Dretske's theory are conflated with the
notions of source and state. Once these notions are unconfounded, it was concluded that
the latter, but not the former, have a legitimate place in the theory.
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If we are to maintain the prepositional approach, we should aim to i) demonstrate that
Dretske's use of the notion of "aboutness" does not save Dretske's use of the analog-digital
distinction, in distinguishing, e.g., utterances from pictures; ii) that a proper treatment of the
distinction can capture the intuitions that "aboutness" is intended to account for in some
other way. In particular, as outlined above, I shall appeal to the relativity of informational
properties to informational idealisation. I shall deal with the first point in the rest of this
section, and take up the second in the next.
Given an arbitrary proposition, how do we specify what object or objects it is about? Let
us assume that, at minimum, a proposition is about any of its constituents. So, the proposi¬
tion that John loves Mary is at least about John and Mary. Applying this criterion to the
example of the utterance about the coffee cup, we get rather unexpected results.
An utterance of "The cup has coffee in it" is supposed to carry the information that the cup
has coffee in it in digital form, despite the additional information that it carries,- since that
information is not about the cup. Unfortunately however, the utterance appears to carry a
host of propositions which (on the minimal "constituency" criterion) are about the cup
(Seligman & Chater, 1989). For example, the utterance carries the information that the cup
is being talked about; that the cup has been noticed by the speaker; that the speaker has
realised that the cup has coffee in it; that the cup is being talked about loudly, that the cup
is being talked about in a low pitched voice. Indeed, in general, for any property G of the
utterance, the utterance carries the information that the cup is being talked about Gly. The
property G is perhaps most naturally thought of as an acoustical property, but it need not
be. G may be a wholly arbitrary property of the utterance such as being made on a Tues¬
day, or being made by the seventh son of a seventh son. So, if the utterance occurs 40
miles from Glasgow, then the utterance carries the information that the cup is being talked
about 40 miles from Glasgow.
If we accept that such additional information is indeed about the cup, then it seems that,
according to Dretske's definition, the utterance does not carry the information that the cup
has coffee in it in digital form after all. To block such counterexamples we need some res¬
triction on which propositions containing the cup as a constituent are genuinely about the
cup and which are not. Suppose that some such restriction picks out some subset, S, of pro¬
positions that are about the cup. If S fulfills the role that we have assigned it, it will include
the proposition that the cup has coffee in it, but exclude the counterexamples. The proposi¬
tion that the cup is being talked about loudly would fall outside S.
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Only propositions in the set S, which are genuinely about the cup are relevant to determin¬
ing whether or not a given piece of information is carried in digital or analog form. That is,
all propositions which are part of the information content of a signal (in this case, the utter¬
ance) may be ignored in determining whether some piece of information is carried in digital
or analog form. Yet by excluding all such propositions, we ensure that none of them can be
carried in digital form by any signal. Propositions outside S are simply not digitalisable.
In particular, for example, an utterance of "The cup is being talked about loudly" can not
carry the information, about the cup, that it is being talked about loudly. Yet if this utter¬
ance does not carry its semantic content in digital form, why should an utterance of "The
cup has coffee in it" carry its semantic content in digital form?
The consequences of adopting some restrictive subset S are even less appealing if we turn
to the implications for Dretske's account of prepositional attitudes. Dretske argues that a
necessary condition for an organism to believe or know that s is F is that some internal
structure of the organism carries the information that s is F is digital form. It has been
suggested that a proposition such as that the cup is being talked about is not digitalisable.
Yet, given Dretske's account of belief, that such propositions are not only unknowable, but
quite literally unbelievable.
Seligman and Chater (1989) point out that the account also has problems with propositions
which fall inside S. Let us consider what propositions might be left inside S. Propositions
involving being talked about loudly, and being noticed, may seem to be somewhat suspect.
Perhaps it really is impossible to carry such peculiar pieces of information in digital form.
Perhaps, then in these case the semantic content of an utterance is carried in analog rather
than digital form.
This approach is tenable only if at least some core set of propositions does not fall outside
S. For these at least, it might be possible to say that the semantic content of an utterance is
carried in digital form. At minimum, surely propositions about the non-relational, physical
properties of objects lie within S. For example, we want an utterance of "The cup weighs
more than 100 grammes" to carry the information that the cup weighs more than 100
grammes in digital form. Presumably propositions about physical properties such as height,
weight shape and so on must be included within S. If these propositions are problematic,
then which propositions are not? If there is to be any principled criterion for membership
of S, then surely it must at least include ascriptions of such non-relational, physical proper¬
ties. Nevertheless, it turns out that any subset S which does include such propositions is
still not sufficiently restrictive to maintain our intuitions about what information an
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utterance carries in digital form.
Seligman and Chater (1989) present the following case. Imagine a black box lying on a
table in Robin's office. Robin says "The black box is a tape recorder". Intuitively, this
utterance carries the information that the black box is a tape recorder in digital form, in the
same way that "The cup weighs more than 100 grammes" carries the information that the
cup weighs more than 100 grammes in digital form. But suppose that the tape recorder was
recording Fred's utterance. The state of the magnetic tape can be specified in purely physi¬
cal terms. Suppose that the tape is in state T having recorded Fred's utterance. Then the
black box has a non-relational physical property P, of its tape being in state T. Moreover,
Fred's utterance carries the information that the black box is P. By our minimal assump¬
tion, the proposition that the tape recorder is P is in the subset S (since P is a non¬
relational, physical property). So we must conclude that the utterance of "The black box is
a tape recorder" carries the information that the black box is a tape recorder in analog form.
In fact, whether or not the information is analog or digital depends on whether or not the
tape recorder is on!
These arguments appear to undermine the attempt to analyse the difference between the
way in which utterances and pictures can carry information, in terms of the analog-digital
distinction.
The underlying problem in the tape recorder example is that utterances have the power to
causally interact with the events that they are describing. The same argument will apply to
any other information bearing object with such causal powers (e.g. mental states).
The only remaining option is to say that which propositions are members of S is decided
for each specific informational occasion. That is, in order to get a satisfactory notion of
aboutness, we must specify which properties of the object s are relevant to determining
whether the information that s is F is carried by a signal in digital or analog form. In
Dretske's account, this specification is built into the very definition of information. The
source in any informational exchange is defined as a set of mutually exclusive and exhaus¬
tive states. The properties of being in each of these states are precisely those required.
According to a specification in which the only source is {{the black box is a tape recorder,
the black box is not a tape recorder)) the information that the black box is a tape recorder
is carried by Robin's utterance in digital form. But according to a specification in which the
audio signal on the tape in the black box is given the information is carried in analog form.
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However, to admit this relativity to specification is just to appeal to the relativity of infor¬
mational properties of a situation to the informational idealisation. The "one true informa¬
tional" idealisation must be abandoned.
3.6 The Analog-Digital Distinction and Idealisation Dependence
Informational properties are relative to informational idealisation. Unless we have some
way of picking out a privileged idealisation (the "one true" informational idealisation) this
implies that whether or not a piece of information is carried in analog or digital form is
relative to the informational idealisation of the situation. Thus, it cannot form the basis for
an absolute distinction between the ways in which certain structures carry information (e.g.
utterances carry information in digital form; pictures carry information in analog form).
In section 3.5, it was argued that, according to Dretske's account, an utterance of "The cup
has coffee in it" does not have as its semantic content that the cup has coffee in it, and
does not even carry this information in digital form. Rather, the signal carries all sorts of
additional information, much of it about the cup, on any idealisation rich enough to be the
"one true idealisation". Such a rich idealisation will unavoidable pick up all sorts of
unwanted informational dependencies involving the utterance. Let us now relativise the
treatment to particular idealisations. Under a simple idealisation the information that the cup
has coffee in it is carried in digital form. If the idealisation is enriched, the information is
carried in analog form. This point is best made by example.
Suppose that Bill is a compulsively truthful poisoner and that he has just made you a cup
of coffee. Being unable to see if the cup is full or empty you are unsure whether the cup
on the table is the cup Bill has just brought you or the one that he drank earlier. You also
do not know whether Bill has put poison in the cup. If he has, then he speaks in a falter¬
ing voice, due to an understandable nervousness. For if there is coffee in the cup, you are
about to collapse, and if there is not, he is. If the cup is not poisoned, then Bill speaks in
his normal voice. You ask "Does the cup have coffee in it?" and Bill says "Yes, the cup
has coffee in it" in faltering voice. Is the information that the cup has coffee carried in
digital or analog form by Bill's utterance? It depends on what idealisation of the situation is
chosen.
Idealisation 1: Simple source, simple receiver. The receiver has two states {{Bill utters
"Yes, the cup has coffee in it", Bill utters "No, the cup does not have coffee in it"}}. The
source has two states {{the cup has coffee in it, the cup does not have coffee in it}}. The
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states of the source and the receiver track each other, since Bill is perfectly reliable. On this
idealisation, the utterance does carry the information that the cup has coffee in it in digital
form, since it carries not additional information about the cup, or anything else (except
itself).
Idealisation 2: Rich source, simple receiver. The source may be idealised as having four
states {{unpoisoned coffee, poisoned coffee, unpoisoned dregs, poisoned dregs}}. The
receiver is idealised , as having two states as before. The utterance again carries the informa¬
tion that the cup has coffee in it in digital form under this idealisation. Intuitively, we
might argue that the character of the utterance (faltering or normal) carries information
about whether or not the cup is poisoned. That is, the utterance carries additional informa¬
tion, over and above that the cup has coffee in it. However, idealisation 2 is not rich
enough to capture the manner of Bill's utterance, since it is too weak to distinguish a falter¬
ing from normal renderings of "Yes, the cup has coffee in it".
Idealisation 3: Simple source, rich receiver. As in idealisation 1, we idealise the source as
having two states {{the cup has coffee in it, the cup does not have coffee in it}}. The
receiver is idealised as having four states {{faltering utterance of "Yes, the cup has coffee
in it", normal utterance of "Yes, the cup has coffee in it", faltering utterance of "No, the
cup does not have coffee in it", normal utterance of "No, the cup does not have coffee in
it"}}. On this idealisation also, a faltering utterance, say, carries the information that the
cup has coffee in it in digital form. Intuitively the fact that the utterance is faltering carries
the additional information about the cup that it is poisoned. However, idealisation 3 is not
sensitive to such additional information. If the source has just two states {{coffee, no
coffee}} then the tenor of Bill's voice carries no information at all. That Bill said that the
cup had coffee in it completely determines the state of the source; the is no further informa¬
tion that can be carried about it.
Idealisation 4: rich source, rich receiver. Suppose that both the source and the receiver are
described as four state sources. The states of these sources track each other in the natural
way: faltering "Yes" tracks poisoned coffee; faltering "No" tracks poisoned dregs; normal
"Yes" tracks unpoisoned coffee; normal "No" tracks unpoisoned dregs. In this case, a
faltering utterance of "Yes, the cup has coffee in it" carries the information that the cup has
coffee in it in analog form. For it carries the more specific information: that the cup con¬
tains poisoned coffee. This piece of the information is carried in digital form.
Under a weak idealisation, the faltering utterance carries the information in digital form.
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Under a richer idealisation the utterance carries the information in analog form. If we aim
to capture the entire informational structure of the world our idealisation will be very rich
indeed. Hence, it is not surprising that, according to the "one true idealisation" hypothesis,
it turns out that the content of an utterance is carried in analog form.
Note that the example does not depend on the fact that we are dealing with linguistic utter¬
ances rather than, say, pictures. For example, suppose that Bill has a Kodak Instamatic
camera. Somewhat bizarrely, rather than responding verbally to your question, he takes a
quick snap of the coffee cup, and hands you the photograph, a thirty seconds later. If he is
nervous his hands shake as he takes the picture, and so the photo is blurred. The photo¬
graph may be idealised as having two or four states, just as the utterance is above: two
states {{picture shows a full cup of coffee, picture shows an empty cup of coffee}}, four
states {{blurred picture of a full cup, clear picture of a full cup, blurred picture of an empty
cup, clear picture of an empty cup}}. In the verbal example, the sentence uttered carries
information whether the cup contains coffee and the tenor of voice carries information
about whether it contains poison. We could construct a precisely analogous example in
which the content of the picture (coffee versus dregs) carries information about whether the
cup contains coffee, and the clarity or otherwise of the picture carries information about
whether the cup contains poison. The informational properties of the two examples are pre¬
cisely the same, irrespective of whether the information is carried verbally or pictorially.
The crucial factor, in determining whether the information that the cup contains coffee is,
in both the pictorial and linguistic cases, the level of abstraction at which the situation is
described. This is perhaps hardly surprising in the light of our observation that, quite gen¬
erally, informational properties of a situation are relative to the information idealisation
chosen.
3.7 Formalising the Analog-Digital Distinction
In section 2.5, we formalised Dretske's notion of information content in propositional logic.
In the current section, an extension of this formalisation is given, in which the complete
analog-digital distinction and Dretske's analog-digital distinction are defined. The semantic
content of a signal (the information that it carries in completely digital form) is closely
related to what we called the full content, in section 2.5. To capture Dretske's analog-
digital distinction, it is necessary to capture the notion of "aboutness", at least in a rudi¬
mentary form. That is, there must be some way of specifying which propositions are about
the object at the source, and thus which propositions are relevant to the analog-digital dis¬
tinction. In the present formulation, this is done simply by specifying an arbitrary subset, X,
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of relevant atomic propositions. Only propositions constructed entirely out of these atomic
propositions are deemed to be relevant. This amounts to allowing the recursive definition to
range over only a restricted set of propositional letters. The language so generated is the
relevant subset of L.
As before, let the language L be defined as follows:
Let P = P PN-.. be the propositional letters
Let the propositional connectives be ->, V, &, <->.
Formation Rules
1) Any propositional letter is a wff
2) i) if A is a wff, so is -A





3) Nothing else is a wff.
Suppose that it is a dark night and a lookout is on a hill overlooking the coast watching for
smugglers. He waves a lamp if he sees anything suspicious on the coast. If the smugglers
are about to land, then the lookout feels panicky and the waves will tend to be irregular
and unsteady. Further, if it is very windy, the lamp will flicker persistently. Let the
atomic propositions of the informational idealisation be: lamp on (a)\ lamp waving (by,
lamp flickering (c); suspicious events on the coast (a); smugglers approaching ((3); high
wind (£,). Suppose that the smugglers are indeed approaching ((3 holds). Does a waving,
flickering light carry this information in digital form [a, b, c}7 Certainly, the information is
not carried in completely digital form, since the state of the light carries the additional
information (£) that it is windy (or, for that matter, a & £, or |3 -> ^ and so on) However,
suppose that we restrict the set of relevant propositions to those which are about suspicious
events on the coast {a, (3} rather than about the state of the wind {£}. The only relevant
complex propositions should be only those which are composed purely of a's and (3's.
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Those which contain £ are partly about the state of the wind, and are thus excluded from
consideration. Given this restriction, the signal carry the information that the smugglers are
approaching in digital form. For there is no additional information carried about suspicious
events on the coast.
Now let us reconsider the problem of trivial additional information. That the light is wav¬
ing (that a holds) carries the information that there are suspicious goings on at the coast
(a). Trivially, it also carries the information that the light is waving (a). Yet this does not
count as additional information, if the lookout is perfectly vigilant, since the light will be
on if and only if there are suspicious events afoot (that is a and a track each other). So a
carried by a, and is a is not additional information. However, if the lookout is very tired
and periodically falls asleep, then there may be suspicious events, but no waving light. So
the trivial content that the light is waving (a) is no longer nested in the desired content -
that there are suspicious goings on at the coast (a). In intuitive terms, the light waving
carries more information than that there are suspicious goings on; it carries the information
that the lookout is awake. So a is not carried by the signal a in completely digital form.
Invoking the relevance restriction, if only propositions that are relevant are constructed
from a and (3 then propositions about the wakefulness of the lookout do not count as addi¬
tional information. So the information the light's being on may carry the information that
there are suspicious goings on in (but not completely) digital form, even with a dozing
lookout.
The information that the smugglers are about to land need not, of course, be carried in digi¬
tal form. If the lookout waved the lamp madly when and only when the smugglers had
their knives between their teeth, then the state of the lamp would not carry the information
that the smugglers are about to land in digital form. For it would carry additional informa¬
tion about suspicious activities at the cove: that the smugglers were ready for battle! On
any natural criterion of relevance (at least from the point of view of customs and excise)
this highly relevant information about the goings on at the coast.
The relevance restriction is formalised simply by restricting the recursive definition to the
relevant subset of the propositional variables. Let us denote the language generated from
V
this restricted set X, by L .
X
Where X is a subset of P, Let L be the language in the variables X generated by the for¬
mation rules of L.
For example, suppose that P is [a, (3, £] and X is [a, (3], Then a, (3, a <-> -(3, a v (a &
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P) are in Lx; ^,av^,a-> (£, -> P) are not. Lx is, of course, itself a subset of L.
As in 2.5, we assume some Gentzen type formulation of the rules of proof of the classical
propositional calculus. As before, informational state is characterised by a theory [A],
If A is a set of wffs then,
[A] = {al A I- a} is the theory generated by the set of sentences A.
If a signal (proposition) is added as a premise, the new information state will be a new
theory. A piece of information is part of the content of the signal, if it is an element of the
new theory, but not the old. The information is a fresh consequence of the signal. Informa¬
tion content was simply characterised as follows.
A signal (proposition) a carries a proposition p iff p is a fresh consequence, when a is
added to the current informational state.
In formalising the analog/digital distinction, we are interested only in the relevant fresh
consequences of the signal (consequence about the events on the coast). So we may intro¬
duce the more restricted notion of relevant information content, as follows:
A signal (proposition) a relevantly carries a proposition p if (3 is a relevant fresh conse¬
quence, when a is added to the current informational state.
The relevant fresh consequences are simply those fresh consequences [A, a] - [A] whose
Y
formulae are wffs of L . Notice that there is no restriction that the formulae of A them-
V
selves must be wffs of L . So, there is no restriction on the premises from which conclu¬
sions may be drawn. The premises need not be "relevant", but the conclusions must be.
The notion of relevant information content will be characterised formally below. Now let
us formulate the analog-digital distinctions.
The Complete Analog-Digital Distinction
Before we consider the restriction to relevant propositions which is necessary to capture the
analog-digital distinction proper, let us consider the complete analog-digital distinction.
Recall that the definition of information content says that a signal a carries the information
that A iff:
-93-
A is a member of [A, a] - [A]
If a signal a carries some piece of information A in completely digital for, then all the
information carried by a (including a itself) is carried by A. Indeed if A carries a it ipso
facto carries all the information that a carries. So, we define a signal a to carry a piece of
information A in completely digital form just when the converse holds. That is, A also car¬
ries the information that a. So,
a carries A in completely digital form just when A is a member of [A, a] - [A] and-a is a
member of [A, A] - [A]
A is carried in fairly analog form if this additional criterion is not met.
It is interesting to note that the definition is symmetrical, so that if a carries A in com¬
pletely digital form then A carries a in completely digital form. Further, if a carries A in
completely digital form, then a and A track each other. That is, given the state of the infor¬
mation system A, A I- a <-> A (see section 2.5) However, the converse does not hold, a
and A may track but not carry each other in completely digital form.
The proof is straightforward.
First, we show that if a carries A in completely digital form, then a and A track each other.
By hypothesis,
A is a member of [A, a] - [A], and
a is a member of [A, A] - [A]
so,
A, a I- A; A, A I- a
So, by arrow introduction,
A I- a -> A; A I- A -> a
from which, by the definition of
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A I- a <-> A Q.E.D.
However, the converse only holds if the signal is a not already a consequence of the infor¬
mational state (that is, it is informative, see below). Suppose that the signal adds no new
information at all to the informational state:
[A, a] - [A] = [A, A]-[A] = { }
a does not carry the information that A at all (let alone in completely digital form), since A
is not a member of [A, a] - [A], since this is the empty set. However, we now show that a
and A do track each other. For, by assumption,
[A] = [A, a] = [A, A]
so,
A I- A; A I- a
and by monotonicity,
A, a I- A; A, A I- a
and so, as before,
A 1- a <-> A Q.E.D.
So two propositions may track each other, without carrying information about each other in
completely digital form, if the signal a is already a consequence of the information state A.
If, however, the signal is genuinely new, we may show that tracking does imply complete
digitalisation. Given that
(1) [A, a] - [A] is non-empty and that
(2) A I- a <-> (3
we need to show that a carries (3 in digital form. That is,
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a is a member of [A, a] - [A]; (3 is a member of [A, [3] - [A]
By the arrow elimination (modus ponens) it follows from (2) that
A, a I- (3 and A, (3 I- a
So, [A, a] = [A, a, (3] = [A, (3] Let us call this theory S.
It follows that, [A, a] - [A] = [A, [3] - [A] = S - [A]
To show that a carries (3 in completely digital form, that is, that a is a member of [A, a] -
[A] (= S - [A]) and that (3 is a member of [A, (3] - [A] (= S - [A])
So we must show that a and (3 are both in S and not in [A], Since S = [A, a, (3], trivially
a and P are in S. By hypothesis, the signal a is not a member of [A] (it is not a conse¬
quence of the current information state, but is genuinely new information). If [A] does not
contain a, then [A] does not contain p, by (2). So both a and p lie in S - [A] as required.
So a carries p is completely digital form (and, of course, vice versa) if a and p track and
are not already part of the information state A.
Notice that a signal may carry more than one piece of information in completely digital
form. For example, the cry of "Heads!" may carry the information that the coin fell heads
and the information that Fred lost the bet in completely digital form, and the conjunction of
the two propositions... and so on. Quite generally, if a is a semantic content of some sig¬
nal, and if a tracks p, then p is a semantic content of that signal. That is, semantic content
is only unique up to equivalence under the tracking relation.
The Analog-Digital Distinction
A signal P carries a proposition Q in completely digital form just when P carries Q and Q
carries P. This ensures that all information that is carried by P is carried by Q and vice
versa - the signal P carries no additional information, over and above that information car¬
ried by Q. However, Dretske's definition of the analog-digital distinction tout court
specifies only that:
"a signal... carries the information that s is F in digital form if and only if the signal car¬
ries no additional information about s..."
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The signal may carry all sorts of additional information, but not information about s. In our
discussion of the analog-digital distinction we concluded that a general aboutness condition
was unworkable on a propositional account, but that its function might be served if we
allowed arbitrary stipulations about which propositions are relevant and which are not.
V
Above, we defined the language L , which is the set of formulae generated by a subset X
Y
of the propositional variables P. Then we defined [A] , which is the set of consequences of
Y
a set of formulae A, which are in the language L . That is, it is the set of relevant conse¬
quences, relative to X.
Applying this relevance restriction, the definition of the analog-digital distinction should
stipulate not that the signal P carries no additional information that is not carried by Q, but
that P carries no additional relevant information not carried by Q. (A small additional
point: in Dretske's account, the putative digital content, that s is F, must itself satisfy the
aboutness condition, since it is about s. Similarly, the putative propositional digital content
V
Q must satisfy the relevance condition. That is, Q must be in the language L ).
Expressing these ideas more formally, we say that a proposition P carries a proposition Q
in digital form, relative to X (where X is a subset of P the set of relevant propositional vari¬
ables) if and only if:
1. P carries the information that Q.
2. Q is in LX
3. [A, P]X - [A]X = [A, Q]X - [A]X
Condition 3 states that the relevant fresh consequences of the axioms A and P are the same
as the relevant fresh consequences of the axioms A and Q. So, in particular, the signal P
carries no relevant information that is not carried by Q. Can the condition be simplified by
removing the term which is subtracted from both sides? In general, it is not, of course, leg¬
itimate to conclude that set A = set B from A - C = B - C. However, in the case that the
subtracted set C is a subset of both A and B, the move is allowed. So, in the present case,
the simplification may be made:
3'. [A, P]X = [A, Q]X
If a signal P carries a proposition Q, but not in digital form (relative to X), the proposition
is carried in analog form.
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There seems to be rather little in common between the definitions of the complete analog-
digital distinction and the analog-digital distinction tout court. However, we shall see below
that, when these are appropriately reformulated, a common underlying structure emerges.
Semantic Content and Relevant Semantic Content
Just as there are two analog-digital distinctions: the complete analog-digital distinction, and
Dretske's analog-digital distinction tout court, there are two corresponding notions of
semantic content: Dretske's semantic content, which I shall call "full" semantic content; and
the more constrained "relevant" semantic content. The first of these is simply "full" infor¬
mational content, as introduced in section II:
The full semantic content, S(a), of a
= {[A, a]} - {[A]}
A formula A is part of the information content of a iff A is a member of S(a). A set of
formulae, H, is part of the information content of a iff E is a subset of S(a)
V
Thus we defined the The relevant semantic content, S (a), of a
= {[A, a]X} - {[A]X}
Not every signal will have a non-empty semantic content. If the signal is added as a fresh
axiom is already a consequence of the theory (in epistemological terms, the proposition
added is merely a reiteration of something that is already known), then there will be no
fresh consequences - the semantic content will be the empty set.
A proposition is informative iff it has an non-empty semantic content, S(a).
A proposition added may have some fresh consequences, but no relevant consequences. In
the example of the smugglers and the lookout, that the pub has just closed may carry all
sorts of information (if the informational idealisation is broad enough), but none which is
relevant to the goings on at the coast.
A proposition is relevantly informative iff it has an non-empty relevant semantic content,
SX(cc).
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Notice that we have defined semantic content using sets of propositions. In Dretske's treat¬
ment, semantic content is identified with a single proposition:
"...that piece of information that it carries in completely digitalized form..." (Dretske, 1981:
184)
However, a signal may carry a variety of propositions in completely digital form. Yet the
notion of semantic content is intended to "...secure the desired uniqueness of a struture's
semantic content..." (Dretske, 1981:184). The present definition secures the intended
uniqueness.
Relevant Information Content
By analogy with the above, we may introduce "relevant" information content. This is
defined in just the same way as standard information content, except that it is based on
relevant rather than full semantic content:
A formula A is part of the relevant information content of a iff A is a member of S (a).
A set of formulae, S, is part of the relevant information content of a iff E is a subset of
SX(a).
Let us make the analogy rather more concrete. A proposition P carries a proposition tout
court Q if and only if Q is a fresh consequence of the information system, when P is added
as an axiom. Similarly, a proposition P relevantly carries a proposition if and only if Q is
a relevant consequence of the informational system, when P is added as an axiom.
Relevant information content can be used to reformulate the analog-digital distinction in a
rather redundant but illuminating form.
P relevantly carries the information that Q iff
1. for any proposition R, if Q relevantly carries R, so does P.
2. for any proposition R, if P relevantly carries R, so does Q.
V
3. Q is relevant (in L ) (Since the content must itself be relevant)
The analogous reformulation of the complete analog-digital distinction gives:
1. for any proposition R, if Q carries R, so does P.
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2. for any proposition R, if P carries R, so does Q.
Thus, we see that the two distinctions are formally very closely related. The key difference
is that the analog-digital distinction has the asymmetrical condition that Q must itself be
relevant. Since Q relevantly carries the information that Q, and P relevantly carries all the
information that Q relevantly carries, this entails that P relevantly carries the information
that Q. However, Q need not relevantly carry the information that P, since P may not be
relevant. If P is not relevant, it cannot be relevantly carried by any signal at all.
There are two ways in which we might attempt to restore symmetry to definition of the
analog-digital distinction. Firstly, the stipulation that Q is relevant could be deleted. How¬
ever, this has the consequence that P may relevantly carry the information that Q without
carrying (tout court) the information that Q at all. For example, consider the information
state defined by the following propositions: P -> R and Q -> R. If R is stipulated to be the
only relevant proposition, then P and Q have the same relevant consequences, if added to
the informational idealisation. But surely this should not imply that P relevantly carries Q
(and, for that matter, vice versa), since the whether Q holds is wholly independent of
whether P holds. In particular, P may hold, and relevantly carry the information that Q,
even though Q does not itself hold. This violation of facticity is surely unacceptable. (If we
retain the additional condition that Q is itself relevant, then that P carries all the relevant
information that Q carries implies that P carries the information that Q. So, if P holds then
so does Q, and hence information is factive, as required).
Secondly, we could impose symmetry by stipulating that Q is relevant and that P is
relevant. However, we noted above that since Q relevantly carries the information that Q
and P relevantly carries all information that Q relevantly carries (by hypothesis), P
relevantly carries Q. If we stipulate that P is relevant then by a precisely similar argument
we have that Q relevantly carries that P. A signal carries all the information that it
relevantly carries. Hence, P carries the information that Q and vice versa. So, by the
definition above, P carries the information that Q in completely digital form. So, on this
revised definition, the notion of digitalisation turns out to be more stringent that the com¬
plete digitalisation. Yet the reason for introducing digitalisation tout court was to provide a
less stringent definition. So the asymmetry of the definition appears to be unavoidable.
The Ubiquity ofDigitalisation
Let us finally turn to the question of the ubiquity of digitalisation - an issue which will be
important in our discussion of the application of the analog-digital distinction to perception
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and cognition in the next chapter. Specifically, does every informative proposition digital-
ise some piece of information?
Dretske says that:
"... a signal carrying information in analog form will always carry some information in di¬
gital form. A sentence expressing all the information a signal carries will be a sentence
expressing the information a signal carries in digital form (since this will be the most
specific, most determinate, piece of information the signal carries)." (Dretske, 1981: 138)
If we consider both digitalisation tout court and complete digitalisation there are two ques¬
tions - one in which we consider the relevance restriction and one in which we do not.
First, does every relevantly informative proposition (one which has a non-empty set of
relevant fresh consequences) carry some relevant proposition in digital form? Second, does
every informative proposition (one which has a non-empty set of fresh consequences) carry
some proposition in digital form? We need consider only the first question, since the
second is a special case, in which the set of relevant basic propositions is the set of all
basic propositions. Let us frame the question more formally.
Given a language, L, current information state A, and set X of relevant atomic propositions,
let P be a relevantly informative proposition. That is, P is such that:
[A, P]X - [A]X * { }
Is there a proposition Q, which P carries in digital form? That is, such that:
1. P carries the information that Q.
2. Q is in LX
3. [A, P]X = [A, Q]X
First, I shall prove what I call the Finite Relevant Axiomatization Lemma:
V
Consider the theory [F] , generated by an arbitrary finite set of formulae T of L. There is a
finite set of formulae T' of relevant formulae (that is, formulae in L ) which finitely
axiomatize the theory:
[F]X = [F']X
The lemma is easy to prove X is finite - that is there are only a finite number of the
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relevant prepositional variables. Even if this is not the case, given that T is itself finite, the
problem can be reduced to the finite case:
Since T is a finite set of sentences of L, it can only contain reference to finitely many
relevant atomic propositions K. Since T does not constrain the truth value of relevant
V
atomic propositions outside K, the only consequences of T in L are those constructed
entirely out of atomic propositions in K - those formulae in L . Since there is no constraint
on the truth values of any atomic propositions outside K, any consequences of T which are
K K
not in L will follow from consequences which are in L . So if we are able to finitely
axiomatize those consequences in L , then we have ipso facto axiomatized all the relevant
X K K
consequences in L . Formally, this means that if [F] = [F*] , (where K is finite) then
[F]X = [F']X (where X need not be finite).
So whether or not there are finitely many relevant atomic propositions, only the finite set
which are mentioned in T need be considered. So, without loss of generality, we treat only
the case in which the number of relevant atomic propositions X is finite.
Now the proof is straightforward. Suppose there are M relevant atomic propositions. There
will be 2M permutations of truth values for these propositions - corresponding to 2M rows
x
in a truth table. The Boolean function corresponding to an arbitrary formula of L will pick
out some subset of these permutations of truth values (the rows in the truth table in which
the proposition is true). Since any of the 2M permutations may be present or absent, there
(2Mf
will be 2K ' such subsets. Two formulae are logically equivalent iff they correspond to the
/^M\
same subset (set of rows in the truth table). So, we generate 2y ' equivalence classes.
Pick a single member from each of these equivalence classes to form a set Z, and consider
x
the set of these which are in the subset [T] , that we are attempting to axiomatize. Let us
consider the set Y of all such propositions.
x
Claim: the set Y axiomatizes [F] as required. That is,
[T]X = [Y]X
We need to show that [Y]X is a subset of [F]X, and that [F]X is a subset of [Y]X.
x
There are finitely many elements of Y, all of which are in L . Since the members of Y
x
were chosen from [T] , clearly:
-102-
[Y]X is a subset of [T]X
X X
Suppose that there is some formula a in [F] which is not in [Y] . Consider p the member
of Z chosen from the same equivalence class as a. p is logically equivalent to a', and so is
also in [T]X. So, since Y is the subset of Z which is in [r]X, p is in Y. So p is in [Y]x.
Hence, since a is logically equivalent to p, a is also in [Y] , contra our hypothesis. So,
X X
there are no members of [T] which are not also in [Y] .
[F]X is a subset of [Y]X
X X
Therefore, [Y] = [F] , and so Y does axiomatize using only relevant propositions.
Having established this lemma, we can now establish that every relevantly informative pro¬
position carries some relevant proposition in digital form. Consider the information state
Y
after P is added, [A, P] . By the Finite Relevant Axiomatization Lemma, there is a finite
Y
set of relevant formulae (that is, formulae in L ) E such that:
[A, P]X = [S]X
Let us simply conjoin the formulae of E into a single proposition, R. Since this conjunct
both is a consequence of its constituents, and has those constituents as consequences, then,
[R]X = [E]X = [A, P]X
The single proposition R axiomatizes the set of relevant consequences in the new informa¬
tional state [A, P]X.
Claim: P carries R in digital form.
To show this, we must satisfy the three conditions:
1. P carries the information that R.
2. R is in LX
3. [A, P]X = [A, P]X
Y
The second condition is satisfied trivially. R is in L , since it is a conjunction of formulae
Y
which are in L .
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Showing that the first condition holds is rather more involved. To show that P carries R,
we need to show that R is part of the semantic content of P. That is, that
R is a member of [A, P] - [A]
So we must show i) that R is a member of [A, P], and ii) that R is not a member of [A].
Let us consider these in turn.
x
i) Since R is a relevant consequence of itself, R is a member of [/?] . Since, by definition,
[R]X = [A, P]X
and since, [A, P]X [A, P]
R is an element of [A, P]
X X
ii) Suppose that R is a member of [A] and hence of [A] (since R is in L ). Then the addi¬
tion of R to the set A will add no new relevant consequences:
[A]X = [A, /?]X 3 [/?]X
Since [/?]X = [A, P]X, we have that,
[A]X 3 [A, P]X
X X
which implies that [A] = [A, P] .Yet this is just the condition for P to be relevantly wran-
x
formative, contra our initial assumption. So R cannot be a member of [A] .
X X
Turning to the third condition, we need to show that [A, P] = [A, R)
Since R has all the relevant consequences that A, P does, it automatically has all the
relevant consequences that A does. So adding A to R will add no fresh relevant conse¬
quences. That is,
[A, 7?]X = [/?]X,
X
which is [A, P] , our specification of R.
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Having shown 1-3, we have shown that P carries R in digital form. So, every relatively
informative proposition carries some relevant proposition in digital form.
Y
(For clarity, R was specified so that it has the whole of [A, P] as consequences. Actually,
this is a stronger condition than is necessary. For example, any proposition which has as
consequences the relevant semantic content of P is carried in digital form. That is, if [A,
X X
P] - [A] is a subset of [5], then P carries S in digital form.)
3.8 Summary
In this section, a formalisation of Dretske's analog-digital distinction and the complete
analog-digital distinction has been presented using the apparatus of prepositional logic.
Dretske views the complete analog-digital distinction as an elaboration of the analog-digital
distinction tout court. However, in our formalisation, the analog-digital distinction is
derived and the complete analog-digital distinction is basic. The problematic "aboutness"
condition is finessed by allowing stipulation of which propositions are considered to be
relevant. Which propositions are deemed to be relevant will depend on the aims and
interests for which the informational idealisation is intended. In our example of the lookout
and smuggler, from the point of view of the Customs Officer, it is natural to take the
relevant propositions to be those about suspicious goings on at the coast. Information about
the weather or about whether the lookout is asleep or frightened, is irrelevant. From the
point of view of the lookout's wife, information about the welfare of the lookout will not
be irrelevant. The information carried by a signal in digital form is relative not only to the
propositions which compose the information system, and the axioms which specify the
current information state, but also to which propositions are taken to be relevant.
In view of the relativity of the analog-digital distinction, it may seem surprising that
Dretske directly applies the distinction to the analysis of the presumably absolute distinction
between perception and cognition. In Chapter 4, I shall argue that Dretske's analysis is
inappropriate, but that the analog-digital distinction may provide an important tool in
describing the informational character of mental processes.
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Chapter 4: Information Processing and Psychology
4.1 Introduction
In Chapters 1-3 we have introduced, modified and elaborated upon Dretske's account of
information content and the analog-digital distinction. In the rest of the thesis, the emphasis
will shift from the development of informational ideas per se to their application to mental
processes. Dretske suggests that a number of psychological issues may be illuminated by
informational notions. In particular, he suggests an account of the distinction between per¬
ception and cognition, and attempts to provide an informational treatment of belief,
knowledge, and the nature of and acquisition of concepts. I shall argue that these specific
applications are inappropriate and suggest a more general role for the information account,
in providing an account of the the content of symbolic and non-symbolic states alike, and
hence a general account of what information processing amounts to. The simple conception
of content and information processing that I shall propose provides no direct classification
of mental processes and gives no account of folk psychological categories such as
knowledge and belief. Rather, it provides an informational account of what it is for an
organism to attune its mental state and consequent behaviour to some piece of information,
over and above simply carrying that information, (in, say, the state of the sensory peri¬
phery). The purpose of mental processes is seen as effecting such attunement. On this view,
"information processing" psychology may be properly viewed, after all, as studying the
processing of information.
In this chapter we shall introduce a naive account of attunement as digitalisation, and dis¬
cuss Dretske's application of the analog-digital distinction to differentiate perceptual from
cognitive processes. We shall consider various specific objections which cast doubt on the
claim that the analog-digital distinction can appropriately be identified with a perception-
cognition distinction. Further, we shall find that the accounts of the perception-cognition
distinction and the naive account of attunement are undermined by the essential relativity of
informational properties (including being carried in analog or digital form) to the idealisa¬
tion chosen. In the light of this consideration, Chapter 5 augments the naive account of
attunement as digitalisation with an explication of what it is for a piece of information to
be digitalised in explicit form, relative to some process. Only explicit digitalisation is taken
to be sufficient for attunemcnt. In Chapter 6, we conclude by discussing a variety of argu¬
ments which purport to show, in principle, that information is an inappropriate notion with
which to characterise mental states and mental processes. For example, it may be objected
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that if the representation and misrepresentation of the world is the heart of cognitive
activity, how can a factive notion such as information be appropriate? In this chapter we
shall simply assume that informational ideas may appropriately be applied to psychology,
and discuss the way in which the tools that we have developed may or may not elucidate
the nature of mental activity.
Throughout much of the rest of this thesis, we shall be concerned to provide an informa¬
tional analysis of information processing. In particular, we shall focus on the information
processing required to recognise, say, some animal, given a projection of a scene contain¬
ing that animal on the retina. According to "information processing" psychology, such
recognition tasks involve information processing of staggering intricacy and complexity.
Yet not all psychologists are in agreement that this is an appropriate way to conceive of the
problem. According to the ecological tradition (Gibson, 1979), the perception of the visual
world is direct - information processing is taken to be unnecessary. If this is so, then any
attempt to provide an informational analysis of information processing may turn out to be
irrelevant to the concerns of psychology.
4.2 Is Information Processing Necessary?
According to the dominant "information processing" tradition, perception involves the
detection of a rich variety of "cues" from the sensory input (the pattern of excitation at the
sensory surfaces, or a neural transduction of that pattern). On the basis of these cues, the
organism must generate the most plausible hypothesis about the nature of the object or
event gave rise to them. Perception is seen as a matter of inference to the best explanation
(Gregory, 1977; Fodor, 1983). Much of perceptual psychology is concerned with the eluci¬
dation of the nature of the cues which underlie various perceptual abilities - the perception
of depth, colour, motion, and so on. A common way of demonstrating that some cue is
being used in some perceptual process is by inducing illusions, in which perceptions of
depth, colour, motion and so on are spuriously generated by presenting the organism with
misleading cues. For example, the use of information about the retinal disparity between the
image may be demonstrated by inducing the illusion of depth in a flat random dot stereo¬
gram (Julesz, 1971).
The very possibility of illusion suggests the conditional probability that the environment is
in this particular state, given these particular cues, must be less that 1. So, according to this
view, information about depth, colour, motion is not carried by the presence of the cues to
which the organism is sensitive. Further, any internal state of the organism that is
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responsive to these cues (some internal state that corresponds to detecting depth, colour or
motion) will ipso facto also not carry the such information. How then, given the possibility
of error, can it be appropriate to utilise informational notions to analyse of perceptual
analysis?
However, the fact that cues can be misleading in the laboratory does not mean that they
can be misleading in the organism's natural environment. It may be that binocular depth
cues invariably indicate the (relative) distance of surfaces, in that environment - there are
no random dot stereograms in nature. If so, then in that environment the conditional proba¬
bility that the (relative) depths are such and such, given such and such binocular disparities,
will be 1. So surely depth information may be carried after all. Quite generally', the mere
possibility that information flow might be disrupted in some circumstances (e.g. in the
laboratory) need not imply that information flow is disrupted, in these circumstances (e.g.
in the natural environment). (Ecological psychologists will often dismiss laboratory illusions
as "ecologically" invalid). Hence, we have at least the possibility that an informational
account of perception is possible. Ecological psychology may be seen as the attempt to
explore this possibility. It has been concerned to describe putative "ecological" laws which
govern the relationship between the structure of real environments to the structure of the
perceptual input (for example, the optic array). These ecological laws underwrite the infor¬
mation that the perceptual input carries about the environment - in more ecological termi¬
nology, these laws determine what information about the environment is specified by the
structure of the perceptual input. Candidate ecological laws relate depth to the pattern of
optic flow (Gibson, 1966,1979), the time-to-contact of an approaching object to optic
expansion (Lee, 1980) and so on.
However, clearly there is more to perception than merely carrying information about the
properties of the environment. If an organism is to generate appropriate behaviour it must
be able to utilise this information. Using Gibsonian terminology in a slightly non-standard
way, the organism must attune its behaviour to the relevant information. For example, con¬
sider a bug-eating frog. Perhaps a small round dark moving patch in the visual field carries
information about the presence and location of a bug. If the frog is to stay fed, it is not
enough for some (perhaps retinal) state of the frog to carry the information that a bug is at
such and such a location. The frog must be able to use this information to generate an
appropriate leap - to attune its behaviour to the relevant information in the environment.
Of course, the psychologist will be able to trick such a frog into inappropriate jumping
behaviour by presenting all manner of decoy stimuli which cast a small round dark moving
-108-
patches on the frog's retina. So, in the laboratory, the firing of the bug detector, and the
jumping of the frog, do not carry the information that a bug is near. Yet this does not show
that the frog is not really attuned to bugs after all. For it may be that in the natural
environment bugs are the only small, round, dark, moving objects. In that environment the
frog's behaviour may never be inappropriate - it may be perfectly attuned. (Actually, of
course, even in the natural environment the frog will no doubt jump at specks of dirt, and
fragments of falling leaf - for survival, all that is required is that jumping is appropriate
often enough to keep the frog well fed. The relation between small round dark moving
patches and flies is not a very plausible ecological law. More realistically, there might be
an ecological law to the effect that the presence of a small round dark moving patch is
caused by a fly perhaps 50% of the time. Since our propositional account is able to deal
with probabilistic contents (1.9), such an informational dependency, such laws are compati¬
ble with the present account. However, for simplicity, we shall leave such probabilistic
cases until Chapter 6).
The goal of ecological psychology is to uncover the ecological laws which underlie the
attunement of the organism's behaviour to their environment. How is depth of a nearby
apple specified by binocular disparity or optic flow, so that an appropriate reach may be
effected. How is the trajectory of an approaching ball specified from the visual array, so
that it may be caught? What cues are used to classify an object as edible or inedible, to
control feeding? So ecological psychology is concerned with characterising the informa¬
tional dependencies which are exploited by the organism - by demonstrating how the
relevant information about the character of the environment is specified in the optic array,
the auditory input, by proprioception etc., or by some combination of sensory modalities.
This amounts to providing a characterisation of the informational basis of attunement.
Suppose that we wish to design a fly catching robot, to simulate the performance of the
jumping frog. The robot is intended to emulate the frog in jumping towards and catching
flies - the jumping of the robot should be attuned to the presence and location of flies. To
construct a robot which is so attuned, we must know two things. Firstly, what is it about
the structure of the visual input that allows the frog to recognise the presence and location
of flies. That is, what is the ecological law which relates the relevant property of the
environment and the character of the optic array. In this case, the putative ecological law
is simply that the presence and location of small round dark moving patches in the optic
array covaries with the presence and location of flies in the environment. However, as Ull-
man (1980) and Braddick (1980) have pointed out, there is also the need for an account of
the mechanism by which the information in the optic array is used. Building a fly-catching
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robot involves designing a machine whose behaviour is appropriately sensitive to the infor¬
mation in the optic array. In "information processing" terminology, this involves design¬
ing a mechanism which is able to detect and integrate the optical cues so that the presence
and direction of the fly is "recognised", and which is consequently able to control jumping
appropriately. Ecological laws characterise what information the organism must be sensi¬
tive to; to build the robot simulation of the frog, we also need to have a mechanistic
account of how it is possible to be sensitive to such information.
To put the matter another way, the goal of ecological psychology is, on this reconstruction,
to characterise the information processing task that the organism faces in order to attune its
behaviour appropriately. In the case of fly catching, the task is to jump in some direction
when and only when there is a small round dark moving patch at the corresponding loca¬
tion in the visual array. In the case of controlling feeding such that only edible things are
eaten, the specification of the structure of the optic array to which the organism must be
sensitive is presumably of staggering complexity - far more complex than current accounts
can handle. A characterisation of the task that the organism must perform amounts to what
Marr (1982) called a computational level (level 1) theory.
A complete understanding of how behaviour can be attuned to some aspect of the environ¬
ment requires that an elucidation of not only what the task is but also of how. it is per¬
formed. In Marr's terms this amounts to providing algorithmic (level 2) and implementa-
tional (level 3) theories. According to this characterisation, ecological psychology is con¬
cerned purely with specifying what the task is - in Gibsonian terminology, what "higher
order invariants" in the perceptual input specify the relevant state of the environment. It is
mute on the nature of the mechanisms which mediate the attunement - these might involve
symbolic or analog computation, inferential or non-inferential processes. So rather than pro¬
viding an alternative to standard symbolic, inferential, theories of perceptual processing,
ecological approach may be seen as providing a characterisation of the competence that
such processes must exhibit.
Gibson took his position to be radically at variance with the "information processing"
orthodoxy in perceptual psychology. Yet there has been considerable debate about the real
nature of the dispute between these positions (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981; Turvey, Shaw,
Reed & Mace, 1981; Ullman, 1980).
One natural source of debate is whether or not the account of the task of the organism is
adequate. Is an informational analysis of perception appropriate at all, given the possibility
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of illusion? Perhaps information about the environment is not, in general, specified in the
perceptual input, but must be supplemented by the knowledge of the organism.
However, what has made ecological psychology controversial is its claims about mechan¬
ism. If the relevant environmental information is already carried by the perceptual input
itself, the elaborate information processing operations postulated by standard models of per¬
ception seem to be redundant. Perhaps such intricacies are simply unnecessary - perhaps
the environment can be perceived directly. Thus Gibson suggest that perception is direct
and not mediated by information processing of any kind. Attunement is held to simply be
a matter of directly "picking up" or "differentiating" the relevant "higher order invariants"
of the perceptual input.
It is this rejection of the need for information processing in general, and in the particular
the standard symbolic, inferential models that has made the Gibsonian position appear so
radical. However, on close analysis it is difficult to make sense of the notion of direct per¬
ception*. Let us grant the assumption that the relevant environmental information is carried
by (specified by) the perceptual input. If so, it is easy to build a device whose state carries
this information. To a first approximation, a camera is adequate, since the state of the film
specifies the instantaneous state of the optic array. Since Gibson stresses the informational
richness of the time-varying informational stimulus, a cine camera is perhaps more
appropriate. Time-varying auditory information could be recorded on a tape recorder. If we
ignore the rest of the senses, it seems that we already have a device whose state carries
much information about the environment - the home video camera! Certainly the home
video camera does not perform a wealth of intricate information processing operations on
its "perceptual" input. But it does not do anything else either - its behaviour is not attuned
to the information about the environment. Even if some piece of information is carried by
the perceptual input, the attunement of behaviour to that information is far from trivial.
What is hard is not carrying the information that a fly or a friend or some food is present,
but utilising this information in controlling behaviour+. It requires considerable sophistica¬
tion to selectively jump at flies, to selectively smile at friends, or to selectively eat food
rather than non-food. Jumping at passing flies involves intricate visual analysis, smiling
only at friends or eating only food involves mental processes of unimaginable complexity.
Even if the relevant information about the environment is specified by the perceptual input,
*Ullman (1980) suggests that Gibson may be viewed as suggesting that the mechanisms underlying perception are uni¬
tary and cannot be decomposed into simpler operations. Ullman then provides extensive arguments against this position. An
alternative reading, which I shall follow, is that Gibson considered the "pick-up" of information to be a trivial problem, which
thus requires no mechanism at all.
+This corresponds to Israel and Perry's (1987) distinction between carrying information and having information, within
the situation semantics tradition.
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the utilization of perceptual information to control behaviour seems to require considerable
work. Yet, for Gibson, attunement is trivial. It is simply a matter of "picking up" the
appropriate high level perceptual patterns. Thus, rather than taking the elucidation of eco¬
logical laws to be part of psychological explanation (specifying the information processing
task that the organism must perform) which must be supplemented by an account of the
mechanism, Gibson saw the ecological approach as providing a complete account of per¬
ception. For Gibson there is no problem of mechanism, since there is no need for mechan¬
ism to underlie attuncment. It is simply a matter of direct information pick-up. However, if
attunement is so easy, why can't rats be attuned to losing chess positions, and cameras to
attractive compositions?
Just carrying information in the raw perceptual input does not seem to be enough to guide
the appropriate utilization of information. We termed the problem of characterising the
purpose of information processing "Gibson's problem". It is not that Gibson raised this
problem, or that he suggested a solution for it; it is rather that Gibson did not consider it to
be a problem. He considered information processing to be unnecessary. That, one might
say, was Gibson's problem!
Gibson's problem poses a challenge to the theorist who wishes to analyse mental processes
in informational terms. If information about the environment is already carried by the per¬
ceptual input what is the point of further processing. What does information processing
achieve. Much of the rest of this thesis will be concerned with this question. Before turning
to the approach implicit in Dretske's use of the analog-digital distinction, let us "consider a
more obvious suggestion - that the purpose of information processing is to enrich the infor¬
mation carried by the perceptual input. In short, the purpose of information processing is
seen as information gain. Unfortunately, however, we shall see that, on the present
account, information gain is impossible.
4.3 Information Processing and Information Reduction
A natural view of the purpose of perceptual-cognitive activity is that it allows us to learn
about the way the world is. For example, I know that there is a dog nearby because I can
see, hear or smell it. In the first instance, this ability is mediated by the fact that the states
of the sensory surfaces of the eyes, ears and nose covary with, and hence carry information
about, the state of the environment. Our pretheoretic, intuitive test for whether or not a
piece of information is carried by the state of a structure is whether or not that piece of
information can, in principle, be learnt by learning of the state of that structure. So, some
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state of my retina carries the information that there is a chair present, if it is possible to
learn that there is a chair present from a detailed retinal examination. Yet this view has a
rather unexpected and counterintuitive consequence.
Suppose, for concreteness, that the result of perceptual and cognitive analysis is the produc¬
tion of a set of sentences which describe the visual scene in terms of everyday objects and
their relations. Perhaps these are roughly intertranslatable with English sentences such as
"There is a chair in front of the window", "The cat is on the mat" and so on. Suppose that
these formulae carry the information that is their content - that is, they carry the informa¬
tion that there is a chair in front of the window, or that the cat is on the mat. (Of course, in
general, a sentence can mean that the cat is on the mat, even though the cat is not on the
mat. In such a case the sentence does not carry the information that is its content at all, let
alone in digital form. We shall defer discussion of how misrepresentation may be treated in
informational terms until Chapter 6). It seems that everything that can be learnt from the
result of perceptual and cognitive analysis, that is, everything that can be leamt from read¬
ing the sentences describing the environment in the language of thought, can also be leamt
by looking directly at the retina. After all, the information may be obtained from the state
of the retina simply by performing the relevant perceptual-cognitive analysis on the retinal
state, deriving the mental sentences, and obtaining the information from them, just as
before. So, any information that is carried by information bearing structures which are
derived from perceptual input, are already carried by that perceptual input.
It is natural to assume that the purpose of processing raw perceptual input is to increase its
information content, to enrich the informational value of the perceptual input. Yet if the
informational richness of a structure is equated with the amount of information carried, this
is just what cannot happen. Perceptual processing and information processing in general can
only lose information. The output of an informational process necessarily carries no more
(and typically very substantially less) information than the input.
Let us make this point rather more precisely. First, consider deterministic processes -
processes in which the output is determined by, or is a function of, the input. Such a pro¬
cess may be modeled by a function/from the set of possible inputs / to the set of possible
outputs O. So, by hypothesis, that the input is such and such determines, and so carries the
information that, the output is so and so. Hence, all the information carried by the output is
ipso facto carried by the input. If the process is not deterministic then the output is not
determined by the input. Relative to the input, the output generates new information. How¬
ever, this new information cannot be information about the environment, since, by
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hypothesis, the state of the sensory surfaces is the sole mediator of covariation with the
environment. So all the information that the output of the process carries about the environ¬
ment is also carried by the input.
The point can be made more generally. Consider the information generated by the output of
some process. This information must either be generated by the input or by some random
factors in the workings of the process (for insofar as the output is a determinate function of
the input, no information in generated internally at all). So, for determinate process, all the
information carried by the output is carried by the input. In a non-determinate process, all
the useful information (i.e. not information about the random behaviour of the internal
working of the device) which is carried by the output is carried by the input. So, in particu¬
lar, all information carried by the output of perceptual analysis is carried by the input to
that analysis.
It may be objected that we have adopted an overly passive view of the way in which
organisms learn about their environment. Have we not neglected that what an organism
learns is not simply determined by the state of the environment, but also by the expecta¬
tions and knowledge of the perceiver. Let us consider an example from Perry (Perry,
1987) A doctor looks at an X-ray and realizes that John has broken his collar bone. John
looks at the X-ray and sees only a tangle of bones. Another doctor seeing the picture will
be able to conclude only that someone has a broken collar bone, since he does not know
that the X-ray is John's. Taking a more prosaic example, suppose that I know that John
usually has a red mug on his desk, and owns no other red objects, and I can see a tiny
patch of red peeping from between two piles of books. There is now a temptation to argue
as follows. Surely the state of the retina does not itself carry the information that there is a
mug present. It is impossible to learn that a mug is present, from the state of the retina,
without already knowing that the mug is the only red object that may be on the desk. Oth¬
erwise, the patch of red could be generated by a red pen, or book, or clock. Yet, given my
additional knowledge, I can conclude that I am looking at the mug. So it appears that the
result of my perceptual and cognitive processing can, after all, carry more information
about the environment than the state of the sensory surface. In the case of the diagnosing
doctor, although the X-ray may carry the information that the collarbone is broken, it surely
does not specify that it is John's, collarbone. After all, the X-ray need not have a label
attached, saying whose it is. The diagnosing doctor, who happens to know that the X-ray
is John's, can draw a conclusion on the basis of his sensory input (the image of the X-ray)
which is only licensed by his background knowledge about the subject of the X-ray. So,
again, it seems that the internal state of doctor carries information which is not carried by
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the sensory input. In both cases, perceptual/cognitive processing seems to enrich the infor¬
mation carried at the sensory surfaces, contrary to the claim that information processing is a
matter of information reduction.
The argument trades on the knowledge relativity of information - that a signal may carry
different information for observers with different background knowledge. In 1.6, we con¬
cluded that the knowledge relativity of information is derivative on the fact that informa¬
tional properties are relative to the idealisation chosen. Knowledge is relative only deriva¬
tively. What the observer knows about what is possible determines what informational
idealisation in appropriate, and information content is relative to this idealisation. Recall the
example of the cups and the hidden peanut. On an idealisation appropriate to my
knowledge, there are two possible locations for the peanut, since I have already seen that it
is not under two of the cups. Since you have just come in, according to an idealisation
appropriate to your knowledge, the peanut could be under any of the four. The raising of
the third empty cup thus specifies the location of the peanut on my idealisation but not on
yours.
It is this knowledge relativity which is being exploited in generating the apparent case of
information gain. When considering the information carried by the retina, it is natural to
adopt an idealisation ignoring the additional information about which red objects may be on
the desk. On this "ignorant" idealisation the red patch does not specify the presence of the
red mug. Yet when we consider what I learn from seeing the red patch, we use an idealisa¬
tion which captures my knowledge that the cup is the only red object that may be present.
On this "knowing" idealisation, the presence of the mug is specified. So the alleged infor¬
mation gain is an artifact of a covert change of idealisation, from assuming ignorance, to
capturing knowledge. Similarly, the X-ray does not carry the information that John has a
broken collarbone in an idealisation which assumes that it could be anybody's X-ray. Yet
on the idealisation appropriate for the doctor, who knows that the X-ray is John's, it does
specify this information. The slippage between the "ignorant" idealisation (when consider¬
ing just the X-ray) and the "knowing" idealisation (when considering the doctor) is again
the cause of this apparent information gain.
Let us consider the "knowing" and "ignorant" idealisations in turn. On a "knowing" ideali¬
sation, the retinal image itself carries the information that the red mug is present - since all
other red objects are excluded; the X-ray carries the information that John has a broken col¬
larbone, since the idealisation excludes situations in which it is an X-ray of somebody else.
Of course, much additional information will also be carried, about the other objects on the
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desk or about the shape of John's shoulder blades. To utilise the information appropriately
(to pick up the mug and pour some coffee, or to pronounce the correct diagnosis), the
observer must strip away this additional information. So the perceptual-cognitive system
seems to be effecting information reduction after all. In contrast, on an "ignorant" idealisa¬
tion, the presence of the red patch (and the consequent generation of the internal sentence
corresponding to "There is a red mug present") is perfectly compatible with a red telephone
being on the desk and the mug being, say, on the draining board. Hence, neither the input
to perceptual/cognitive processes, or the output of those processes carry the information that
the mug is present. Similarly, on an "ignorant" idealisation, the X-ray image, and the
doctor's consequent diagnosis are quite compatible with someone other than John having a
broken collarbone, and John being wholly intact. Hence, neither the X-ray or the diagnosis
carry the information that John has a broken collarbone. In sum, on a "knowing" idealisa¬
tion the information is carried by both input and output. On an "ignorant" idealisation the
information is carried by neither. If the idealisation is fixed, information processing can
only reduce the amount of information carried.
So the point of information processing is not to produce outputs which carry information
that is not carried by the raw input. The sensory surfaces carry all the information that can
be obtained about the environment. So again we must face Gibson's problem: what is the
function of information processing?
Inherent in the Dretske's discussion is the important idea that the point of information pro¬
cessing is analog-digital conversion. Only when information is converted into digital form
can it be "conceptually mobilised", "cognitively utilized" or used to "modify output". It is
this approach, and variants upon it, that will we shall be concerned with from now on. Let
us turn, then, to the view that attunement is a matter of analog-digital conversion.
4.4 Digitalisation and Behaviour
In 4.2, we noted that there must be more to perception that carrying information about the
environment - otherwise cameras and tape recorders would count as exhibiting perceptioa
Intuitively, there is a vast gulf between such devices and genuine perceptual systems. On
what is this intuition based? Let us consider a camera and a person both facing the smiling
couple Janet and John. The state of the camera and the state of the observer both carry
information about the pair: that John has a handlebar mustache; that Janet has a birdsnest
hairstyle; that John is taller than Janet. While the states of both the camera and human
observer carry this information, only in the latter case can this information be causally
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implicated in behaviour. The person may selectively emit a suppressed laugh when looking
at Janet's head, or ask John rather than Janet to reach for the saucepan on the top shelf.
The behaviour of the camera is not sensitive to such information - it does not, for example,
change its aperture or focus just when presented with a handlebar mustache. In Gibson's
terms, the person is attuned to this information, the camera is not. This does not mean,
however, that the camera is attuned to no information about the state of the environment.
For example, on a modern automatic camera, the aperture will be adjusted in response to
the light reading. Or perhaps the tripod falls over when and only when there is an earth¬
quake of over 6 on the Richter scale. In these cases, the camera is attuned to information
about the light intensity and the strength of earthquake, respectively.
The relevance of digitalisation is perhaps already apparent. If I suppress a laugh when and
only when I see a birdsnest hairstyle, then suppressed laughter tracks the presence of
birdsnest hairstyles. So, given that the presence of such a hairstyle is new information, this
means that whether or not I am suppressing laughter carries the information that a birdsnest
hairstyle is present (or absent) in digital form. That is, the behaviour itself digitalises the
information. So the attunement of some behaviour to a piece of information involves the
digitalisation of that information.
Consider a monkey who should race up a tree when and only when a tiger is near. If the
monkey is gazing in the general direction of the tiger, the state of its retina will carry the
information that a tiger is present in digital form. The optimally successful monkey must
attune its tree climbing behaviour to the presence of tigers. That is, whether or not the
monkey races up the tree should carry the information that there is or is not a tiger nearby
in digital form. Monkeys whose behaviour is not so attuned to the presence or absence of
tigers spend a lot of time unnecessarily shooting up trees, getting eaten, or both. So there is
a high premium on successful digitalisation.
To be attuned to some piece of information is to be able to respond selectively to it. The
attuned monkey is to be able to run up a tree just when a tiger is near, the attuned frog is
able to to be able to jump at all and only flies, the attuned parent is to be able to ask John
to fetch the from the top shelf in the kitchen just if he is taller than Janet. However, only
on a behaviouristic psychology does attunement amount to a fixed link between environ¬
mental stimulus and behavioural response. As we are using the term, attunement only
requires that the organism is able to correlate behaviour with the state of the environment -
not that behaviour is invariably so correlated - the monkey might be suicidal, the frog
might not be hungry, a parent might ask John to fetch the saucepan just in order to have a
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few quiet words with Janet. Indeed, the rise of non-behaviourist representational theories
of mind, has been driven by the realisation that the link between the state of the environ¬
ment and the behaviour of the organism typically depends on the goals and beliefs of that
organism. In representationalist terminology, what attunement requires is that, given the
appropriate beliefs and goals, the organism is able to link its behaviour to the relevant state
of the environment. So, given the belief that tigers are dangerous, and the goal of avoiding
danger, the attuned monkey will shoot up the tree just when tigers are nearby. (More
broadly, the link between environment and behaviour may be seen as dependent on the
current mental state of the organism, irrespective of whether this state is appropriately
characterised using the propositional attitude ascriptions of folk psychology).
The almost unlimited plasticity of the link between perceptual input and behavioural output
is stressed by cognitivists (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1984). To take a fresh example, let us suppose
that I see a man approaching in a suit covered in arrows. Using my knowledge of old
films, I realise that this specifies that he is a prisoner. Typically this might induce me to
clutch my wallet. However, if I am determined not to show my disquiet, or the prisoner is
handcuffed to a policeman this behaviour may not ensue. If I am an undercover policeman
looking for an escaped convict, I may use some arbitrary agreed signal (perhaps raising an
eyebrow or standing on one leg) to pick out suspicious characters that a colleague should
follow. Attunement to a piece of information requires that I may establish a link between
that information and some behavioural response - not that such a link need necessarily
already exist.
The plasticity of response suggests that the behaviour which carries the information in digi¬
tal form is derivative on the digitalisation of some internal structure of the organism which
carries the information in digital form. Suppose that a raised left eyebrow is the code for
the approach of an escaped prisoner. I may be instructed to change the signal and instead
raise my right eyebrow. How is it possible to freely control which piece of behaviour is
attuned to, and hence carries in digital form, the information that an escaped prisoner is
approaching? Surely we must decouple the process of recognition (prisoner detection) from
action (eyebrow raising). When I change the code, the process of villain detection is
unchanged, but now it is linked to a different overt response. In mechanistic terms, this
amounts to the proposal that I must possess some internal structure (a "prisoner detector")
which responds selectively to prisoners, and that this internal structure may be arbitrarily
connected to behavioural outputs. This is no more than an example of the general cogni-
tivist point that the structure of behaviour is derivative on the structure of thought (e.g.
Fodor, 1983).
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Let us call the link between behaviour and environment behavioural attunement, and the
link between an internal structure of the organism and environment internal attuncment. In
this terminology our conclusion concerning plasticity becomes simply that plastic
behavioural attunement is necessarily mediated by internal attuncment.
So far, we have assumed that a behaviour or the state of an internal structure is only
attuned to some piece of information if it tracks that information, and hence carries it in
completely digital form. However, this restriction is extremely severe, since tracking
requires detection is infallible. A less strict characterisation is simply that the behaviour
carries the information in digital form tout court (rather than in completely digital form)
relative to some relevance restriction. Suppose that I raise my eyebrow just when a villain
passes, unless I have temporally fallen asleep. So (assuming that my sleeping-waking state
is included in the idealisation) the raising of my eyebrow carries information over and
above that there is a villain present - namely that I am awake. So the information is not
carried in completely digital form. However, if the only relevant propositions are about
criminal movements, then this is not relevant additional information, and so the information
is, according to this idealisation, carried in digital form. According to this, looser, condi¬
tion, a monkey can be attuned to tigers even if it does not run up the tree every time a tiger
is near - for example, it may fail to detect tigers when it has its eyes closed, or in the dark.
It seems only reasonable to loosen this condition. For we do not surely want to say that
just because if a monkey fails to spot a tiger on one tragic occasion, it never really detected
tigers at all.
Let us stress again that we are interested in an providing an informational account of what
attunement amounts to, rather than the mental structures and processes which effect such
attunement. The internal structures which carry information in digital form might be sen¬
tences of a language of thought, single "grandmother" cells, patterns of activation in a dis¬
tributed memory, holographic traces, mental images, or procedures in a "machine code" of
the brain. The application of an informational account to mental processes is intended to
tell us what it is to extract, store and utilise information about the environment, not how
these processes are realised.
4.5 Information Processing as Digitalisation
The notion of digital information content has been invoked to provide an explication of
attunement. Yet, in this section, we shall see that it is sufficiently general to apply equally
to any information processing, not only to the domain of mental processes. In particular,
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an account of information processing based on analog-digital conversion should apply
equally to symbolic and non-symbolic information processing. In this section, we shall dis¬
cuss a variety of device which are pretheoretically taken to effect information processing.
First, let us illustrate the general point with the example of a standard symbolic example.
Consider a cash register which can take some number of inputs (strings of key presses "7 +
4 + 3 Rtn") and immediately produces a single output (in this case, it prints the symbols
"14"). Let us assume that the operation of the cash register is perfect, in the sense that on
the standard arithmetical interpretation of the key presses, and on the standard arithmetical
interpretation of the numbers displayed, the output number is always the sum of the input
numbers. Let us consider the state of the output display. This may display symbols which
decimally encode any natural number value (modulo space limitations of the display). The
display will, of course, change constantly throughout the day as the cash register is in use.
Suppose the output display is the symbol "6". This state of the output carries the informa¬
tion that the answer to the current problem is 6. For the conditional probability that the
answer to the current problem is 6, given that the symbol displayed is "6" is unity. How¬
ever, the very same information (that the answer to the current problem is 6) is also carried
by the state of the input. For the conditional probability that the answer to the current prob¬
lem is 6 given that the input is, say, "1 + 3 + 2 Rtn" is also unity. Given that the informa¬
tion carried by the output was already carried by the input, it seems that we have no
account of what computational work is done by the cash register. However, crucially, the
output symbol seems to carry the information in digital form - all you know about the
problem under consideration is that its answer is 6. The problem might equally have been 2
+ 4, 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1, 1+2 + 3 and so on. On the other hand, the input key presses
carry the additional information that the particular problem was 1+2 + 3. Hence, the key
presses carry the information that the answer is 6 in analog not digital form. So, the transi¬
tion from input to output has lost all information about the problem except the answer. In
informational terms, the information processing function of the cash register is converting
the information about the sum into digital form - that is, to lose all the rest of the informa¬
tion carried by the input.
In IV.3 we saw that information gain is impossible in principle. Nonetheless, it seems
rather paradoxical that the information processing role of a device is to lose informatioa
Intuitively, we still want to say that the role of the device is to gain information - to give
us information (about the answer of the problem) that we did not have before. This
apparent tension may be readily resolved.
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Let us change our example slightly. Suppose that I have an addition sum written on a
piece of paper. I wonder what the answer is, and decide to use the cash register to do the
calculation. I then write down the answer. The paper is transformed from, say, having the
symbols 6 + 3 + 2 on it to having the symbols 6 + 3 + 2; 11 on it. I feel intuitively that I
have made progress by making the calculation. The symbols on the paper seem to give me
more information than they did before - now I can see not only what the problem is but
what the solution is too. However, from an information-theoretic standpoint it might seem
that I have made no progress at all. For the additional "11" only carries the information that
the answer to the problem is 11. This information is also carried by the original "6 + 3 +
2". So it seems that I have made no progress at all. Suppose that I take another addition
problem (say, 2 + 9) and repeat the procedure. As it turns out the answer to this problem is
also 11. Thus the output of the cash register is the same as before. The addition process
can be seen as a process of categorising addition problems into classes according to their
solutions. "6 + 3 + 2" and "2 + 9" are categorised to be in the same class. The output has
lost the information about the particular element of the class we are dealing with. Now it is
easy to see why information loss may count as cognitive progress. For suppose that I
wonder whether or not the two expressions 6 + 3 + 2 and 2 + 9 are equal. I need only
compare the two answers on my piece of paper. If the symbols are the same ("11" and
"11") then they are equal, otherwise they are not. There is no equivalent procedure which
operates directly upon the expressions "6 + 3 + 2" and "2 + 9". The only way to find out
is, of course, to do the addition. So using the cash register really was useful. Although the
paper carries no more information after I have calculated the addition, it does carry more
information in a usable form. To prefigure terminology that we shall introduce in Chapter
6, the answer is only implicitly coded in the input; the answer is explicitly coded in the
solution. So a general principle might be: information is only usable when it is carried in
digital form. Information processing is a matter of transforming from analog form in the
input to digital form in the output.
Or consider the case of logical inference from some set of premises. Suppose the premises
are logical formulae in a theorem prover, corresponding to "All men are mortal" and "Bert
is a man". Let us assume that these formulae do not just represent, but carry the proposi¬
tions that they represent in digital form (It is reasonable to doubt, in general, both that
representations need carry their contents at all, since representation is not factive; and it is
reasonable to doubt that the information is carried in digital form. These issues are
addressed in chapter 6). Given these premises, the information that Bert is a man is carried
in analog form (assuming some appropriate informational idealisation). The theorem prover
draws the obvious inference and derives the formula corresponding to "Bert is mortal".
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This formula carries no additional information, over and above that Bert is mortal. So the
operation of the theorem prover has digitalised the information that Bert is mortal.
So although information processing is a matter of information reduction, we can do justice
to the intuition that such processing makes more information available. For the processes
involved in the calculation of the sum or the drawing of the inference may not lead to gain
of information per se, but it does lead to an increase in the information which is coded in
digital form.
We noted above that since the informational account merely attempts to characterise what
information processing amounts to, it is independent of the nature of the internal mechan¬
ism which mediates such processing. So the account applies equally to non-symbolic
processes.
Consider the problem of finding the length of an irregular line, such as the course of a road
or a river. A simple analog "string" solution is simply to place a string such that it follows
the structure of the line as closely as possible. In this state, the string carries (more or less)
detailed information about the shape of the line - its topographic character, how bumpy it
is, and so on. In particular, one piece of information that the string will carry, of course, is
the (approximate) length of the line. However, this information is initially "buried" in the
mass of additional information. The string is then straightened out and measured, to give
the approximate length of the line. The operation of straightening out the string throws
away all the information about the irregular line except its length. The straightened string
carries the information about the of the line in digital form.
Or consider the problem of ordering some set of exam scores from highest to lowest. The
input is of the form (John, 35; Jill, 66; James, 45...). Clearly the raw results already carry
the information that Jill came top, James third, and John nineteenth, and so on. However,
considerable additional information is carried about the particular scores that each pupil
achieved, over and above the ordinal position in the class. When the ordering is obtained
such additional information is thrown away. From the point of view of the informational
account, it is immaterial what sort of mechanism effects this sorting process. Let us con¬
sider an analog method from "spaghetti" computing. First, we represent the score of each
pupil by the length of a piece of spaghetti, which has a label with the pupil's name written
on it. Then we pick up all the pieces of spaghetti and bang them down onto the table, such
that the end of each piece is in contact with the surface. The tallest piece of spaghetti is
then removed and its label placed in the " 1" slot; then the tallest remaining piece is placed
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in the "2" slot; and the procedure is iterated until all the pieces of spaghetti have been
assigned a slot. Each pupil is thus assigned an ordinal position within the class. In the out¬
put, there is no additional information carried about each pupil, over and above that ordinal
position, since no information about actual scores is carried by the position of the labels.
Despite their apparently naive character, such simple analog computations are good illustra¬
tions of the methods of analog computation. For much analog computation, involves the
direct exploitation of the natural constraints of the substrate over which it is computing (see
the discussion of Pylyshyn's characterisation of analog computation in III. 1) In the cases
that we considered, the analog computation exploits the constraints that string may be bent
freely, but has a fixed length and that spaghetti is rigid.
As our final example of non-symbolic computation, let us consider a competitive neural
network. Such a network consists of a collection of non-linear summation units,-fully con¬
nected by inhibitory links between them. A pattern of activation is presented to the units,
and they compete until only one, highly active unit remains. In the simplest case, in which
the network is fully connected with equal inhibitory connections, the unit that is initially
most active will "win" the competition. So the settling of the network acts picks out this
initially most active unit - all additional information about the initial values of the various
units is lost*.
Rather than consider more examples, let us consider a more general characterisation of the
informational treatment of computation. The analysis of information processing that I shall
sketch is no more than an informational gloss on the standard construal of (deterministic)
computation.
A (deterministic) computation may be considered to perform some mapping f:In -> Out,
where In is the set of possible inputs, and Out the set of possible outputs. Since the output
is determined by the input, all the information carried by the output is already 'carried by
the input. However, the output typically does not carry all the information that the input
carries. This occurs when f maps more than one input onto the same output. The output
does not distinguish between these various inputs - they are classified together, and so
information is lost. For example, the inputs 3 + 5, 4 + 4, 6 + 2 and so on, to the cash
register all lead to the output 8. The operation of the cash register serves to classify these
various inputs as equivalent - to throw away additional information about them.
♦In general, of course, which unit ultimately wins the competition is a very much more complex function of the initial
pattern. Nonetheless, the general point is unchanged.
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In more formal terms, a function f is said to induce equivalence classes of elements of In
which map onto the same elements of Out. The output only specifies which equivalence
class the input was in. The function f may be viewed as mapping each element of the input
onto its equivalence class under f - that is, as classifying the input into these equivalence
classes.
In informational terms, the function of information processing is ignoring additional infor¬
mation in the input, to classify the input into the relevant equivalent classes. In other
words, information processing is a matter not of the generation new information from old,
but of the abstraction of new information from old. Only when this abstraction is has been
performed - only when the information has been digitalised - can a piece of information be
utilised.
4.6 Digitalisation and Behaviour (Again)
We have suggested that, quite generally, a piece of information must be coded in digital
form if it is be utilized. However, as we shall see, this position is somewhat over-
restrictive. Let us again suppose, for purposes of exposition, that the vehicle of internal
representation is a language of thought, and that the sentences of this language carry the
information that they represent in digital form. The sentence corresponding to "John is
taller than Mary and has a handlebar mustache" does not carry the information that John is
taller than Janet in digital form, since it carries additional information about John's mus¬
tache (assuming that this is relevant on the chosen idealisation). Further (rather trivial)
information processing is required to put this information into digital form. Yet, nonethe¬
less, this information is utilisable, although it is not carried in digital form. This is because
it may straightforwardly be converted into digital form, as required.
This point is analogous to that which arises in the analysis of propositional attitudes as
relations to mental representations (Fodor, 1978; Dennett, 1979; Stich, 1983; Field, 1978).
Paradigmatically, to believe that snow is white is to have a token of the corresponding sen¬
tence of mentalese stored in the "belief box". Yet surely the belief that armadillos don't
wear trousers is not stored anywhere - the possibility has simply not occurred to us. Yet it
is plausibly a consequence of beliefs which are stored directly in the belief box (perhaps,
inter alia, that only people wear clothes, that trousers are an article of clothing and so on).
So the beliefs of an organism are taken to be characterised by the sentences in the belief
box and their easy (in some sense of "easy") consequences. We cannot take the beliefs of
an organism to be the set of all derivable consequences. Firstly, the stored sentences might
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be inconsistent, in which case the organism will believe any arbitrary proposition and its
negation; secondly, any organism that has the axioms of number theory must automatically
believe that, say, Fermat's theorem is true or false - depending on whether Fermat's last
theorem is true or false. In the informational case, if we assume that a piece of information
carried by some structure may be utilized as long as there is some way of converting it into
digital form, then any piece of information carried, whether in analog or digital form will
be utilisable. Just as we may distinguish paradigmatic beliefs from "latent" beliefs (those
which may be easily derived from paradigmatic beliefs) we may distinguish paradigmati-
cally digital information from "latently" digital information (that which may easily be digi-
talised from the existing information structures). In both cases, the characterisation of
"easily" is obscure, and I shall say no more about it. Nonetheless, strictly speaking, latent
digitalisation is enough for attunement to a piece of information, for that information to be
able to influence action, and, more generally, for the utilization of information.
It has been suggested that information can only be utilized if it is coded in digital form (or
may easy be transformed into digital form) and that the purpose of information processing
is to convert information from analog (unusable) to digital (usable) form. Although he
does not discuss the utilisation of information in the section on the analog-digital distinc¬
tion, in later discussion, (see Chapter 5 below) Dretske draws out the moral that only when
some piece of information has been converted into digital form can be it be used, for exam¬
ple, to control the behaviour of an organism. Nonetheless, the proposal that digitalisation is
a precondition for the utilisation of a piece of information is largely implicit in Dretske's
text. Instead he focuses on a rather more specific claim - that the analog-digital distinction
allows us to classify mental processes into two sorts. On the one hand, sensory or percep¬
tual processes merely transmit information in analog form (thus, in our terms, leaving it is
unutilisable form). On the other, cognitive processes effect the digitalisation of information
(thus turning it into a form in which it can be utilised). In the rest of this chapter, I shall
consider the putative relationship between the analog-digital distinction and the perception-
cognition distinction in detail. I shall present (4.8) various reasons to suppose that the
analog-digital distinction does not differentiate sensory/perceptual processes from cognitive
processes, on any natural reading of these terms. Having considered some specific prob¬
lems with Dretske's analysis, I shall discuss a more general difficulty. In short, the rela¬
tivity of the analog-digital seems to fit ill with the presumably absolute nature of a distinc¬
tion between perceptual and cognitive processes. We shall see that this relativity has
import for the application of informational notions quite generally.
-125-
4.7 Dretske on Perception, Cognition and the Analog-Digital Distinction
Dretske applies the analog-digital distinction to characterising the difference between sen¬
sory (or perceptual) and cognitive processes.
"The contrast between an analog and a digital encoding of information... is useful for dis¬
tinguishing between sensory and cognitive processes. Perception is a process by means of
which information is delivered within a richer matrix of information (hence in analog
form) to the cognitive centers for their selective use. Seeing, hearing, and smelling are
different ways we have of getting information about s to a digital-conversion unit whose
function it is to extract pertinent information from the sensory representation for purposes
of modifying output. It is the successful conversion of information into (appropriate) digi¬
tal form that constitutes the essence of cognitive activity. If the information that s is F is
never converted from a sensory (analog) to a cognitive (digital) form, the system in ques¬
tion has, perhaps, seen, heard, or smelled an s which is F, but it has not seen that it is F-
does not know that it is F. The traditional idea that knowledge, belief, and thought involve
concepts while sensation (or sensory experience) does not is reflected in this coding
difference. Cognitive activity is the conceptual mobilization of incoming information, and
this conceptual treatment is fundamentally a matter of ignoring differences (as irrelevant
to an underlying sameness), of going from the concrete to the abstract, of passing from
the particular to the general. It is, in short, a matter of making the analog-digital transfor¬
mation." (Dretske, 1981: 141-142)
In a footnote Dretske points out that "It is not merely the conversion of information from
analog to digital form that qualifies a system as a perceptual-cognitive system" (Dretske,
1981: 254) and that he will discuss the additional conditions that must be met later. To give
a rough idea, a digitalised piece of information will only count as a belief if it may be
causally implicated in controlling the behaviour of the organism.
At first sight, the analog-digital distinction is being used in a rather unusual way. The dis¬
tinction is between the way in which information is carried, yet it is used to distinguish
sensory (or perceptual) and cognitive processes. From an informational point of view, such
processes take the state of one information bearing structure as input, and produce another
structure as output. If a piece of information is carried in analog form in the input, and in
digital form in the output, then that piece of information has been converted from analog to
digital form. Perhaps the state of the retina carries the information that John is in a losing
position in a game of chess in analog form, and, after the appropriate analog-digital conver¬
sion by the cognitive centres, this information is carried in digital form by some internal
state of the observer. By contrast, consider the photochemical processes of the retina, which
transform the impinging structure of the light into a neural pattern of activity. Both the
structure of the impinging light and the neural pattern carry the information that John is in
a losing position in analog form. Thus, these photochemical processes mediate an analog-
analog transformation with respect to this piece of information.
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So, in distinguishing analog from digital processes, Dretske is distinguishing analog-analog
transformations from analog-digital transformations, relative to some piece of information.
In the former case, we speak of information being "picked up" or "registered". In the latter,
we speak of information being "extracted", or "digitalised". Dretske takes perceptual
processes to be a matter of registering or picking up information and cognitive processes to
involve extracting or digitalising information. Dretske argues that this fundamental
difference in kind has been missed by much modem psychological theorising:
"Information-processing models of mental activity tend to conflate perceptual and sensory
phenomena on the one hand with cognitive and conceptual phenomena on the other. Per¬
ception is concerned with the pickup and delivery of information, cognition with its utili¬
zation. But these, one is told, are merely different stages in a more or less continuous
information-handling process. Recognition, identification, and classification (cognitive ac¬
tivities) occur at every phase of the perceptual process. Seeing and hearing are low-grade
forms of knowing.
I think this is a confusion. It obscures the distinctive role of sensory experience in the en¬
tire cognitive process." (Dretske, 1981: 135)
"...our perceptual experience (what we ordinarily refer to as the look, sound, and feel of
things) is being identified with an information-carrying structure~a structure in which in¬
formation about a source is coded in analog form and made available to something like a
digital converter... for cognitive utilization. This sensory structure or representation is said
to be an analog encoding of incoming information because it is always information em¬
bedded in this sensory structure (embedded within a richer matrix of information) that is
subjected to the digitalising processes characteristic of the cognitive mechanisms. Until in¬
formation has been extracted from this sensory structure (digitalisation), nothing
corresponding to recognition, classification, identification, or judgement has occurred-
nothing, that is, of any conceptual or cognitive significance." (Dretske, 1981:143)
Sensory (perceptual) mechanisms register information; cognitive mechanisms extract it.
Information registration is commonplace - photographs, retinas and mirrors can all carry the
information that John is in a losing position, or that there is a chair in the room in analog
form. For Dretske, information extraction is rarer. Only people, and perhaps some animals
or AI programs can carry such information in digital. Indeed, Dretske raises the possibility
that:
"It may be that the acquisition of language is essential to an organism's having the capaci¬
ty to convert sensory information into digital form..." (Dretske, 1981: 143)
So, it seems that for Dretske, it is conceivable that the digitalisation or extraction of infor¬
mation may be an exclusively human ability.
Let us summarise the variety of theses which arise from the application of the analog-
digital distinction to the perception-cognition distinction. Sensation (perception) is a matter
of analog-analog transformation. Cognition involves analog-digital transformation. So,
deriving the look, sound and feel of things involves only analog processes. Recognition,
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identification, generalisation and classification and the possession of concepts involve
analog-digital conversion. To be capable of analog-digital conversion is to exhibit cognition
(and hence, presumably, to be at least a rudimentary cognitive agent), modulo the addi¬
tional condition that the digitalised information somehow affects behaviour.
In the next section we consider whether this distinction can be appropriately applied to
differentiate perceptual or sensory from cognitive processes. Dretske's claim that there are
two qualitatively distinct kinds of information processing involved in mentation has consid¬
erable intuitive appeal. In Gibsonian terms, the sensory input specifies some proposition
about the environment if the state of that input carries the information that the proposition
holds. However, such information is (typically) still carried in analog rather than digital
form. For the utilisation of this information, for the behaviour of the organism to be (flexi¬
bly) attuned to the state of the environment, this information must be converted into digital
form. So perhaps there are two distinct species of information processing - those which
mediate specification, and those which mediate attunemenL However, I shall argue that i)
the apparently absolute qualitative distinction between informational processes is an illu¬
sion; ii) that the analog-digital distinction cannot be used to provide a taxonomy of mental
processes.
4.8 Perception and Cognition
For Dretske perception involves analog-analog transformation of information:
"Perception is a process by means of which information is delivered within a richer matrix
of information (hence is analog form)..." (Dretske, 1981:142)
By contrast, cognition is matter of analog-digital conversion:
"It is the successful conversion of information into (appropriate) digital form that consti¬
tutes the essence of cognitive activity" (Dretske, 1981:142)
However, this characterisation does not seem to fit well with modem perceptual theory. The
goal of perceptual processing is seen as transforming the input from the sensory surfaces
into a form which may be directly utilized by such cognitive mechanisms as underlie
memory, learning, common-sense inference and the production and comprehension of
natural language (e.g. Fodor, 1983; Lindsay & Norman, 1977; Marr, 1982). For example,
the goal of a visual perception might be taken to be to take a grey level image as input and
generate, say, a viewer independent, predicate calculus description of the objects present in
the scene and the way in which they are arranged. Information such as that there is a cat
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on the mat is extracted from the richer matrix of visual input and isolated in some formula
ON (CAT, MAT). Such a formula can be stored in memory, used in inference and reason¬
ing tasks and so on (at least given the standard, if controversial, assumption that higher
mental processes are proof-theoretic in character). If the goal of perception is to turn infor¬
mation at the sensory periphery into a form which is accessible to high level cognitive pro¬
cess, then perception is a paradigm case of analog-digital conversion - and not an example
of analog-analog transformation, as Dretske intended. So, far from distinguishing percep¬
tion and cognition, the analog-digital distinction seems to lump them together.
Further, the perceptual process is typically considered to be mediated by the derivation of a
number of perceptual representations which describe the input at a number of different lev¬
els of description (Marr, 1982; Moore, 1982). These range from low level descriptions
(close to the level of physical descriptions of the input at the sensory surface), to high level
descriptions (close to, or at, the level of description into which we consciously categorise,
remember, reason and talk about the everyday world). In vision, the blobs and lines of the
primal sketch constitute a low level description; a description of the visual scene in terms
of tables and chairs constitutes a high level description. In hearing, a description in terms
of simple auditory features of the the input signal may be an appropriate description of the
lowest level of representation; a description in terms of which individuals are speaking,
what they are saying, and where they come from might be a relevant high level description.
The derivation of each these levels is a matter of classification, or recognition. The pattern
in the visual input must be classified as a termination, or a continuous line, or a surface at
such and such orientation and so on. Recognition, classification, analog-digital conversion
are held to be ubiquitous through the levels of the perceptual process. According to
modern perceptual psychology, not only does the perceptual process in its entirety involve
analog-digital conversion, but the internal workings of this process involve digitalisation
through and through.
So perhaps Dretske's distinction is not between sensation and perception on the one hand
and perception and cognition on the other. Since the analog-digital appears to categorise
perception and cognition together, perhaps it should be taken to differentiate sensation from
perceptual-cognitive activity. There are (at least) two ways in which the notion of sensation
may be understood, and which Dretske does not distinguish. Sensation may be considered
as the excitation of the sensory surfaces by environmental stimulation - that is, sensory
input, prior to processing. Alternatively it may be identified with the phenomenology of
perceptual experience. I shall argue that on neither interpretation does the analog-digital
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distinction capture the difference between sensation and cognition. As a reading of Dretske,
the first notion is prima facie plausible in that it appears to map the sensation-cognition dis¬
tinction onto the familiar cognitivist distinction between non-computational transduction of
the environmental input, and computational processes acting on the transduced input
(Pylyshyn, 1984). However, we shall see that the non-computational processes of transduc¬
tion are at least as plausibly viewed as involving digitalisation as the computational
processes acting on them. It is clear from Dretske's text that he (primarily) adopts the
second reading that phenomenology is analog. However, this position is undermined by
various considerations from perceptual psychology to which Dretske himself draws atten¬
tion. I shall deal with the the two readings in turn:
1) Sensation as Excitation at the Sensory Surfaces
Suppose that we construe the process of sensation to involve those processes which under¬
lie the covariation between the physical/chemical/physiological state of the sensory surface,
and environment. The chemical activity of the photoreceptors in the retina in response to
visual input, or the vibration of the hair along the basilar membrane in the cochlea in
response to auditory input, will then be paradigmatically sensory processes. Such a division
ties in quite directly with a distinction drawn by theorists interested in which biological
processes of an organism are properly viewed as computational processes. Pylyshyn (1984)
distinguishes transduction from cognition. Transducers simply covary with the simple phy¬
sical properties of the environment; cognitive processes are defined over representations of
the environment, which may (or may not) correspond to the state of the environment.
Yet even sensory processes appear to digitalise some information in digital form. The
chemical state of the photoreceptors in the retina plausibly carry no additional information
over and above the information that it carries about the local light intensity in the relevant
wavelengths; the vibration of a hair on the basilar membrane plausibly carries no additional
information other than the sound intensity in the appropriate frequency range. In general,
insofar as the state X, Y,„. of the sensory surface is determined by the state of the
environment, it induces a classification of the environment into states X' (states which lead
to the sensory state X), Y' and so on. So it seems that X does carry some information
about the environment in digital form, namely X'.
In any case, the traditional distinction between transduction and cognition is precisely that
between those processes which can be given a simple informational explanation (perfectly
reliable covariation - in our terms, tracking) and those which cannot (representations, which
-130-
do not reliably represent the world, but may be true or false)*. As traditionally conceived,
the present analysis should apply only to transduction, rather than only to cognition. Cogni¬
tive processes trade in representations, which may be true or false, and hence do not neces¬
sarily carry information about the environment at all, let alone in digital form. Thus, the
putative qualitative distinction is between processes of simple covariation with the environ¬
ment, which may be understood informationally, and computational processes, which may
not. Whether or not this distinction is valid, it certainly does not correspond to the
difference between analog-analog and analog-digital processes.
2) Sensation as phenomenological experience
Dretske identifies sensation with our phenomenological experience of the environment:
"Sensation, what the ordinary man refers to as the look (sound, smell, etc.) of things..."
(Dretske, 1981:142)
"...I merely with to develop the idea that the difference between our perceptual experi¬
ence, the experience which constitutes our seeing and hearing things, and the knowledge
(or belief) that is normally consequent upon that experience is, fundamentally, a coding
difference." (Dretske, 1981:143) (my italics)
According to perceptual psychology, the look, sound and smell of things are the result of
perceptual activity. We do not have direct conscious access to the states of our sensory sur¬
faces. Rather, our phenomenology represents the environmental input as it is presented to
thought by the perceptual systems. Dretske's own examples are telling. In a footnote, he
quotes Rock with approval:
"But there is a genuine perceptual change when in viewing potentially familiar figures one
goes from an initial "nonsense" organisation to a subsequent "meaningful" organisation.
The figure looks different when it is recognized" (Rock, 1975 An Introduction to Percep¬
tion, quoted in Dretske, 1981:257)
Organisation is a paradigmatically cognitive activity. Patterns on sensory surfaces are not
organised, structured descriptions of the world are. Yet, Rock points out that the organisa¬
tion of the input is crucially implicated in phenomenology. Rock's point shows precisely
that phenomenology is dependent on rather than prior to perceptual processing. Another
class of examples of the dependence of the phenomenal quality of the environment on per¬
ceptual processing are the perceptual constancies. Dretske quotes Woodworth (1938):
"the retinal image continually changes without much changing the appearance of objects.
The apparent size of a person does not change as he moves away from you. A ring turned
♦The issue of misrepresentation will be deferred until Chapter 6
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at various angles to the line of sight, and therefore projected as a varying ellipse on the
retina, continues to appear circular. Part of a wall, standing in shadow, is seen as the same
in color as the well-lighted portion. Still more radical are the changes in the retinal image
that occur when we move about a room and examine its contents from various angles. In
spite of the visual flux the objects seem to remain in the same place..." (quoted in
Dretske, 1981: 164)
Dretske phrases this point revealingly:
"The visual experience that constitutes our sensory encoding of information about ordinary
physical objects can, and generally does, remain unchanged in response to quite different
proximal stimulation" (Dretske, 1981: 163)
Dretske appears to claim i) that the constancy phenomena show that sensory experience is
not to be identified with the state of the sensory surfaces; ii) that phenomenological experi¬
ence (in which the constancies hold) is not mediated by cognitive processes (analog-digital
conversion). Yet, the perceptual constancies and hence phenomenological experience,
necessarily involve digitalisation. For to treat an object as the same, independent of
viewpoint, or to assign a surface the same colour, whatever the composition of the ambient
light, is just to treat different things (at the sensory surface) as the same. This just consti¬
tutes, for Dretske, recognition, abstraction, classification, stimulus generalisation. In short,
the mechanisms underlying perceptual constancies, and hence phenomenology, ipso facto
involve digitalisation. So if our taxonomy of mental processes distinguishes processes
which involve digitalisation, and processes which do not, then cognition, perception,
processes at the sensory surfaces, and processes underlying phenomenology are classed
together.
4.9 Is Analog-Digital Conversion Ubiquitous?
The informational distinction between analog-analog and analog-digital processes informa¬
tional transformations does not appear to correspond directly to the distinction between per¬
ceptual and cognitive processes, or to the distinction between cognition and sensation. All
of these involve some kind of classification, organisation, generalisation - in short they all
involve the digitalisation of some information.
The discussion so far raises the possibility that all information processing involves the digi¬
talisation of some information. It is to this question that we now turn.
First, let us consider a simple example. We take three sets of basic propositions: proposi¬
tions about the environment (these will be the relevant propositions, in the informational
idealisation); propositions about the state of the input to the process; propositions about the
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state of the output of the process. For example, suppose the basic propositions about the
environment include D, C and F (that there are dogs, cats or ferrets present, respectively),
as well as information about the weather, the time of day and so on. The input might be
some complex description of the retinal image - for example, let us consider a discretized
description of the image, with 100,000 pixels, each of which may be active or not (to take
the simplest case). The specification of the entire retinal image involves the specification of
the intensity value at each of the 100,000 pixels. Suppose that the process under study is
animal recognition. The organism under study is able to spot dogs and ferrets, but not cats.
Suppose that the output has just two basic propositions D ,, and F _ - thesef f spotted spotted
correspond to some internal state of the organism denoting that a dog or a ferret has been
detected respectively. There is no output corresponding to the detection of cats, since the
organism is, by hypothesis, unable to detect cats. The "perceptual processes" under con¬
sideration map combinations of the basic input propositions (i.e. information about the










Of course, we cannot enumerate the plethora of informational dependencies between states
of the input, output and the environment. Let us assume that each of the possible retinal
inputs (specifying the intensity value at each pixel) determines which animals are present,
as well as other features of the environment. Let us also assume that the input state deter¬
mines the output state.
Suppose that a cat, a dog and a ferret are all present. The specification of the input to the
perceptual process involves a specification of the light intensities at each of the pixels of
the retina of the viewer, as generated by the animals and the rest of the scene. This
amounts to a conjunctive proposition consisting of each of the 100,000 basic input proposi¬
tions or their negations - each having the content that such and such a pixel is or not
active. Since the organism is able to detect dogs and ferrets, though it is oblivious to cats,
the output is D , & Fspotted spotted
Suppose that we add the complex conjunctive proposition for the input state is added as an
axiom of the informational system. This will carry the information that there is a cat, ferret
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and dog present, but, by hypothesis, it also carries additional information about the scene -
the time of day, the length of the grass, that the cat is a ginger torn (assuming that these are
included in the idealisation of the environment). Hence, it carries information about which
animals are present in analog form. (Notice that the input will also determine the state of
the output units - but propositions such as D , and F do not count as relevantspotted spotted
additional information, since they are not about the environment). By contrast, if we instead
add the conjunction for the output state, D , & F ., the information that a cat andJ spotted spotted
no dog is present, D & F, is, at least plausibly, carried in digital form. For additional infor¬
mation, about ferrets, the time of day, the length of the grass, and the type of cat is lost.
So, prima facie at least, the process which maps the retinal input (under the pixel idealisa¬
tion), to the dog and ferret detectors, has converted the information that there is a dog and
a ferret present from analog to digital form.
(We have not shown that no additional information about the environment is carried, by the
output Dspot[cd & ^spotted' Inc*eed ^ raay t>c argued that surely there may be such addi¬
tional information. For example, if the dog is visible to the viewer, then it must be in front
of, rather than behind, the garden wall. More generally, that an animal is visible carries
more information than simply that the animal is present in the scene - at a minimum that
the animal is visible. So it may be that some information carried in analog form cannot, in
principle, be converted into digital form, since additional, unwanted information cannot be
eliminated. This problem, which I shall call the Detectability problem is treated in detail in
chapter V. For the moment we shall ignore it.)
On the basis of such examples it is natural to conclude that only very particular processes
convert information from analog to digital form. Such conversion appears to require that
the output covaries appropriately with properties in the environment (e.g. the dog detector
fires only when a dog is present).
However, this intuition is misleading. In section III we showed that every relatively infor¬
mative proposition carries some relevant proposition in digital form. This means that if the
output carries any information about the environment at all, then it must carry some piece
of information about the environment in digital form (in fact, we noted that it will typically
carry more than one such piece of information in digital form). So as long as the input car¬
ries some additional piece of information about the environment, and hence does not itself
carry the proposition in digital form, the input-output process involves the analog-digital
conversion of that information. Hence, if the distinction between analog-analog and
analog-digital processes is taken to quantify over pieces of information, then it is of little
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use, since there will be almost no analog-analog processes. Rather, the distinction should
surely be framed relative to a particular piece of information:
A process converts a proposition P from analog to digital form iff the input to the process
carries P is analog form, and the output of the process carries P in digital form. This is
analog-digital transformation or analog-digital conversion.
If both input and output carry P in analog form, then the process effects only analog-
analog transformation, relative to P.
Dretske suggested that an absolute distinction may be drawn between sensory/perceptual
analog-analog processes, and cognitive analog-digital processes. However, we found that
sensory, perceptual and cognitive processes all seem to convert some information from ana¬
log to digital form. Given the above discussion, this is hardly surprising, since just about
any process will convert some information into digital form.
So the difference between cognitive and non-cognitive processes cannot be that only the
former digitalise information at all. However, the possibility remains that only cognitive
processes digitalise the right kind of information.
4.10 Digitalisation and the "Right Kind" of Information
Dretske appears to claim that only rather few information bearing structures carry informa¬
tion in digital form, and that only rather few processes digitalise information. Only on such
a view is it appropriate to wonder whether "the acquisition of language is essential to an
organism's having the capacity to convert sensory information into digital form" (Dretske,
1981: 143); and to identify cognitive processes with analog-digital conversion. Yet,
according to the present formalisation, and on Dretske's admission, (just about) every sig¬
nal carries some proposition in digital form, and this implies that (just about) every process
digitalisation some piece of information.
Let us consider some examples. The waving light carries information about the goings on
at the coast in digital form. The monkey shooting up a tree digitally codes the information
that a tiger is nearby. In both cases, digitalisation is mediated by a (plausibly) cognitive
agent. So perhaps digitalisation must involve cognition. However, the north pole of a mag¬
net being at one end may carry the information that the south pole is at the other end in
digital form; that the mercury column is on the 70 degree mark carries no additional infor¬
mation over and above that the temperature is 70 degrees. Surely magnets and thermome¬
ters do not exhibit cognition!
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To exclude such counterexamples, it is natural to claim that digitalising any piece of infor¬
mation is not enough for cognition - that information must be of the right kind. The exam¬
ples above suggest that the information that there are suspicious goings on at the coast and
that there is a tiger present count as the right kind of information, and that the information
that this end of the magnet is north, or that the temperature is 70 degrees do not. Drawing
the obvious moral, the wrong kind of information is directly tied to physical quantities
(magnetic polarity, temperature). Simple physical devices (magnets, thermometers) can digi-
talise such quantities simply in virtue of the lawful correlations with these magnitudes.
Such digitalisation is ubiquitous since physical magnitudes are just those over which physi¬
cal laws are defined. However there are no physical laws defined over properties such as
being a nearby tiger, or being a suspicious circumstance on the coast. Perhaps laws only
apply to such properties if they are recognised by cognitive agents. For example, the law¬
like correlation between the goings on at the coast and the waving of the light are mediated
by the recognition of the suspicious circumstances by the lookout; the lawlike correlation
between the nearness of the tiger and the monkey's climbing are mediated by the monkey
noticing that there is a tiger. So perhaps cognition is the digitalisation of non-physical pro¬
perties.
This line is strongly reminiscent of Fodor's (1986) proposal that sensitivity to non-physical
properties is a litmus test for the presence of mental representations and cognitive processes
defined over them*. Rather than debate the merits of the claim that cognition is the digital¬
isation of non-physical properties, I shall merely note the following.
A consequence of adopting such an approach is that the substantive issue is making
rigorous the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of information (between
physical and non-physical properties, or whatever it is). The taxonomy is not given directly
by the analog-digital distinction. Since I am concerned only with informational notions and
their application to psychological theory, I shall not discuss how or whether an appropriate
distinction between the right and wrong kinds of information can plausibly be drawn. Even
if a convincing account can be provided, there are still further difficulties with the
Dretskian account.
Let us suppose that some plausible putative distinction between right and wrong kinds of
information can be found. Thus, we may retain the hope that the analog-digital distinction
may provide an absolute taxonomy of cognitive processes. Only cognitive processes may
*For Fodor, an informational analysis is appropriate only at the non-cognitive level. At the cognitive level, where men¬
tal states may represent or misrepresent the world, he considers a factive notion of information to be inappropriate (e.g. Fodor,
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carry information of the right kind (perhaps non-physical properties) in digital form. Non-
cognitive processes may carry such information only in analog form, and digitally code
only information of the wrong kind. However, the possibility of such a taxonomy is under¬
mined by consideration that we have so far ignored. Informational properties, such as being
carried in digital form, are relative to the choice of informational idealisation. Since the
analog-digital distinction is idealisation relative, so is an psychological distinction based
upon it. Prima facie, at least, the distinction between sensation and cognition is absolute -
surely a process can not be cognitive (or perhaps sensory or perceptual) under one idealisa¬
tion, and non-cognitive under another. Idealisation relativity also appears to undermine our
more general account of information processing as analog-digital conversion, as we shall
see.
4.11 Idealisation Relativity
If the analog-digital distinction is to classify the mental processes involved in learning
about the environment, then we must surely respect certain core intuitions. If analog is to
denote raw, unprocessed information, and digital to represent the result of such processing,
then, for example, the state of the retina should carry a piece of high level information,
such as that there is a chair in the room, in analog form. Only after considerable analysis is
this information coded in a structure which carries this information in digital form. Now
that the information is digitally coded, the organism's behaviour may be sensitive to it. This
is why the information processing of sensory input is important. However, whether a piece
of information is carried by a structure in analog or digital form is relative to the informa¬
tional idealisation adopted. We shall see that, in particular, if there is an idealisation accord¬
ing to which some piece of information carried in analog form by the retina is digitalisable
at all, then there will be some idealisation according to which that information is carried in
digital form already. So, although on one idealisation considerable analysis in required to
convert the information that a chair is present from analog to digital form, on another, the
information is in digital form in the input, rendering further analysis unnecessary. There are
two simple ways in which an idealisation according to which some piece of information is
carried in analog form may be altered in order to give idealisations according to which that
information is already digitally coded. We may change 1) the characterisation of the signal
or 2) the set of relevant propositions about the environment.
Consider the example of the retina and cat, dog and ferret detection of 4.9. Since each of
100,000 pixels can be in either of two states, the retina can be in 2100'000 states denendin?
on the intensity values at each pixel. Some of these will carry the information that the ferret
is present, presumably in analog form, and some will not. However, by 1) changing the
specification of the signal - the idealisation of the state of the retina, or 2) changing the
specification of the environment, we can generate alternative idealisations according to
which information about which animals are present is already coded in digital form. We
shall consider these cases in turn.
1) Relativity to the characterisation of the signal
I shall argue that if a (digitalisable) piece of information is carried in analog form accord¬
ing to one idealisation, then we can specify an idealisation according to which it is digitally
coded already, by reducing the richness of the specification of the signal.
If it is possible to digitalise the information that a ferret is present, there will be some
detector which does digitalise this information*. The state of this detector carries no addi¬
tional information over and above that the ferret is present.
Consider the disjunction V of all states of the retina that trigger the ferret detector. It is
easy to show that this proposition about the state of the retina must also digitally code the
information that a ferret is present. The triggering of the ferret detector carries the informa¬
tion that the retina is in a state which is in the disjunction V. So, the triggering of the
detector carries V, and, ipso facto it carries all information carried by V. So if V carries any
information over and above that a ferret is present, so does the detector. That is, if V car¬
ries the information in analog form, so does the detector. Yet, by assumption, the detector
digitalises this information.
Now it is easy to provide an idealisation according to which the information is carried in
digital form by the retina itself. The states of the retina are as before, except that all the
disjuncts of V (all the states which trigger the ferret detector) are lumped together as a sin¬
gle state. Just as the disjunction of states V of the old idealisation carries the information
that a ferret is present in digital form, so does the corresponding single state of the new
idealisation.
Consider a case in which the ferret is in front of the retina. On the old idealisation, the
135:1987).
*Recall that in 4.9, we noted that there may be some analog information that cannot digitalised, in principle. If the fer¬
ret is only visible when it is in front of the wall, then the detection of the ferret carries the additional information about its lo¬
cation (assuming that the idealisation is rich enough to capture this). So the information that a ferret is present is not digi-
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signal that this induces is very specific - the light intensity at each pixel is determined. This
detailed description of the retina will typically carry detailed information about the state of
the environment - information over and above that a ferret is present. However, on the new
idealisation, the signal is so much less specific that all this additional information is lost.
2) Relativity to the relevant states of the environment
In this section, I shall argue that if the state of some structure carries a piece of information
at all according to some idealisation, then, by reducing the richness of the environment we
can specify an idealisation according to which the state of the structure carries that informa¬
tion in digital form.
In the previous idealisation, the richness of the signal is very severely reduced, so that it
carries no additional information about the scene. An alternative way to achieve the same
result is to reduce the richness of the scene, by restricting the set of basic propositions in
the idealisation, or the subset of these which are considered relevant. In this case, no addi¬
tional relevant information can be carried, not because the signal is too impoverished, but
simply because there is no relevant additional information. Clearly an idealisation according
to which the only relevant piece of information is that the ferret is present will suffice.
More liberally, we may eliminate rather fewer states than this. For each state of the retina
which carries the information in digital form on the old idealisation, in analog form, there
is a set of additional propositions carried. Let us eliminate from the set of relevant proposi¬
tions of the new idealisation all basic propositions which occur is any such additional pro¬
position (perhaps one is that the ferret is in front of, rather than behind, the wall). So the
retina being in such and such a state (however detailed the description) carries the informa¬
tion that the ferret is present in digital form, since with such an impoverished idealisation
of the environment, there simply is no more (relevant) information to carry.
Notice that 2) applies more generally than 1). There is no requirement that the information
need be digitalisable, under the original idealisation.
We have shown that under an appropriate idealisation, the state of the retina (in vision), or
the vibration of the basilar membrane (in audition), can carry the right kind of information
in digital form. The relativity of informational properties of a situation to the idealisation
chosen creates serious difficulties for our account so far.
talisable.
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Firstly, it further undermines the attempt to distinguish sensory/perceptual processes from
cognitive processes. We noted above that according to Dretske:
"The contrast between an analog and a digital encoding of information... is useful for dis¬
tinguishing between sensory and cognitive processes. Perception is a process by means of
which information is delivered within a richer matrix of information (hence in analog
form) to the cognitive centers for their selective use. Seeing, hearing, and smelling are
different ways we have of getting information about s to a digital-conversion unit whose
function it is to extract pertinent information from the sensory representation for purposes
of modifying output. It is the successful conversion of information into (appropriate) digi¬
tal form that constitutes the essence of cognitive activity." (Dretske, 1981: 141-142)
On this picture, the mental processes involved in learning about the environment can be
divided into two successive stages: perceptual processes, which transform information
coded in analog form in one structure into information coded in analog form in another
structure; and cognitive processes, which take the output of the perceptual processes and
perform analog-digital conversion. Let us call these stage 1 and stage 2 processes.
In 4.9, it was noted that since just about every signal codes some piece of information in
digital form, just about every process converts some information from analog to digital
form, and hence appears to count as a cognitive process. However, it was suggested that
we should restrict cognitive processes to those processes which involve digitalisation of
information of the right kind (where propositions about chairs, tables, dogs and ferrets are
paradigmatically of the right kind, and propositions about brightnesses, magnetic fields and
temperatures are paradigmatically of the wrong kind). However, according to Dretske's
account, what counts as a cognitive rather a non-cognitive process is dependent on the
idealisation that we choose. Let us briefly return to the ferret detection example of 4.9.
First we shall consider an intuitively natural idealisation, according to which the retina car¬
ries the information that such and such an animal is present in analog form, and then we
shall consider a bizarre idealisation according to which the state of the retina already digi¬
tally codes this information.
Consider the proposition that the ferret is present (presumably, a proposition of the right
kind). Taking some intuitively natural idealisation of the retina (e.g. the pixel level descrip¬
tion), the processes at the sensory periphery (stage 1 processes) map the environment onto
the retina, such that the state of the retina carries all sorts of information about the scene.
Since the state of the environment carries more information than that the ferret is present,
this information is initially in analog form. So the information that the ferret is present is
still in analog form. The ferret detector then converts this information into digital form
(stage 2).
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However, consider an idealisation on which the state of the retina carries the information
that the ferret is present in digital form. Then the processes which map the state of the
environment onto the state of the retina will convert the information that a ferret is present
from analog to digital form. Hence according to this idealisation, the (stage 1) processes
determining the state of the retina count as performing analog-digital conversion. By con¬
trast the stage 2 processes do not digitalise the information (since it is already in digital
form). So, on such an idealisation stage 1 processes are cognitive, and stage 2 processes
are not! This is precisely the opposite to the pattern of results according to the "natural"
idealisation.
The implications of this observation are far reaching. It was suggested that the purpose of
information processing was to convert information from analog form in the input, to digital
form in the output. However, we have seen that simply by recharacterising the input, such
information may be seen as digitally coded already. So further processing appears to be
unnecessary. So Gibson's Problem has recurred - if digitalisation is trivial, and digitalisa-
tion is supposed to be the purpose of information processing, then such processing does not
seem to be necessary after all.
4.12 Strange Idealisations and Strange Consequences
By appropriately characterising the idealisation of the signal, environment or informational
laws, it may be possible to derive informational idealisations of a given situation which do
not have counterintuitive consequences for what information is carried, and what informa¬
tion is coded in digital form. However, although some idealisations may have intuitively
satisfying properties, we have seen that others will have extremely bizarre consequences.
In developing an informational account of perceptual-cognitive activity and information
processing in general, we are concerned to delimit the appropriate idealisations from the
inappropriate. An idealisation according to which the ferret detector converts the informa¬
tion from retinal input from analog to digital form may be acceptable. However, on an
idealisation with a two state retina (ferret projected on retina, ferret not projected .on retina),
or with a degenerate environment, retina itself will digitally code the presence or absence of
a ferret. Yet these idealisations are just crazy! It is hardly surprising that such strange ideal¬
isations of the situation generate such strange consequences. What may, perhaps, seem wor¬
rying is that such idealisations can be formulated at all within the present framework. It is
tempting to suspect that a better theory of information would somehow constrain the class
of allowable idealisations to rule out idealisations with such counterintuitive consequences.
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Notice, however, that analogous considerations arise in the application even of the theory
of numbers. Just as the informational properties of a situation are relative to the chosen
idealisation, so the numerical properties of a situation are relative to the chosen scheme of
individuation. Such questions as "How many things are there in the cupboard?" are only
coherent relative to a scheme of individuation. Depending on the relevant scheme, a book
might count as a single thing, or as a collection of 315 things (314 pages and a cover), or
as an even larger collections of lines, words, or characters. A bottle of water might be
counted as one object, as two (a bottle and a body of water), as three (a bottle, a body of
water and a cap), and so on. Just as we can formulate bizarre informational idealisations,
we can formulate bizarre schemes of individuation. For example, the bottom half of a bottle
could be individuated as a separate object from the top half, or the bottle and the table on
which it is standing might be individuated as a single object. Three bottles sitting on a table
might count as 4 things, 7 things, or indeed as 1 thing. As in the informational case,
strange idealisations will have strange consequences for the numerical properties of the
situation. What scheme of individuation is appropriate depends on the purposes of the
theorist. If we are interested in whether the weight of the table/botlles set up is flattening
the carpet, then we consider tables and bottles as a single system. If we are interested in
trying to use bottles as poker chips, then a bottle and its cap might naturally be treated as
separate objects, denoting different amounts of money.
The relativity of counting to the way in which the situation is individuated in no way
detracts from its utility. Indeed the flexibility to choose a scheme of individuation
appropriate to the problem is a crucial determinant of the generality of numerical notions. I
can talk equally of 4 atoms, 4 ideas, 4 tables, or 4 galaxies. Of course, counterintuitive
conclusion may be drawn if a scheme of individuation is chosen which is inappropriate to
the purposes of the theorist. For example, according to a scheme of individuation accord¬
ing to which dust particles count as objects, we draw the rather counterintuitive conclusion
that a dusty cupboard that has not been used for years might contain hundreds of times
more objects than the wardrobe. If you are wondering where there enough room to store
the ironing board, or whether which cupboard is most likely to contain something for the
jumble sale, this is not a very useful scheme of individuation.
Let us draw out a few morals from this analogy. Firstly, the idealisation relativity of pro¬
perties need not detract from their utility. Secondly, idealisation relativity may be crucial in
allowing a theory to be applied flexibly to a situation, depending on the purposes' which the
theorist has in mind. This flexibility will prove crucial in subsequent discussion of how
informational ideas should be applied to mentation. Thirdly, the theory can, of course, be
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applied inappropriately. However, it is no part of the business of the theory (of information
or of numbers) to delimit appropriate from inappropriate idealisations. What is an
appropriate idealisation is an extra-theoretic question. In the case of counting, the question
of what may be viewed as an object is raised in the philosophy of identity and the psychol¬
ogy of perception, rather than the theory of numbers. Much of the rest of this thesis may be
seen as attempt to provide the beginnings of a corresponding extra-theoretic discussion of
the way in which informational idealisations may be applied to perceptual-cognitive
processes and information processing in general.
In this chapter we have observed that what information is carried in digital form is crucially
relative to the idealisation chosen. This observation appears to undermine our account of
information processing as the conversion of information from analog to digital form. How¬
ever, in the final chapters, I shall argue that idealisation relativity is not merely compatible
with, but essential to, the development of an account of information processing as digitali-
sation.
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Chapter 5: Making Information Explicit
5.1 Introduction
It has been stressed throughout the present analysis that the informational properties of a
situation are relative to the informational idealisation chosen. For example, in chapter IV
we saw that the information carried by the state of the retina, is relative to both the way in
which it is idealised, and the idealisation of the environment (which propositions are taken
to be relevant). In IV. 10 we found that if some piece of information is carried in analog
form under one idealisation, then it is carried in digital form under some other idealisation.
Appropriate idealisations may be obtained either by changing the characterisation of the
signal, or changing the set of relevant propositions.
If some piece of information is coded in analog form on the retina on one idealisation, then
it is coded in digital form according to some other idealisation. So the contention that
attunement requires that information be carried in digital rather than analog form appears to
be vacuous. If the mental sentence (grandmother cell, pattern of neural activity, or what¬
ever) that is the result of perceptual-cognitive processing carries some piece of information
in digital form, according to one idealisation, then that information is already carried in
digital form at the sensory surfaces, on some other idealisation. If behavioural attunement
simply requires that information is carried in digital form under some idealisation,
perceptual-cognitive processing seems to be quite unnecessary.
The problem stems from the mismatch between the apparently absolute constraint that
information must be processed before it can be used to drive behaviour and the idealisation
relativity of informational properties (such as being coded in analog or digital form). There
may be strange idealisations upon which the retina carries the information that granny is
present in digital form, but surely there cannot be strange idealisations on which the retina
directly drives behaviour, without the mediation of perceptual-cognitive processes.
Perceptual-cognitive processing may be necessary for digitalisation on some idealisations
and not on others, but it is absolutely necessary for producing appropriate behaviour. In
short, perhaps I may not need need a brain to digitalise the information that granny has
arrived (on an appropriately bizarre idealisation of my retina), but (on any idealisation) I
definitely do need a brain to be able to generate appropriate greeting and tea-making
behaviour.
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It is worth noting that the problems of idealisation relativity may be overlooked, given a
covert belief in the existence of "one true" informational idealisation. The various bizarre
idealisations that have been discussed then appear to present no problems for the account of
attunement and information processing as matters of analog-digital conversion. For exam¬
ple, we could simply stipulate that attunement to the information that granny is present
requires digitalisation according to this "one true" idealisation. The fact that the retina car¬
ries this information in digital form according to certain rather unnatural idealisations is
then quite beside the point. Restricted idealisations are, according to this view, of value
only insofar as they approximate the relevant structure of the "one true" informational
idealisation. So bizarre idealisations, constructed as they are by using various ad hoc res¬
trictions on the specification of signal or environment, may be dismissed as just the sort of
restricted idealisations which fail approximate the "one true" idealisation. (After all, it
might be argued that bizarre applications of, for example, Newtonian mechanics - such as
idealising a falling leaf as a point mass - also lead to bizarre consequences. The existence
of such cases in no way undermines Newtonian mechanics. A bizarre application of a
theory, however sensible, may have bizarre consequences).
According to any putative "one true" informational idealisation, the state of the retina must
carry far more information than that if the information is successfully digitalised, the output
of perceptual-cognitive processes carry this information in digital form, according to the
"one true" idealisation. Although the informational properties of a situation are relative to
the informational idealisation of that situation, the informational properties of a situation
given a particular idealisation are absolute. So, informational properties of some situation
relative to the putative "one true" idealisation are absolute. So, if idealisation relativity is
not recognised, there is no mismatch between the apparent relativity of digitalisation, and
the absolute need for information processing, to allow perceptual input to appropriately
influence behaviour.
In this chapter and the next, I shall argue, however, that it is because rather than in spite of
idealisation relativity that informational notions may be applied to perceptual-cognitive
activity, and information processing in general. I shall consider three difficulties which
may be taken to challenge the utility of an informational approach to the study of menta¬
tion. In each case, we shall appeal to the flexibility licensed by idealisation relativity. In
the present chapter we shall attempt to resolve Gibson's problem - the problem of provid¬
ing an informational account of what information processing amounts to. In Chapter 6, we
shall turn to the inter-related problems of "Detectability" and Misrepresentation.
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5.2 Gibson's Problem: What Does Information Processing Achieve?
It has been suggested above (4.4) that the point of perceptual-cognitive processing is the
conversion of information into a form which is utilisable by the organism. Using Gibsonian
terms to express somewhat un-Gibsonian sentiments, the proposal is that such processing
serves to attune the behaviour of the organism to the information specified at the sensory
periphery. However, it has proven to be less than straightforward to capture the difference
what is required for attunement, over and above merely carrying the information at the
retina.
It has been argued (4.4) that the utilisation of information requires that the information be
coded in digital form. So it was conjectured that information processing is a matter of
analog-digital conversion. However, in 4.10, we saw that even if some piece of information
is encoded in analog form according to some idealisation, there will be other idealisations
according to which it is carried in digital. For example, under an idealisation of the state of
the retina as either having a ferret projected on it (or not) then the retina carries the infor¬
mation that a ferret is present (or absent) in digital form (at least if we ignore the Detecta-
bility problem).
In short, the problem may be put as follows. That the ferret detector fires carries the infor¬
mation that a ferret is present in digital form. However, that the retina has a ferret projected
on it also carries the information that a ferret is present in digital form. Thus, according to
some idealisation, this information is digitally coded even at the lowest level. So how can
the information processing purpose of the hypothetical ferret detector be analog-digital
conversion?
I shall argue that the crucial consideration that has been ignored is the different causal pro¬
perties in the two cases. In simple terms, it is easy, at least in principle, to have a
behaviour (or belief, or other mental processes) depend on the firing of a detector, simply
by passing the output of the detector to the appropriate output system (or part of memory).
It is less than clear how the retina's having, or not having, a ferret projected on it can be
hooked up in order to appropriately shape the organisms beliefs and behaviour. The firing
of the detector has a causal efficacy that the retina's having a ferret projected on it does
not. Putting it crudely, brain processes may be causally sensitive to the firing of a putative
ferret detecting cell. They are not sensitive to whether or not the retina has a ferret pro¬
jected on it or not.
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5.3 Dretske on the role of causality.
In Dretske's discussion of the perception-cognition distinction, he notes that while digitali-
sation is necessary for cognition, it is not sufficient. The additional condition that he
invokes, in the discussion of belief, is that the digitalising structure be able to effect output.
"D.M. Armstrong, following F.P. Ramsey, takes belief to be a kind of (internal) map by
means of which we steer. This, of course, is nothing but a suggestive metaphor, but it
does reflect two properties that are commonly taken to be essential to the idea of a belief:
(1) the idea of structure with some representational powers (hence a map), and (2) the
idea of a structure that has some control over the output of the system of which it is part
(hence something by means of which we steer). Up to this point we have concentrated
exclusively on the first aspect of belief. The idea of a semantic structure [i.e. a structure
with a semantic content], I submit, captures all that is worth capturing in the metaphorical
equation of a belief with a map... But we must also take note of the second property of
beliefs, the fact that these structures, in order to qualify as beliefs, must shape or be capa¬
ble of shaping the behavior of the system of which they are a part.
Consider, for example, an ordinary home thermostat. This device has an internal bimetal
strip that registers room temperature by its degree of curvature... When the bimetal strip
bends enough to touch an adjustable contact (adjustable to correspond with desired room
temperature), an electric circuit is closed and a signal is sent to the furnace... In
information-theoretic terms the bimetal strip is temperature detector: its curvature depends
on, and carries information about, the ambient temperature. The thermostat's responses
(sending a signal to the furnace) are controlled by this detector...
A belief is like the configuration of a bimetal strip in a properly functioning thermostat: it
is an internal state that not only represents its surroundings but functions as a determinant
of the system's response to those surroundings. Beliefs are semantic structures, but that is
not all they are. They are semantic structures that occupy an executive office in a system's
functional organization... Hereafter, those semantic structures that have an executive func¬
tion, that help shape a system's output, shall be called cognitive structures for the System
in which they occur." (Dretske, 1981: 197-8)
So, according to Dretske's account, a cognitive process is one which not only converts
information into digital form, but allows that information to causally influence output. This
additional condition is explicated further:
When I speak of a semantic structure determining output, I mean that the information...
constituting the semantic content of that structure is a causal determinant of output. I have
already... explained what is meant by the information in a structure or signal causing
something to happen: viz., information (in a signal or structure S) causes E insofar as the
properties of S that carry this information are those the possession of which (by S) makes
it the cause of E. So, for example, if S carries the information that s is F, and this infor¬
mation is carried by means of S's having the property G, then we may say that if S"s be¬
ing G causes E, the information that s is F causes E. If a structure has the semantic con¬
tent m, then m causes E insofar as the properties of S which give it this content are those
which are responsible for S's causing E." (Dretske, 1981:198-199)
So, the processes intervening between the retina and the ferret detector has made some pro¬
gress. That the ferret detector fires meets two criteria: i) it carries the information that a
ferret is present; ii) it causally affects beliefs or behaviour or mental processes. That the
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retina has a ferret projected on it meets only the first of these criteria. At least prima facie
a description of the chemical state of the retina is an appropriate description at which is
causally influences mental processes - namely the neural structures which mediate the
transduction of information from the sensory surface. However, under such a description,
the retina no longer carries the information that a ferret is present in digital form. In
fulfilling the second criterion, we have sacrificed the first.
In short then, if information is to be utilised it must be carried by a state that is causally
efficacious. So, although the digitalisation of a piece of information is easy, digitalisation
under a causally relevant description is hard.
Let us call the requirement that information be coded so as to have causal consequences the
"Requirement of Causal Efficacy" (hereafter, RCE).
I shall argue that RCE is properly construed as picking out information which is in utilis-
able form, from information which is not. I shall argue that RCE is too general to pick out
beliefs from non-beliefs pieces of information in utilisable form. I take RCE to provide an
important condition on providing an account of what the purpose of information processing
is (to answering Gibson's problem), rather than illuminating the nature of folk psychologi¬
cal notions such as belief and knowledge.
The discussion will fall into three stages. Firstly, I shall argue that causal efficacy is rela¬
tive to the processes that are operating over the thermostat, thermometer or whatever.
Secondly, I shall introduce some examples to show how information processing may be
seen as transforming information which is not utilisable by some process, into a form
which is utilisable by that process. Finally, I shall return briefly to consider Dretske's alter¬
native use of RCE to characterise belief.
5.4 Process relativity
We have argued that the point of information processing is the conversion of information
from unusable to usable form. The encoding of the information must have appropriate
causal, as well as informational properties. Dretske considers the case of a disabled ther¬
mostat:
"If, however, we should mechanically remove the adjustable contact so that no electrical
contact could be made... No signal would be sent to the furnace... We still have an inter¬
nal "map", but it no longer has its hand on the steering wheel." (Dretske, 1981:198)
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Why is the information no longer usable, in such a case? Since the contact has been
removed and thus thermostat no longer has "on" and "off positions, a first suggestion
might be that the information that it is above or below 20 ° is no longer converted into
digital form (according to Dretske's characterisation of the set-up). However, this proposal
cannot handle a slightly different example. Consider the case in which the thermostat is
intact, but the output wire is disconnected from the heating system. In this modified exam¬
ple, the on-off state carries information about ambient temperature just as it does in the
properly functioning thermostat. Further, the on-off state of the thermostat has just the same
immediate causal powers as before, such as allowing current to pass or not, generating con¬
sequent magnetic fields or not and so on. These causal effects could be used to control the
behaviour of some structures. For example, a compass needle near the wire would be
deflected from North (or not) depending on whether the thermostat was on or off. So the
information that the temperature is above or below 20 ° would still be in utilisable form, for
the compass needle. However, this on-off state is no longer causally linked to the heating
system - hence the information about the ambient temperature, though utilisable by the
compass needle, is not utilisable by the heating system.
These considerations show that whether or not a piece of information can be utilised is
dependent on what that information is to be utilised by. So the Requirement of Causal
Efficacy is relative to the process or structure that is being controlled or influenced
(whether the state of the heating system or the position of compass needle). We shall say
that information carried in a causally efficacious form is information carried in explicit form
(relative to some process):
If a proposition P both carries the information that Q in digital form, and the state
corresponding to P holding is causally efficacious in influencing or controlling some pro¬
cess, then let us say that Q is carried explicitly relative to that process.
If the thermostat is properly connected to the heating system, then that the thermostat is on
carries the information that it is below 20 ° in explicit form, relative to the heating system.
If the thermometer is not connected, it may still carry this information in explicit form rela¬
tive to the compass needle, or, for that matter, to the electric circuit through which current
does or does not flow.
So now we can restate our answer to our most recent incarnation of Gibson's problem. To
control the heating system according to whether the temperature is above or below 20 °,
temperature information must not merely be carried in digital form, according to some
idealisation, but carried in in explicit form, relative to the the heating system. Turning to
the psychological case, to have my behaviour depend up features of the environment, the
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relevant information must be coded in explicit form, relative to that behaviour.
As we have framed it, the distinction between explicit and inexplicit information is relative
to a particular process. Information can be explicit with respect to one process, and inexpli¬
cit with respect to another, as we have seen. This relativity makes the explicit-inexplicit
distinction, like the analog-digital distinction, inappropriate for attempting to draw absolute
taxonomies of psychological states and processes.
It might be countered that this definition is too restrictive. Surely, all that is necessary is
that information is coded in such a way that it potentially affects output. For example, if I
notice the cake shop on the comer, this information may directly affect my behaviour -
perhaps I go in and buy a pie. On the other hand, I may simply ignore it. It seems
appropriate to say the information that the cakeshop is near is explicit in both cases.
Perceptual-cognitive processing puts information in a form such that it may be used to
determine behaviour. However, the notion of potential influence is problematic. For surely
the disconnected thermostat has the potential to influence the heating system and will do so,
if I connect it up again. Indeed, a broken thermostat has the potential to affect the state of
the heating system - it just needs to be repaired. Yet we do not want to say that discon¬
nected and broken thermostats carry information about temperature in explicit form, relative
to the heating system. If it were, then from an informational point of view, it would be
unnecessary to actually reconnect or mend the thermostat, since the relevant information is
explicit, and hence utilisable, already!
Fortunately, capturing the fact that behaviour is not necessarily directly determined by sen¬
sory input does not require any adjustment in the account. In our example, the information
that a cakeshop is near is not explicit relative to my going in to buy a pie, if I decide to
walk past. However, it is explicit relative to my belief that the cakeshop is present. The
presence of the cakeshop need not control my behaviour, but it does control my mental
state. This does not mean that the presence of the cakeshop can never be explicit relative
to behaviour. If I happen to be looking for the nearest cake shop, then my believing that I
have sighted a cake shop may be lawfully connected to my going in to buy a pie. In this
case, the information that a cakeshop is present may be carried in explicit (digital and
causally efficacious) form relative to both may beliefs and my actions.
5.5 Information processing as making information explicit
In this section we shall consider a variety of examples which suggest that information
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processing is a matter of converting information from a form which is not explicit relative
to some process to a form in which it is explicit relative to that process.
Consider a tabletop on which there is a collection of two kinds of block - small green ones
and large red ones. Suppose that we want to scoop up just the red ones. If the blocks are
jumbled together into a heap this cannot be done directly. First, the large red blocks must
be sorted into a separate pile - then the large block can be scooped up selectively. The
information that a block is red is carried in digital form by the proposition that it is red.
Relative to the shovel, however, this information is not explicit since the shovel is not
selectively sensitive to large blocks, but rather to blocks in a particular region of the table.
When the blocks have been sorted into piles, the proposition that a block is in, say, the left
hand pile carries the information that the block is red in digital form. Now, however, the
information is explicit relative to the shovel. Whether or not the shovel picks up the block
or not is determined by where it is, not by how large it is. The sorting process would not
have been necessary had we been picking up the blocks with a loose mesh net. The whole
jumbled pile could be netted, and all but the large, red blocks would fall through the mesh.
The proposition that a block is large carries the information that it is red in explicit form,
relative to the net, but not to the shovel. So the process of sorting the blocks is not a matter
of converting information from analog to digital form, or form inexplicit to explicit form
per se, but rather of converting information from inexplicit to explicit form relative to the
shovel.
In the light of our revised conception of information processing, let us briefly reconsider
one of the symbolic and non-symbolic examples of information processing that' we intro¬
duced in 4.5. First, let us consider the example of the cash register. In our initial descrip¬
tion of the case, we argued that the column of numbers which the cash register takes as
input carry additional information over and above the information about their sum (for
example, information about what the first number is, what the second number is, how many
numbers are input, and so on). Hence, we argued, it follows that the information that the
sum is such and such is carried in analog form in the input. The output of the cash register,
by contrast, was held to carry none of this additional information, since it consists simply
of a single number. Thus, the information processing role of the device was seen as con¬
verting information about the sum from analog to digital form. From the present perspec¬
tive, however, this characterisation is oversimple. If the input is idealised differently, the
information that the sum is such and such may be carried in digital form in the input. In
particular, if the various inputs are characterised according as "column of numbers whose
sum is 132", "column of numbers whose sum is 253" and so on, the input will carry no
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additional information, over and above the sum of the numbers. Indeed, according to this
apparently bizarre idealisation, the value of the sum is explicit, with respect to the function¬
ing of the cash register. For the category into which the input falls does causally determine
the output of the cash register since, after all, the cash register is designed precisely to cal¬
culate sums. The output of the cash register is, for example, 153 when and only when the
input is a "column of numbers whose sum is 153". However, although the input is explicit
to the cash register, it is not explicit to the person using the cash register. Presumably, it is
not the case that some "output" of the user which is sensitive to the sum of an arbitrary
column of figures - unless, of course, the person is a master of mental arithmetic, in which
case the information is already explicit to them in the input, and cash register performs no
useful information processing function. The output of the cash register is, by contrast,
explicit relative to the user - it carries information about the sum in a digital form which
may causally determine behaviour. For example, that the cash register outputs 642, might
determined that the user turns to the customer and say "That's six pounds, forty-two pence,
please". To respond appropriately to the output of the cash register require only an under¬
standing of the decimal system. To respond appropriately to the input to the calculator
requires considerable facility with arithmetic. Since the former ability is much more com¬
mon than the latter, calculators perform a useful information processing function. They con¬
vert information that is (for most of us) coded in inexplicit form, into a form which is (for
most of us) explicit.
Similarly, recall the method of estimating the length of an arbitrary curve by overlaying a
piece of string. In the original discussion, the operation of straightening the string was seen
as throwing away all additional information about the curve, other than its length. Thus,
this operation was seen as converting the information about the length of the string from
analog to digital form. However, the initial curve may be idealised purely according to its
length. According to this apparently bizarre idealisation, the information that the string has
such and such a length is coded in digital form - but this information is not explicit relative
to the process of measurement with a ruler. The reading on the ruler is simply not sensitive
to the length of arbitrary curves. Only when the overlayed string has been straightened is
the information about the length of the curve carried in a form which is explicit relative to
the ruler - since the reading on the ruler is sensitive to the length of straight lines. Hence,
relative to the use of the ruler, the overlaying and straightening of the string converts infor¬
mation about the length of the curve from inexplicit to explicit form. However, relative to
some device whose reading is directly sensitive to the length of a curve, such as a measur¬
ing wheel which may be traced along its length, the information is already explicit relative
to the input. Just as the cash register has no information processing use to the "human
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calculator", the "string" method of finding the length of curve is redundant, if the measur¬
ing device to be applying is inherently able to handle arbitrary curves. When using a
measuring wheel rather than a ruler, there is simply no point overlaying and straightening a
string, since measuring wheels may be used equally to estimate the lengths of straight lines
and curves.
5.6 Dretske on belief
We have applied RCE to provide an account of the nature of information processing. Given
that this it is such a general condition, it seems prima facie unlikely that it can be used to
characterise belief. However, Dretske intends that RCE play just this role.
Before discussing Dretske's approach, it is necessary to consider how his object-property
account compares to the prepositional account that we have been using. According to a
prepositional account, that the thermostat is on both carries the information that the tem¬
perature is below 20 °, and causes the heating system to come on. On Dretske's account,
information is seen as carried by objects, in virtue of their properties. So, for Dretske, the
thermostat carries the information that it is below 20 °, in virtue of being on.
So Dretske must rule out the possibilities such as the following. Suppose that the thermos¬
tat is soldered in to the "on" position. Hence, the thermostat causes the heating system to
be on. The temperature of the thermostat, and the stresses on the bimetallic strip, depend
directly on the ambient temperature. So the thermostat carries the information that the tem¬
perature is 20 °, as well as causing the heating system to come on. However, surely this
not count as attunement of the thermostat's output to the ambient temperature; the thermos¬
tat is not using the information about the temperature. For the causal and informational
powers of the thermostat are in virtue of different properties. Dretske introduces this con¬
straint:
"...if S carries the information that 5 is F, and this information is carried by means of S's
having the property G, then we may say that if S's being G causes E, the information that
s is F causes E. If a structure has a semantic content m, then m causes E insofar as the
properties of S which give it this content are those which are responsible for S's causing
E." (Dretske, 1981: 198-199)
If we take objects as bearers of information, then it is necessary to specify which properties
are operative. If, however, we take propositions as informationally basic, then such addi¬
tional conditions are unnecessary. In the case of the soldered thermostat, it is the proposi¬
tions that the thermostat has a bimetallic strip under such and such stresses, or that the
thermostat is itself above or below 20 °, that carries the information about the ambient
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temperature. Yet it is not these propositions which determine the state of the heating sys¬
tem. Thus the information about the environment is not carried in causally efficacious
form. That the thermostat is in the "on" position does causally affect the state of the heat¬
ing system, but carries no information about the ambient temperature, since the bimetallic
strip has been soldered.
Now let us return to Dretske's characterisation of cognitive structure, and his attempt to
explicate what is distinctive about belief.
"To qualify as a cognitive structure... an internal state must not only have a semantic con¬
tent, it must be this content that defines the structure's causal influence upon output. Only
then can we say that the system does A because it occupies an internal state with the con¬
tent that s is F - because (in other words) it believes (or knows) that j is F." (Dretske,
1981: 199)
That is, a system believes that s is F iff it has an internal state which i) carries the informa¬
tion s is F in digital form, and ii) causally influences the system's output. Let us put this
point in terms of our prepositional account of information: a system believes that P iff
there is a proposition Q about its internal state such that i) Q carries the information that P,
and ii) Q causally influences the system's output. That is, P must be carried in explicit
rather than inexplicit form, relative to system output.
However, this account is far too lenient. Whether the bimetallic strip is in the on or off
position carries the information that it is below 20 ° in explicit form, relative to die heating
system. Yet surely the thermostat (or the bimetallic strip) does not believe that it is below
20 °. Dretske comments in a footnote that "Thermostats... have no beliefs. The reason they
do not is not that they lack internal states with informational content, not that these states
fail to affect output, but that... these internal states have no appropriate semantic content"
(Dretske, 1981: 261-262). Yet the on-off state of the thermostat seems to be precisely an
internal state which carries no information over and above that it is 20 °, irrespective of
what this information is about - it carries this information in completely digital form, that
is, as its semantic content. In any case, we saw in 3.11 that every (fresh) signal has some
semantic content. So whether or not the thermostat can be ascribed the belief that it is
below 20 °, it can be ascribed some belief or other.
Any causally active signal will have some semantic content, and be causally efficacious
relative to some process. The position of the on-off button on a calculator presumably car¬
ries the information that the calculator is on or off in completely digital form. The position
of the button plainly affects the output of the calculator. Yet when the calculator is on it




In Chapter 4, we saw that the specific applications of informational notions suggested by
Dretske do not seem appropriate. Nonetheless, it was suggested that the mental processes
can properly viewed as converting information from analog (unusable) to digital (usable)
form. Whereas traditional accounts of semantics apply only to symbolic structures and
hence only to symbolic processes, an informational account at least promises to be broad
enough to cope with mental processes whatever their character. However, we have seen
that whether some piece of information is carried in digital form is relative to the informa¬
tional idealisation chosen. Unless there is some restriction on what idealisations are
appropriate, whether a piece of information is carried in analog or digital form can be
manipulated almost at will. In this chapter I have discussed this difficulty and propose that
the appropriateness of the idealisation of some structure (whether it be a retina or a grand¬
mother cell or a token of a mentalese) is relative to some process or processes operating
over that structure. The suggestion is roughly that an idealisation is appropriate if the(se)
process(es) are causally sensitive to the classification of states that the idealisation imposes.
So whether or not an informational idealisation is appropriate is process relative. A piece
of information that is carried in completely digital form under a process relative idealisation
is said to be explicit relative to that process. Information can only be utilized if the causal
processes operating over the information bearing structure are sensitive to whatever pro¬
perty of the structure encodes that information. That is, information can only be utilized if
it is carried explicit form. The account of explicitness applies equally to linguistic and
non-linguistic structures, and hence equally to symbolic and non-symbolic information pro¬
cessing. Such an information based account provides the prospect of a notion of semantics
which treats symbolic computation as continuous with non-symbolic processing, rather than
sui generis.
In the final chapter, we consider two related problems for the application of informational
notions to mentation, which we have left outstanding - the problems of Misrepresentation
and Detectability.
-155-
Chapter 6: Information and Folk Psychology
6.1 Introduction
On a Dretske/Shannon/Weaver view of information, any structure can be seen as generating
or carrying information. The ripples on a pond carry information about the size and trajec¬
tory of the stone thrown into it; the icicles on the roof carry information about the weather;
the positions of the stars carry information about the time of year; and so on. Of course,
just what information is carried is relative to the informational idealisation that we choose
to apply. That there are icicles on the roof can be taken to carry the information that the
temperature has recently been below 0°C (assuming that we know the freezing point of
water); or equally it can be taken to carry the information that water freezes when at -5°C
(assuming that we know this to have been the recent temperature). Information is ubiqui¬
tous - every process may be viewed as effecting the processing of information. This may
perhaps have the ring of an substantive metaphysical thesis. However, it is no more sub¬
stantive than the observation that any very general framework can be used to describe just
about anything. For example, it is possible to describe arbitrary phenomena using the terms
of number theory. After all, just about anything can be counted - the ripples on a pond, the
icicles on the roof, the visible stars. So the pond can be said to have an odd number of rip¬
ples, the roof may be said to have a prime number of icicles, there may be a triangular
number of visible stars. Notice that just as the informational properties of a situation are
relative to the way in which it is idealised, so are the numerical properties of a situation.
How many fronds or ripples or visible stars there are depends on what we count as a frond
or a ripple or a visible star. Informational properties depend on how we idealise a situation
as a set of propositions', numerical properties depend on how we idealise a situation as a
set of objects. Further, just as almost any process can be seen as processing information,
arbitrary processes can be seen as processing numbers. As the pond settles the number of
ripples changes; the falling of the snow increases the number of icicles; the progression of
the seasons affects the number of visible stars. So, in the sense in which we have used the
terms, the world is full of information and information processing just in the way that the
world is full of numbers and numerical processing. Both informational and numerical
idealisations are sufficiently broad that they can be used to describe just about anything.
The substantive issue of whether or not mental processes should be seen as processing
information (on the technical rather than informal sense) is not whether an informational
idealisation can be applied at all, but whether such an idealisation is useful, explanatory,
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predictive, parsimonious... Of course, we can say that a pond has a odd number of ripples
but such a description is (presumably) no help in understanding, explaining, predicting the
behaviour of the surface of the pond. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
this thesis. In any case, the validity of the informational approach can only be established
by the development of a rigorous and detailed theory of informational semantics. The pro¬
ject of developing Situation Theory (e.g. Barwise, 1989), though embryonic, represents an
important attempt to provide such a theory. Nevertheless, in this chapter, we shall consider
some general issues surrounding question of whether an informational analysis of mental
activity is likely to prove to be appropriate.
6.2 Information and Psychology
A theory of information promises the possibility of providing an account of the content of
non-symbolic and symbolic states and processes, independent of their realisations. In partic¬
ular, we have at least the beginnings of an account of the content of mental states, and the
information processing function of mental processes. It may be hoped that a fully
developed theory of information might be used to explicate what specific mental structures
detect, what features of the environment particular trigger particular behaviours, what is the
informational function of specific mental operations, and so on. In short, an information
based semantics might play an analogous role to that of standard denotational semantics for
symbolic computation. Just as standard semantics provides powerful tools for understand¬
ing symbolic computation, so a putative information-based semantics might provide
methods for analysing the informational processes in general, and mental processes in par¬
ticular.
Ultimately, of course, the interest of informational notions for the study of the mind
depends on whether or not the informational approach can be applied in detail in practice to
specific psychological structures and the processes defined over them. Since a detailed
understanding of the nature of these structures and processes are a very long way off, it
seems plausible that it will not prove possible to properly assess the appropriateness of
informational ideas to psychology for some time. Nonetheless, some theorists have sug¬
gested that we already possess sufficient insight into the nature of thought to make at least
a preliminary assessment of the utility of an informational account of content. It has been
argued (Fodor, 1975) that folk psychological explanation - in particular, the explanation of
behaviour in terms of an organisms beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes - is
covertly assumed by current "information processing" psychology. Further, it is argued
that (appropriately reconstructed) folk-psychological notions must be part of any adequate
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account of mentation. In short, folk psychology is part of real psychology. This position is,
of course, controversial. For example, it has been argued that folk psychology is as radi¬
cally false as other folk science (Churchland, P.M., 1981; Churchland, P.S., 1986); that
only syntactic properties of mental states may play a role in psychological explanation
(Stich, 1983); that the adoption of folk-psychological talk should be construed merely as
adopting an "intentional stance" towards an organism, rather than making substantive
claims about its internal workings (Dennett, 1979). According to this skeptical view, it is
pointless to seek an informational, or any other, analysis of prepositional attitudes, just as it
is pointless to attempt to provide an analysis of phlogiston, vital humours or the terms of
any false theory. So the very fact that Dretske attempts to provide an informational account
of the terms of folk psychology implicitly commits him to a realist stance towards folk
psychology. In this section, we shall not discuss the complex issues surrounding the status
of folk psychology, but rather we shall simply assume that folk-psychology is a part of real
psychology, and consider various considerations which purport to show that an informa¬
tional account of prepositional attitudes is unworkable in principle.
In the last chapter, we noted the inadequacy of an explication of belief, which requires only
that beliefs be appropriately causally efficacious. This raises the wider question of provid¬
ing an adequate account of the various attitudes - belief, desire, hope and so on. However,
in this chapter, we shall leave such matters aside an concentrate instead on informational
accounts of the content of prepositional attitudes. In particular, I shall consider certain argu¬
ments against the possibility of reconstructing even the very simplest content - such as that
the chair or a table or a ferret is present. I shall argue that these arguments are not per¬
suasive. In defending the viability of an informational account I shall also bring out vari¬
ous points about the nature of informational idealisation, which should be of interest
whether or not a realist attitude to folk psychology is adopted.
6.3 Information and the Reconstruction of Folk Psychology
Informational properties are relative to the idealisation chosen. Yet ascriptions of belief,
concepts and other folk psychological notions appear to be absolute. Prima facie, then, the
informational account is inappropriate for analysing such notions. Surely the (absolute) con¬
tent of a prepositional attitude cannot be analysed in terms of (idealisation relative) seman¬
tic content or digital content. However, the possibility remains that there will be some
informational idealisation under which ascriptions of semantic (or digital, or whatever) con¬
tent given by the informational idealisation conform with our pretheoretic intuitions. That
is, perhaps there is some idealisation according to which an informational analysis is able
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to provide a semantics for mental states. It would not be sufficient to show that an organ¬
ism could, according to one particular idealisation, be viewed as digitalising the information
that a chair is present, and that, according to some other particular idealisation, that it may
be viewed as digitalising the information that a table is present. What is required is a single
informational idealisation of organism, environment and the relevant law-like relations
between them, so that the full range of concepts, propositional attitudes, and the like can be
appropriately ascribed at once. We have seen that by altering the informational idealisation
in a variety of ad hoc ways, informational properties can be manipulated in very bizarre,
counterintuitive ways. However, it may be that the constraint of having to account for men¬
tal life globally rather than piecemeal, may rule out these bizarre idealisations. While
perhaps we may reject the general notion of the "one true" informational idealisation, why
should we not hold that, for the purposes of explaining the contents of mental states, there
is "one appropriate" informational idealisation. Of course, providing such a complete infor¬
mational account is a huge and incredibly arduous task - but surely, so far, we have seen
no reason to suppose that it is not possible in principle. In this section, we shall outline
some arguments about the a priori feasibility of providing a global information based
semantics for mental states - what I shall call the global naturalisation programme. Let us
first quickly examine the opposing positions.
i) Global naturalisation of the contents of folk psychological mental states is possible. An
information based account offers the chance of providing a physicalist account of the folk
psychological content ascriptions. Perhaps the most popular account of proposition atti¬
tudes is the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) (Fodor, 1978). According to the
RTM the possession of a propositional attitude involves a relation (of believing, desiring,
fearing) to some mental representation - typically a sentence of an internal "language of
thought". According to RTM, the task of giving a naturalistic account of propositional atti¬
tudes, reduces to the task providing a semantics for this internal system of representation -
where the meanings of sentences of the internal language correspond roughly to the propo¬
sitions in the that clauses of natural language propositional attitudes ascriptions. That is, the
semantics of this system of internal representation corresponds roughly to that of natural
language.
On many accounts (Grice, 1957) the meaning of natural language is derivative on the
meanings of mental states. So there is at least the possibility that an informational account
of the semantics of mental states could be extended to provide an informational account of
linguistic meaning.
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ii) Global naturalisation of the contents of folk psychological mental states is not possible.
While global naturalisation is appealing, there are a number of considerations which may
be taken to show that it is unworkable. If these considerations are held to be persuasive,
then an alternative view of the role of a theory of information is required. As a descriptive
tool of science, it may prove appropriate to adopt a wide variety of idealisations of the
organism/environment. However, it may be that none of these will provide a semantics of
mental processes in terms of dogs, cats, tables and chairs. So informational analysis of
mentation may not reconstruct our intuitive folk psychological ascriptions. This need not be
particularly distressing to theorists who are not committed to folk psychology as a basis for
scientific psychology. If folk psychology is viewed as a naive, false theory of psychology,
then there is no reason to suppose that an informational (or any other) account of proposi-
tional attitudes should be forthcoming.
Dretske proposes that the contents of folk psychological mental states can be explicated in
terms of his notion of semantic content (as long as the property encoding that content
causally influences output). Yet we noted in 3.8 that if P is the semantic content of Q, then
this has the consequence that P and Q track each other - that is, then P and Q lawfully co-
occur. Consider the case of a putative ferret detector. If the firing of some cell, or the
tokening of some symbol of the language of thought, has as its semantic content "ferret
here", then that cell must fire, or that symbol be tokened, if and only if there is a ferret
present. Yet, given the fallibility of our perception of the world, surely this condition is far
too strong, in both directions. Firstly, surely there will ferrets that are not detected.
Secondly, surely there will be false alarms, when no ferret is actually present. These possi¬
bilities correspond to the two problems with which we shall be concerned: the Detectability
Problem, and the Misrepresentation Problem.
1. The Detectability Problem: If some ferrets go undetected, then the firing of the ferret
detector carries additional information, over and above that a ferret is present - for example,
that a ferret is present and not behind the fence. So the semantic content of the state of the
detector is not that a ferret is present, since this information is not carried in completely
digital form. In short, since it seems inevitable that some ferrets will go undetected, the
constraint that the information that a ferret present cannot be the semantic content of the
internal state of any organism. Yet if semantic content is the basis for propositional atti¬
tudes such as belief, this means that no organism can have beliefs about ferrets. In short,
(complete) digitalisation is too hard.
2. The Misrepresentation Problem. If the ferret detector occasionally fires when no ferret is
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present, then the information that a ferret is present is not carried at all by the firing of the
detector, by the facticity of information. Hence, ipso facto, this information is not carried in
digital form. So perhaps not only is digitalisation too hard, but carrying information at all
is too hard.
The discussion of these issues will fall into two parts. Firstly, in 6.4 and 6.5, I outline
various ways in which the problems of Detectability and Misrepresentation may be avoided.
In particular, we shall see that adversion to idealisation relativity may considerably alleviate
these difficulties. Nonetheless, we shall find that this strategy is ultimately unworkable - if
we are to base an account of propositional attitudes, the problems of Detectability and
Misrepresented must be faced head on. Hence, we shall consider how the problems of
Detectability and Misrepresentation may be reconciled with an informational account of
folk psychological propositional attitudes. Dretske's own proposal to account for misattune-
ment is introduced and rejected. In the final section, a general framework for the relation¬
ship between information idealisations and folk-psychology is proposed.
6.4 The Detectability Problem: Digitalisation is too hard
The Detectability Problem is that certain signals appear inevitably to carry unexpected and
unwanted additional information. We noted above that, if there are occasions on which a
ferret is present, but that the ferret detector does not fire, then the firing of the ferret detec¬
tor carries additional information over and above that there is a ferret present. For exam¬
ple, it carries the more specific information that the ferret has been detected and is not
behind the fence. So the information that a ferret is present is not carried in digital form.
Thus no internal structure will have the content that a ferret is present.
Notice that this problem may be alleviated simply by employing the notion of digitalisation
tout court, rather following Dretske's use of complete digitalisation (semantic content), as
the foundation for the explanation of propositional attitudes. For although a signal may
carry lots of unwanted additional information, much of this information may be -classed as
irrelevant. Since (at least part of) the point of perceptual activity is to allow the organism
to leam about the state of its environment the criterion of relevance to be determined by
some (more or less intuitive judgement) of what information is about the state of the
environment (rather than, for example, the state of the perceiver). So although the
detector's firing may carry additional information, on a reasonable idealisation, it may not
relevant additional information. So the information may be carried in digital form, if not in
completely digital form.
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In the example of the lookout and the smugglers, the waving of the lamp carries the infor¬
mation that the smugglers are approaching, but also the information that the lookout is
awake. According to our rational reconstruction of Dretske, such examples were precisely
what motivated the introduction of the notion of relevance - and hence the derivation of
digitalisation tout court from the more basic notion of semantic content. The restriction to
relevant propositions allows us to ignore all sorts of unwanted additional information. This
move deals with Barry Loewer's criticism of Dretske's account:
"...r's being R cannot have as its semantic content... information that we associate with
belief contents, for example, that s is a dog, at least not if r [sic. presumably R is intend¬
ed] is a neurophysiological property. The trouble is that r's being R will carry information
about other neurophysiological states... since if r is R, then the organism must have previ¬
ously been in certain other neurophysiological states." (Loewer, 1983: 76)
Loewer does not give any examples, but they are easy to find. For instance, adapting the
case of the lookout and the smugglers, suppose that the observer's ferret detector only fires
when the observer is awake. So the firing of the detector carries not just the information
that a ferret is present, but the additional information that the observer is conscious. Yet
this is information about the organism and not the environment. So, on any reasonable
idealisation, it will not count as genuine additional information, but be excluded as
irrelevant.
Or consider an non-deterministic detector, which fires, on average, half of the time that a
ferret is present due to a "loose connection". The firing of the detector will, in this case,
carry the information that the connection is closed in addition to the information that a fer¬
ret is present. The detector carries information which is not simply determined by the state
of the environment but also by a source internal to the organism (the closed-open state of
the loose connection). Since this additional information is about the state of the organism,
rather than the state of the environment, it is precisely the kind of information that will be
excluded by the relevance criterion, and hence will not count as genuine additional informa¬
tion. Clearly such an non-deterministic detector does not track the whether or not a ferret is
present - indeed, by adjusting the probability with which the loose connection is closed, it
may fail detect an arbitrarily high proportion of ferrets. Nonetheless, it may still carry the
information that a ferret is present in digital form, since, although it carries additional infor¬
mation, over and above that a ferret is present, this information is irrelevant to the state of
the environment.
However, the Detectability Problem recurs even if we replace the requirement that a puta¬
tive ferret detector must have the information that a ferret is present as its semantic content,
with the more lenient requirement that this information must only be carried in digital form,
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relative to some appropriate relevance restriction
Recall that, if we are to provide a global naturalisation of prepositional attitudes in informa¬
tional terms, then the idealisation of the environment must be rich enough to capture the
content of any prepositional attitude. Given such a rich idealisation there is the possibility
that a detector may carry unexpected fine-grained additional information.
Let us consider a metal detector, the purpose of which is, of course, to detect metal. So one
might conjecture that the wailing of a successful metal detector carries the information that
metal is present in digital form. Yet a metal detector does not detect just any metal. It does
not detect metal on Mars, iron filings, or metal deposits buried thousands of feet under¬
ground. So surely the wailing of the detector carries additional information - that the metal
is sufficiently near and sufficiently large for the detector to register it, and so on. In the
same way, surely the ferret detector of our example carries additional information about the
location of the ferret, that it is not night time, that the ferret is not occluded by the fence,
and so on. Such considerations appear to apply quite generally to arty detector system.
Just what particular additional information is carried is, of course, idealisation relative. In
the discussion so far we have stressed the importance of the idealisation of the signal and
the environment. In this instance, however, both of these factors are fixed. The idealisation
of the signal is simply taken to be the on-off state of the detector. The idealisation of the
environment is some characterisation which is sufficiently rich to capture the content of any
prepositional attitude. This does not, however, mean that there is no room for genuine
idealisation relativity. For informational properties are relative not only to the characterisa¬
tion of the signal and the environment, but also to the informational constraints which are
captured by the idealisation. What informational constraints are naturally included in the
idealisation depends how specifically we intend to idealise that situation. Let us illustrate
this point with an example.
Consider Eric the butterfly, who detects a mate by the presence of the distinctive two red
spots Get us assume, for the moment, that pairs of red spots occur only on the wings of
female butterflies, so that the information that a female butterfly is present is carried). What
information is carried by the firing of Eric's female_butterfiy detector? There are a variety
of answers, depending on the specificity of the idealisation.
i) If it is 3.30 in the afternoon, Eric has settled on an oak tree, and Eric and Ethel are the
only butterflies in the vicinity at that time, then the firing of Eric's detector carries the
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information that Ethel is near the oak tree at 3.30 (in the de dicto sense - that is it Ethel
who is near). Given this background information it is possible to learn of Ethel's proxim¬
ity to the oak tree at that time from the firing of Eric's detector. For, since Ethel is the only
other butterfly in the area, and hence the only other possible source of the two.red spots,
then it must be Ethel who is present.
ii) Suppose that the population of butterflies in the vicinity is unspecified. According to this
less specific idealisation, we can learn only that some female butterfly is near the oak tree,
at 3.30.
iii) If the time is unspecified, then the firing of the detector carries only the information that
some female butterfly was near the oak tree once.
iv) If Eric's location is not specified, then the firing specifies just that some female butterfly
was near Eric once.
and so on.
Of course, it would be misleading to suggest that there is a strict order of specificity of
idealisations of this situation. Rather, arbitrary combinations of background knowledge
may or may not be taken into account in the informational idealisation. For present pur¬
poses, the moral is simply that as the description of the situation becomes less and less
specific, the signal carries less additional information. On a very specific idealisation of the
situation, the detector carries the information that it is Ethel who is present. Such an ideali¬
sation may not apply to a similar event the next day - for it may be that in that situation
some other butterfly is in the area. So on a more general idealisation, the information is not
carried. This suggests that if our informational idealisation is sufficiently general, perhaps
all unwanted additional information can be eliminated. In other words, is it possible to
make the idealisation so non-specific that the only information carried by a signal is what
we intuitively take to be its content*?
The use of general rather specific idealisation is inherently appealing, given the goal of pro¬
viding an account of propositional attitudes in informational terms. After all, the beliefs of
*It is perhaps worth stressing that the specificity of an idealisation, in this sense, is a function of which informational
dependencies are included in the idealisations. It is not a matter of the coarseness of the grain at which the environment is
idealised. We found, in 4.9, that by making the characterisation of the environment very impoverished, informational proper¬
ties - such as whether some piece of information is carried in analog or digital form - could be radically manipulated. The
present point is that informational properties are also dependent on how rich is the characterisation of the informational depen¬
dencies between states.
-164-
an organisms are stable across whatever the specific details of the situations in which it
finds itself. So an informational idealisation which presupposed such specific details would
ipso facto be inappropriate.
In the case of the metal detector, however, there seems to be no idealisation, of whatever
generality, which does not carry some unwanted additional information, over and above
that metal is present. Since the detector is only triggered by sufficiently near, sufficiently
large pieces of metal, it seems that it must necessarily carries additional information about
the location and amount of metal. So the state of the metal detector does not carry the
information that metal is present in digital form. If digitalisalion is a prerequisite for propo-
sitional attitudes such as belief, then this implies that the detector cannot believe that metal
is present. This conclusion is hardly disturbing for the proponent of an information-based
semantics for prepositional attitudes - for, after all, no-one ever suspected that metal detec¬
tors could have such beliefs. Nonetheless, this case does present a challenge to the attempt
to provide an informational account of prepositional attitudes. If metal detectors necessarily
carry additional information, over and above that metal is present, why do the same con¬
siderations not apply to people too? How is it that a putative mental state which responds
to metal (my internal "metal detector") need not carry additional information, and hence can
carry the information that metal is present in digital form?
Dretske (1983) exploits what appears to be a crucial difference between the way in which
people and metal detectors respond to metal. While the state of a metal detectors is deter¬
mined by a single causal mechanism, human beliefs about metal may arise from arbitrary
sources. My internal "metal detector" may fire because I have seen metal, or heard a metal¬
lic clanging, or been told that metal is near, and so on.
"There are an unlimited number of ways of getting the information that s is a dog. Why
couldn't a variety of such different causal lines converge on a structure so that the struc¬
ture itself, though carrying information about the remote source of these fines (the dog),
carried no information about which fine joins it to the source? ...such patterns for the
delivery of information could representationally "skip" the more proximal causal an¬
tecedents to yield a structure whose semantic content applied directly to the more distal
condition." (Dretske, 1983:88)
It might be admitted that, in general, my beliefs about the presence of metal may be fixated
in arbitrarily many ways. However, there will be particular circumstances in which the
cause of my beliefs that metal is present is just as constrained as the cause of the wailing
of the metal detector. In particular, if I am operating the metal detector to search a field for
treasure, and there is no metal to be seen above ground, then the only cause of my belief
that metal is present will be the wailing of the metal detector. If the metal detector carries
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additional, unwanted information about the proximity and amount of metal, then so must
my belief. So how can digitalisation be a prerequisite for belief, since in this case, my
belief that a ferret is present does not digitally code the information that a ferret is present?
This objection assumes that we are adopting a specific idealisation of the situation in which
I am looking for metal. In particular, this idealisation is specific to the fact that I am in in a
field in which there is no visible (or audible) metal, and so that the only way that I can
come to believe that metal is present is in virtue of the wailing of the metal detector. Yet,
as we pointed out above, it is hardly surprising that additional, unwanted information
(about the nearness and amount of metal) is carried on a specific idealisation. The amount
of unwanted additional information carried is dependent on the specificity of the idealisa¬
tion. According to a more general idealisation (which does not, for example, specify the
location at which I am conducting my search for treasure), then I might believe that metal
is present simply because I come across a spent shotgun cartridge, or because I see a pass¬
ing car or a tractor in the next field. According to a general idealisation the additional infor¬
mation about the nearness and amount of metal that, though carried by the metal detector,
is not carried by my belief.
In short, in general it is the case that beliefs have (almost) arbitrary origins, and so addi¬
tional information which is specific to those origins is not carried. In particular cases,
beliefs may be caused only by some specific causal route, and, according to an idealisation
specific to such particular cases, additional information will be carried. However, in
attempting to provide an account of prepositional attitudes it is precisely the general case in
which we are interested.
These considerations appear to show that the Detectability Problem can be diffused. Unfor¬
tunately, the Detectability Problem returns in a new form. The firing of an 'X-detector
surely invariably carries the information that the X has been detected, whatever the causal
route which causes the detector to fire. However I detect the presence of the ferret - by
seeing it, smelling it, hearing it, or being told about it - it is trivially true that the ferret has
been detected. However, unless the detector tracks the presence of X's, and hence fires
every time an X is present, this information is not nested within the information that an X is
present. Hence, the information (that an X is detected) counts as genuine additional infor¬
mation - and so state of the detector does not carry the information that an X is present in
digital form*. So, unless every X is detected, the information that an X is present will be
*One natural response is that the property of detectability is a bizarre relational property between organism and en¬
vironment, and so that X detected propositions tiger detected can reasonably be excluded from set of relevant propositions
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undigitalisable - and, according to an account on which digitalisation is a prerequisite for
belief, unbelievable! So the problem with which we started has returned.
We noted above that if to hold the belief that a ferret is present involves possessing some
internal state which has the semantic content that a ferret is present, then such an internal
state must track the presence and absence of ferrets. That is, such an internal state, the
putative "ferret detector", must "fire" when and only when a ferret is present. It was sug¬
gested that this apparently excessively rigorous condition might be relaxed, by requiring not
that the information must be completely digitalised, but merely digitalised tout court.
Further, it was suggested that if the informational idealisation of the situation was
sufficiently non-specific, much unwanted additional information might be eliminated. The
hope was that the detector might carry the information that a ferret is present in digital
form even if not all ferrets are detected - and thus reconcile the informational account of
belief with the fallibility of perception. Unfortunately, it seems that despite these moves,
tracking may be necessary after all.
In practice, of course, tracking cannot be achieved. A ferret or tiger may be present but
under a bush, behind a tree, creeping up behind me, and so on. Hence, it seems that an
internal ferret or tiger detector cannot digitalise the information that a ferret or a tiger is
present, but merely that a ferret is detected or a tiger is noticed. So, we seem to be forced
to the unpalatable conclusion that according to an informational analysis, beliefs turn out
not to be about the world, but the perceiver's knowledge.
So the Detectability Problem cannot be avoided simply by switching from complete digital¬
isation to digitalisation. So we shall face up to the Detectability Problem directly.
6.5 The Misrepresentation Problem: Carrying information is too hard.
According to the informational account, to believe that an X is present requires that this
information be digitalised. In the last section we found that, however general the idealisa¬
tion of the situation, there may inevitably be additional unwanted information carried by the
state of an X detector, unless X are always successfully detected. So although the informa¬
tion may be carried, it may not be carried in digital form. The Misrepresentation Problem
about the environment. Unfortunately, although this makes it possible to believe that a ferret is present, on an informational
account, it has the consequence that it is impossible to believe that you have detected a ferret. For, by definition, a piece of
information can only be the digital content of signal if it is relevant. So according to any idealisation whose relevance require¬
ment rules that the information that a ferret has been detected is irrelevant, this information cannot be coded in digital form.
Given that digitalisation is here taken to be a prerequisite for belief, then, according to such an idealisation, the proposition
that the ferret has been detected is quite literally unbelievable. Since, as noted above, our goal is to find a single informational
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is rather more basic. Since information is factive, if some state carries the information that
an X is present, then an X must be present (in the terms of Dretske's original definition of
information content, the conditional probability of an X being present, given that state, must
be 1). This means that if the putative "ferret detector" can "fire" when no ferret is present,
then the firing of the detector does not carry the information that a ferret is present at all,
let alone in digital form. It seems to be inappropriate to characterise belief in factive terms.
For surely I can mistakenly believe that a ferret is present when I hear a rabbit rustling in
the bushes, or see a squirrel through the undergrowth. In short, how can misrepresentation
of the world be captured with a factive notion of information.
As in the case of the Detectability Problem, the Misrepresentation Problem may to some
extent be alleviated by exploiting the idealisation relativity of informational properties*.
Prima facie, the possibility of error appears to immediately rule out an informational
analysis of belief. For example, a hologram of granny, or a tiger or a ferret, is more than
likely to lead to a spurious belief that granny, or a tiger or a ferret is present. So-surely my
belief that granny, or a tiger or a ferret is present cannot carry the information that granny,
or a tiger or a ferret is present, even when, as it happens, I am looking at the real thing.
However, although the possibility of error does entail that information is not carried, what
counts a as possibility is dependent on the specificity of the informational idealisation
adopted. We shall make this point first by reconsidering the case of the butterfly, and then
return the human ability to detect grannies, tigers and ferrets.
Recall that Eric detects a mate purely in virtue of his sensitivity to pairs of nearby red
spots. We noted that since the only pairs of red spots in that part of the jungle are caused
by a female butterfly, the firing of Eric's female_butterfiy detector carries the information
that a female butterfly is present. However, just as human perception can be deceived, so
can Eric's. Indeed, since Eric's perceptual system is so simple, all sorts of non-female
butterflies may trigger his detector - the L.E.D. watch of a passing explorer, adjacent red
mushrooms, a field of tulips, and so on. Whether or not these are considered to be genuine
possibilities depends on the idealisation of the situation in which Eric's detector fires.
Consider a very specific idealisation of the situation in which Eric and Ethel meet on a tree
in the jungle, and Eric's detector fires. According to such an idealisation, it is simply not
possible that Eric's detector is spuriously triggered by an explorer's watch, or a pair of
mushrooms or a field of tulips. For, as it happens, there are no explorers in the area at the
idealisation to account the contents of all propositional attitudes, this consequence is, of course, unacceptable.
*This line is plausible only if we are considering beliefs which are relatively directly generated by perception. Dretske
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moment, no red mushrooms grow in the jungle (or that part of the jungle), and Eric is in an
equatorial rainforest where, of course, there are no fields of tulips. So, given a very specific
idealisation of the situation, there is no possibility that the firing of the detector is spurious.
A less specific idealisation might not specify whether or not an explorer is nearby at the
time. According to such an idealisation it is possible that the detector is triggered by the
explorer's L.E.D. watch. Hence, the firing of Eric's detector does not carry the information
that a female butterfly is present, since the detector cannot distinguish female butterflies
from L.E.D. watches. Taking a coarser idealisation still of the situation, which makes no
reference to Eric's location, then the detector might indeed be triggered by a pair of mush¬
rooms, or a field of tulips.
The same point may be made in the case of human perception. Suppose that I go to the
fruitshop and select an apple, correctly believing it to be an apple. However, given that I
am unable to perceptually distinguish real apples from wax apples, I should also' form this
belief even if I had selected a wax apple. Does this mean that my belief does not carry the
information that what I have selected is an apple? As before, whether or not the presence
of a wax apple counts as a genuine possibility depends on the specificity of the idealisation
of the apple choosing situation. According to a specific idealisation, since all the apples in
the shop are real, it is not possible that the apple that I select is in fact a wax replica.
According to such an idealisation, my belief does carry the information that what I have
selected is an apple. On the other hand, according to a less specific idealisation, according
to which I might equally be in the fruitshop or the joke shop next door (where wax apples
are sold in plenty), the information that what I have selected is an apple is not necessarily
carried by my belief.
Similar considerations apply in the holograms examples. If I see a tiger in the zoo, then, on
a specific idealisation, it is not possible that my belief that a tiger is present is caused by a
hologram - since the zoo does not have any holograms. Hence, according to such an ideali¬
sation, the information that a tiger is present is carried by my belief. According to a
broader idealisation, which does not specify whether or not I am at the zoo or at Madame
Tussaud's, the possibility that I am looking at a hologram may be a genuine possibility.
Hence, on this more general idealisation, the information is not carried.
Information transmission is typically governed by dependencies which are reliable only
within some particular context. The thermometer tells the temperature if it is not broken, if
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the temperature is not above 40° C and so on. Wet pavements carry the information that it
has rained recently - but not near a lawn sprinkler, a car wash, or a leaking water main.
The presence of smoke carries the information that there must be fire - but not at a pop-
concert, or near a toaster. Gibsonian "ecological laws" - laws by which the structure of the
environment is specified by the structure of the sensory input - have this context sensitive
character. For example, the time-to-contact of a directly approaching object is specified by
the expansion of the image of that object (Lee, 1980); the relative depths of nearby objects
is specified by binocular disparity (Braddick, 1980). Such laws may be violated in outside
the organism's natural ecological niche. For example, time-to-contact illusions may be
induced in the laboratory by, for example, projecting a film of an expanding image on a
static screen (Schiff & Detweiler 1979). Depth illusions can be induced by viewing ran¬
dom dot stereograms through coloured spectacles (Frisby, 1980). However, this does not
mean that time-to-contact or relative depth information is not specified, even in the natural
environment - for such cases do not occur in that environment*.
The idealisation relativity of information has allowed us to alleviate (at least to some
extent) both the problems of detectability and misrepresentation. In the case of detectabil-
ity, the more general the idealisation, the less unwanted additional information carried. In
the case of misrepresentation, the more specific the idealisation the more unwanted coun¬
terexamples are eliminated as not genuine possibilities.
Given the above discussion it seems that, prima facie it is may seem at least conceivable
that the Detectability and Misrepresentation Problems may be avoided by a judicious choice
of idealisation - sufficiently general so that the signal carries no additional information, and
sufficiently specific that there is no possibility of erroneous detection. However, the feasi¬
bility of this rather difficult balancing act may be a matter of purely technical interest. For,
I shall argue, any account which attempts to provide an informational account of preposi¬
tional attitudes must face the problems of Detectability and Misrepresentation head on.
(1981: 212) explicitly notes that his account of belief is only intended to apply to such cases.
♦Ecological psychologists have stressed that the possibility of illusion in an artificial context in no way entails that en¬
vironmental information is perceptually specified in the natural environment (e.g. Gibson, 1979). The same issues arise in
epistemology, where the question is whether or not the possibility of illusion under some circumstances necessarily makes cer¬
tainty impossible (Goldman 1979). Indeed, the line that we have adopted here is directly analogous to Dretske's (1981) anti-
skeptical arguments, although Dretske does not, of course, frame his discussion in terms of idealisation relativity.
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6.6 Facing Detectability and Misrepresentation
Folk psychology ascribes beliefs and desires to people (and animals) in order to explain
their behaviour. A typical case folk-psychological explanation is the following rationale for
my going into the next office. I have the desire to write some notes on a paper, and the
belief that this requires the use of a pen. Hence I have the consequent desire to find a pen.
However, I also believe that there is no pen in my office, but that I might be able to bor¬
row one next door - I thus want to know if this is true. A natural way of finding out
involves getting up and going into the next office. So I get up and go to the next office. Of
course, the exact formulation of and level of detail of such an explanation may be varied.
For example, perhaps the explanation should include the reason that I did not instead shout
"Have you got a spare pen" to the people next door - reasons which would presumably
involve my beliefs about tacit social conventions, my desire not to flout them, and so on.
Whatever the precise nature and depth of folk psychological explanations, they will fre¬
quently involve explanation of behaviour in terms not just of veridical beliefs, but of false
beliefs. For example, my going into the next office to look for a pen may be unnecessary,
since there is one in my coat pocket. My behaviour is explained in terms of my false belief
that there is no pen in my office. Even in a more directly perceptual case, I may see a pen
on my desk but falsely believe that it is pencil. This is, of course, not just an in principle
possibility, but a matter of everyday experience - it is difficult to tell certain kinds of pencil
from certain types of pen (particularly if they are part of the same set), until you look very
closely, or start writing. Our folk psychological explanations crucially involve reference to
such difficulties. I go into the next office looking for a pen, even though there is one on
my desk, because I don't realise that it is a pencil. Or I go to pick up a pencil, with which
to write a cheque, because I believe it to be a pen. Any reconstruction of the semantics of
prepositional attitudes must provide an account of how it is possible to misidentify as well
as correctly identify things. It must provide an understanding of mwattunement as well as
attunemenL
The hope of avoiding the problems of Detectability and Misrepresentation rests on the pos¬
sibility that, according to some appropriate idealisation of the situation, belief and world
will be properly attuned - for example, that if the object is a pen, then I believe that it is,
and vice versa. However, a reconstruction of the terms of folk psychology requires that we
account for, rather than find some way of eliminating, cases of misattunement.
Notice that the case in which I mistake a pen for a pencil, and hence set off on an unneces¬
sary search, may be viewed as giving rise to both the Detectability Problem and the
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Misrepresentation Problem. Firstly, with respect to my beliefs about pens, my miscategori-
sation amounts to a failure to detect a pen. Hence, in some situation in which I do
correctly identify something as a pen, my belief cannot carry this information, in digital
form. For my belief also carries the more specific information that the object has been
identified as a pen. This information is more specific, since not all pens are detected.
Secondly, with respect to my beliefs about pencils, the same miscategorisation of a pen as
a pencil, my error amounts to a misrepresentation of a non-pencil as a pencil. Since infor¬
mation is factive, my belief that this object is a pencil cannot carry the information that it is
a pencil. In sum, a miscategorisation that is an instance of the Detectability Problem from
one standpoint is equally an instance of the Misrepresentation Problem from another*. So
the problems of Detectability and Misrepresentation are closely related - they are both
consequences of the misattunement of belief and the environment. If misattunement cannot
be reconciled with the factive character of information, an informational account of proposi-
tional attitudes is unworkable. The rest of this chapter will be concerned with various
attempts to tackle this issue. In the next section, I shall discuss Dretske's own account,
and a recent proposal due to Fodor (1987). I shall argue that of these approaches are inade¬
quate, and, in the final section, outline a rather different, though related, solution.
6.7 Dretske on Misattunement
Dretske proposes that a distinction must be drawn between the informational properties of a
token of some type (e.g. some internal state corresponding to some belief) and the type
itself. He proposes that the informational properties of a type are determined during a
prescribed learning period - during which the type acquires as "life of its own".
"Suppose that during the period L a system is exposed to a variety of signals, some of
which contain the information that certain things are F, others of which contain the infor¬
mation that other things not F. The system is capable of picking up and coding this infor¬
mation in analog form... but, at the onset of L, is incapable of digitalising this information.
Suppose, furthermore, that during L the system develops a way of digitalising the informa¬
tion that something is F: a certain type of internal state evolves which is selectively sensi¬
tive to the information that s is F... Once this structure is developed, it acquires a life of
its own, so to speak, and is capable of conferring on its subsequent tokens (particular in¬
stances of that structure type) its semantic content (the content it acquired during L)
whether or not these subsequent tokens actually have this as their informational content...
The meaning of a structure derives from the informational origins of that structure, but a
structure type can have its origins in information about the F-ness of things without every
(indeed without any) subsequent token of that type having this information as its origin."
(Dretske, 1981:193)
Of course, adversion to the prescribed learning period only insofar as the prescribed
*Of course, there are exceptions to this - for example, in failing to detect a pen, I need not necessarily mischaracterise
it as a pencil or anything else - I may simply fail to notice it, or it may be lying out of sight.
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learning period is less problematic that the subsequent period. Dretske suggests that:
"In the learning situation special care is taken to see that incoming signals have an inten¬
sity, a strength, sufficient unto delivering the required piece of information to the learning
subject... Such precautions are taken in the learning situation... in order to ensure that an
internal structure is developed with the appropriate semantic content, and internal structure
which constitutes a (complete) digitalisation of the information that s is F...
But once we have meaning, once the subject has articulated a structure that is selectively
sensitive to information about the F-ness of things, instances of this structure, tokens of
this type, can be triggered by signals that lack the appropriate piece of information. When
this occurs, the subject believes that 5 is F but, because this token of the structure type
was not produced by the information that s is F, the subject does not know that 5 is F.
And if, in fact, s is not F, the subject falsely believes that s is /." (Dretske, 1981: 194-195)
Let us put Dretske's point in the terms of one of our previous examples. Suppose that I
look at a wax apple, and, being unable to differentiate wax apples from real apples, believe
that a real apple is before me. Hence, by the facticity of information, this particular token
of my belief that a real apple is before does not carry the information that a real apple is
before me. Dretske proposes that, nonetheless, the type of internal state which is associated
with this belief may have the semantic content (completely digitalise) that an apple is
before me - for the digital content of the type is determined purely by what that internal
state responded to during the learning period. Assuming that the learning period occurred
in an environment in which there were no wax apples, then, Dretske argues, the tokens of
that belief, during the learning period, did have the semantic content that a (real) apples is
before me. If the content of the type is fixed purely by the content of the belief-tokens dur¬
ing the learning period, then the belief type may have the semantic content that an apple is
before me, even if later tokens do not. It is this cleavage between the informational proper¬
ties of type and token which allows for the possibility of misattunement.
I shall consider four objections to this view, in increasing order of importance. Firstly, the
distinction between learning period and subsequent use seems at best rather artificial.
Secondly, the learning period itself need not be free of spurious instances - children come
across wax apples as often as adults. According to Dretske's view, this seems to raise the
worrying possibility that an unwitting parent might impair a child's conceptual system for
life, simply by mistakenly presenting a wax apple as real! Dretske appeals to the difference
between the information that is carried by tokens and types. It has been stressed in the
present analysis that it is propositions, rather than, say, objects that carry information.
According to Dretske's account, these propositions must be of the form s is F. Yet surely
to say that some object s has the property F is equivalent to saying that some token s is of
type F. Accordingly, it makes sense to say that the proposition that some token is of some
type carries some information, but not to say that a token or a type themselves carry
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information. A fortiori it is inappropriate to attempt to contrast the information carried by
token and type. More significantly, however, Jerry Fodor (1987) raises a much more fun¬
damental objection:
Consider a trainee who comes to produce 'A' tokens in A circumstances during the learn¬
ing period. And suppose that the teacher does his job and ensures that only A's elicit 'A'
tokenings in the course of training... At some time later... the erstwhile trainee encounters
an instance of a B and produces an 'A' tokening in causal consequence thereof. The idea
is, of course, that this B-elicited tokening of 'A' is ipso facto wild [it is a case of misat-
tunement] and, since it happened after the training ended, it has the (false) content that A.
But this won't work; it ignores counterfactuals that are clearly relevant to determining
which symbol-to-world correlation the training has brought about. Imagine, in particular,
what would have happened if an instance of B had occurred during the training period.
Presumably what would have happened is this: it would have caused a tokening of 'A'.
After all, B's are supposed to be sufficient to cause 'A' tokenings after training; that's the
very supposition upon which Dretske's treatment of wild if a B had occurred during train¬
ing, it too would have brought about an 'A'. But that means, of course, that if you take
account of the relevant counterfactuals, then the correlation that training established is
(not between instances of A and tokenings of 'A' but) between instances of A v B and to¬
kenings of 'A'... If 'A's are correlated with (A v B)s, then the content of a tokening of
'A' is that A v B. So a B-caused 'A' tokening isn't false... [and so the problem of misat-
tunement has not been addressed after all]" (Fodor, 1987:104)
Using our example of real and wax apples Fodor's point might be put as follows. Even I
am shown only genuine apples during the learning period, this does not mean that my
belief during that period is selectively responsive to apples. For although the tokening of
this belief has been perfectly correlated with the presence of instances of the category
REAL APPLE, it has also been perfectly correlated with instances of the more general
category REAL OR WAX APPLES. How are we to decide which of these categories is
really the category to which the belief is really responding to? Surely by asking with which
category is the correlation lawlike. This question involves appeal to the relevant counterfac¬
tuals. Namely, if a wax_apple had been presented during the learning period, would the
belief that an apple is before me have been tokened? If a wax apple had been presented, a
belief it is surely undeniable that such a belief would have been tokened - since, after all,
such tokening does occur, by hypothesis, when a wax apple is presented after the learning
period is over. So during the learning period the belief is really in lawlike correlation with
REAL OR WAX APPLE, rather than REAL APPLE - hence the later belief tokening in
response to of a previously unencountered wax apple is not an instance of misrepresenta¬
tion at all. The content of the belief acquired during the learning period is that there is a
real_or_wax apple before me, rather than simply that there is a real apple before me.
A precisely similar difficulty arises for the analogous attempt to solve the Detectability
Problem (with which Dretske does not deal). Suppose that the appropriate belief is not tok¬
ened if some rather peculiar and previously unencountered apple is presented - perhaps a
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Russet. This is an instance of the Detectability Problem, since the belief is responsive only
to non-Russet apples. Hence it does not carry the information that the apple before me is a
apple in digital form - it also carries the additional information that it is a non-Russet apple.
If the learner has never actually encountered a Russet, then the tokening of the belief dur¬
ing the period is perfectly correlated both with instances of the category APPLE and the
more specific category APPLES EXCEPT RUSSETS. By precisely repeating the above rea¬
soning, it is clear that the lawlike correlation is with the latter category (since had a russet
been presented during the learning period, it would not have tokened the relevant belief).
Hence the failure to token the relevant belief in response to a previously unencountered
russet does not involve misattunement after all - for the content of belief acquired during
the learning period is assigned the content that there is an apple_except_russet before me.
Hence, Dretske's invocation of the learning period is unable to show how either of the
problems of Detectability and Misrepresentation can be consonant with an informational
account of propositional attitudes. In the final section, I shall propose that an informa¬
tional idealisation may be properly viewed as prescribing, as well as describing the
behaviour of a system. According to this construal, misattunement is simply a matter of the
failure of the behaviour of the system to match up to the prescription that the informational
idealisation provides.
6.8 Prescriptive Informational Idealisation
First let us identify two distinct, although related, questions:
i) How is a (factive) informational account to be able to account for mwattunement? Prima
facie, it might seem that it may be necessary to elaborate the apparatus of the present
approach to account for error. However, we shall see below that nothing more than a
change of attitude towards the function of the informational idealisation is required.
ii) In view of the misattunement (the problems of Detectability and Misrepresentation) how
can a naturalised (i.e. purely physicalistic) account of the content of propositional attitudes
be provided? I shall argue that the change of attitude that is suggested for i) is a prere¬
quisite for providing a solution to ii) - although, as we shall see, this change of attitude
merely characterises rather than solves the problem that is faced in providing an informa¬
tional analysis of propositional attitudes.
In the following discussion these issues will be addressed in turn. Let us begin with an
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analogy. Suppose that a scientist is faced with the task of understanding the operation of
some physical system - for example, the swinging of a pendulum. The scientist might con¬
jecture that the pendulum may be idealised as a freely swinging point mass, and thus that
the period of the pendulum swings is constant. However, it turns out, after careful observa¬
tion, that the periodicity is actually rather erratic. Assuming that the laws of mechanics are
not called into question, such recalcitrant behaviour will be taken to imply that the idealisa¬
tion is inadequate - perhaps there is an unsuspected driving force or frictional component
acting, which causes the behaviour of the pendulum to depart from the behaviour predicted
using the mathematical idealisation. To correct for this, the idealisation will be revised by
adding various additional terms and seeing whether or not these account for the behaviour
of the pendulum. Various experiments may be performed using the pendulum, to test
between the different idealisations which may be suggested. Various possibilities will be
explored until the scientist is satisfied that the predictions of the mathematical idealisation
correspond sufficiently well with the behaviour of the real pendulum (or the enterprise is
abandoned!).
Crucially, in cases of scientific investigation, a mismatch between the idealisation and the
world is taken to throw into question the validity of the idealisation. Recalcitrant experi¬
mental findings cannot be ignored on the basis that the idealisation is valid, but that the
world is simply not behaving as it should! For the scientist, an idealisation or a theory can
be in error but the world cannot - for the goal of science is to describe the structure of the
world, whatever it may be.
Consider now the clock-maker, who has a rather different attitude. The clock-maker has a
very specific idealisation of the behaviour of the pendulum in mind - specifically one in
which the periodicity of the pendulum swings is constant, and hence the clock keeps regu¬
lar time. The clock-maker too observes a mismatch between the actual, irregular behaviour
of the pendulum and this idealisation. Yet in this case, the idealisation is not seen as error-
ful, but the clock is diagnosed as malfunctioning. That is, for the clock-maker it is the
world rather than the idealisation which should be changed. The clock-maker may propose
and test various explanations of this departure from the intended behaviour, and will
modify the pendulum (adding oil, changing the angle of the swing, setting the clock to be
closer to the vertical and so on) until it conforms to the specified idealisation - the period is
regular and the clock keeps good time. Where the scientist modifies the idealisation to
account for a mismatch, the clock-maker modifies the world in order to bring it into line
with the idealisation.
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More generally, consider the difference of attitude of a scientist and a mechanic. If the
behaviour of a system departs from that predicted by its physical idealisation, the scientist
changes the idealisation. The mechanic, by contrast, changes (repairs) the system so that it
conforms to the idealisation. The scientist intends the idealisation to describe the behaviour
of the system under study. The mechanic takes the idealisation to prescibe the way that the
system should behave. The mechanic has a concept of error for the system; the scientist
has only a concept of error for the idealisation - the laws of nature cannot break down.
Notice that, despite these very different conceptions of error, both mechanic and scientist
use the same principles to understand the system. The difference lies purely in their atti¬
tudes to the divergence of system and idealisation.
Similarly, different attitudes may be taken to informational idealisations. As "scientists", if
the idealisation departs from the observed behaviour, we modify the informational idealisa¬
tion so that information flow is veridical. The idealisation is treated as a flawed description
of the system. As "mechanics" we view the idealisation as a specification of the informa¬
tional properties that the system should respect. Rather than modify the idealisation, we
modify the system - we repair a broken thermometer so that it again carries information
about the temperature; we insist that deceitful children promise to tell the truth in future, so
that their utterances carry information about their actions. It is the mechanic, rather than
the scientist, who has a notion of breakdown of information flow, of misinformation, as
failure of a system to live up to its informational specification. As before, no special prin¬
ciples are required to handle errorful systems - simply a change in attitude to the system.
Adopting the prescriptive stance finesses both the Detectability and Misrepresentation Prob¬
lems. An informational idealisation according to which a metal detector (or the belief that a
ferret or granny is present) is simply taken to prescribe that the state of the detector (belie!)
should track the relevant the presence of metal (or a ferret or granny), rather than the way
in which it does behave. So failures of both detection and misrepresentation in no way
undermine the validity of the idealisation. A burglar alarm is ipso facto intended to sound
when and only when burglars enter the premises - so under an appropriate prescriptive
informational idealisation, the sounding of the alarm should carry the information that a
burglar has entered the premises in digital form. However, in practice, of course, burglars
are very adept at disabling burglar alarms before they enter, and burglar alarms are notori¬
ously prone to going off spuriously. The actual behaviour of a burglar alarm departs very
severely from the prescriptive informational idealisation which describes its function.
So the answer to our first question - how do we account for error on an informational
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account - turns out to be remarkably easy. Rather than necessitating the enrichment of the
theoretical apparatus of the theory, all that is required is a change in attitude to the relation¬
ship between the idealisation and what is idealised.
Now let us turn to our second question: given the phenomenon of misattunement, how can
a naturalised informational account of propositional attitudes be provided? The problem is
that the belief that granny is present, or that there is a pen in front of me seems to be only
very loosely tied to granny being present or there being a pen in front of me - so the infor¬
mation that granny is present, or that there is a pen in front of me, will typically not be car¬
ried at all, let alone in digital form. According to a descriptive stance, this has the conse¬
quence that, according to an informational account, the relevant beliefs does not really have
the content that granny is present, or that there is a pen in front of me, after all (but rather
some much weaker content). If I can't tell granny from a hologram of granny then it seems
that when granny walks in I have the correct belief that granny_or_hologram_of_granny
(and other grannyish looking things), rather than the false belief that granny is present (this
is what Fodor (1987) terms the "Disjunction Problem").
According to a prescriptive stance, by contrast, that such and such a belief should track the
presence of granny, or that there is a pen in front of me, is a specification of the way that
the belief should be tokened. Insofar as the belief is not tokened when it should be, or is
tokened when it should not, then perceptual-cognitive mechanisms which mediate the
fixation of belief are seen as malfunctioning, as being in error, as being misattuned to the
state of the environment. Since, in talk about belief, we continually talk of ignorance and
misrepresentation, it is clearly the prescriptive rather than the descriptive stance that is
appropriate.
In attempting to provide a naturalised informational account of propositional attitudes, we
must ask not what information some internal structure is responding to, but rather what
informational it is supposed to be responding to. That is, we require a naturalised account
of the purpose of internal states. Needless to say, this is a very hard problem indeed, and it
may legitimately be doubted whether or not a single, definitive answer is possible in princi¬
ple.
It is relatively easy to provide some kind of account of the purpose of the fire alarm or
some other artifact, in terms of the purpose that the designer had in mind, during the pro¬
cess of invention (or is it the purpose for which it is reproduced by the manufacturer, or
the purpose for which it is sold by the retailer, or the purpose for which it is used by the
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homeowner, or some combination one or more of these). Such accounts are easy to formu¬
late (if not easy to agree upon!) precisely because the desired explanation need not be
naturalistic - that is, we can freely advert to the intentions of the designer, manufacturer,
retailer and homeowner. The purpose of an artifact such as a fire alarm is (at least argu¬
ably) derivative on the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Here, however, we are
concerned with an account of precisely the semantic properties of these attitudes - the
explanation of which must, therefore, be conducted in wholly non-intentional (naturalistic)
terms.
In these terms, the goal of providing a naturalised informational account of the semantics of
mental states crucially involves specifying what it is that makes this or that token of a men¬
tal state have this or that purpose. In other words, the question is: in virtue of what is it
that presciptive idealisations can be assigned to tokens of mental states? Seen in these
terms, it is hardly surprising that the task is so arduous - it is after all, a special case of the
general problem of providing physicalistic basis for purposive explanation.
There have, nonetheless, been a variety of recent proposals about how naturalisation may
proceed. In the present terms, each amounts to an attempt to provide a naturalistic account
of what determines the prescriptive idealisation appropriate to the tokening of some internal
state. Most accounts have taken the relevant prescriptive idealisation to be specified pre¬
cisely by the relevant descriptive idealisation in some subclass of situations that the organ¬
ism encounters. That is, within this subclass the process of belief fixation is assumed to
track the state of the world as required - error occurs only when the organism is in a situa¬
tion not in that subclass. The relevant subclass has variously been identified as the class of
situations in which perceptual conditions are optimal (Fodor, 1984) or, as we saw above,
with some fixed learning period (Dretske, 1981). A related approach is to attempt to
characterise the purpose of some token as what it is naturally selected for (Millikan, 1984;
Israel, 1987; though see Fodor, 1989). A further recent proposal (Fodor, 1987, 1989)
appeals to an alleged asymmetry in the counterfactual properties of the laws which relate
"true" and "false" tokenings. The claim is that the dependencies inducing "false" tokens are
produced is parasitic on the dependency in virtue of which "true" tokens are produced.
Each of these proposals is extremely controversial, and the intricate and unresolved debate
as to their relative merits is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is not unreasonable
to speculate that, given the disarray and fierceness of the debate, together with the intrinsic
difficulty of the problem, that it is, to put it mildly, unlikely that the question of how or
whether a naturalistic informational account of propositional attitudes may be provided will
be speedily resolved.
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6.9 Information and Psychology (Again)
It was noted above that, prima facie, the application of informational notions to psychology
requires a detailed understanding of the nature of mental states and the mental processes
operating over them - and that this is an understanding that we simply do not have. Hence,
an assessment of the value of informational notions to the understanding of mentation may
be premature. According to the advocates of a realist construal of folk-psychology, there
must be mental states which correspond to the contents of propositional attitudes and an
important test of the applicability of informational notions to psychology is the feasibility
of the reconstruction of propositional attitudes in informational terms. Yet even here, we
have seen that given the problems raised by Detectability and Misrepresentation, it is
extremely unclear whether or not an informational account is viable.
On a more positive note, we have seen that many of Dretske's ideas, despite certain
difficulties in their original formulations, can be formalised in propositional logic. The ori¬
ginal definitions of information content and the analog-digital distinction were recast, and
we were forced to recognise that the informational properties of a situation are necessarily
idealisation-relative, and cannot be ascribed absolutely. Idealisation relativity was found to
have significant implications for the application of informational ideas to information pro¬
cessing in general and human cognition in particular. For example, we found that
Dretske's distinction between perception and cognition can be manipulated almost arbi¬
trarily, by varying the informational idealisation chosen. Further, the notion of idealisation
relativity is able to subsume the apparent knowledge dependence of informational proper¬
ties. As we saw in the case of the cups and the peanuts, the knowledge of the cognitive
agent involved crucially determines what is an appropriate idealisation of the situation, and,
of course, which idealisation is chosen affects the informational properties that are ascribed.
The importance of the what the cognitive agent knows is that it constrains the way in
which the theory is appropriately applied - the agent's knowledge plays no direct role in
the theory of information content. The primacy of idealisation relativity and knowledge
relativity is more than a terminological change. Firstly, many different knowledge states of
the observer may correspond to the same informational idealisation - since, for example,
much of a cognitive agent's knowledge will be irrelevant. Secondly, the import of idealisa¬
tion relativity is more general than that of knowledge relativity, and applies equally to
situations in which there are no cognitive agents. Thirdly, only by putting considerations
of knowledge outside the domain of the theory of information can a formal account of
information content be provided. As we have seen, however, the realisation that informa¬
tional properties are idealisation relative creates severe difficulties for the direct application
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of informational ideas to the study of mind.
It is perhaps disappointing that we can do no more than draw the weak conclusion that the
value of the application of informational ideas to understanding mental life is undecided. So
whether or not the brain may be appropriately (parsimoniously, predictively, explanatorily)
described as processing information, in the sense which we have discussed here, must
remain an open question. Since we have only the tentative beginnings of a theory of infor¬
mation and only the most naive understanding of mentation, it is perhaps only to be
expected that the degree to which the one can illuminate the other is unclear. This unclarity
will be resolved as our theories of information become less tentative, and our understanding
of mentation becomes less naive. This thesis is intended to make a small contribution to
the former project, and derivatively perhaps also to the latter.
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